

The Handbooks of Moral and Political Philosophy



Number 4
Plato & Aristotle

**The Handbooks of Moral and Political Philosophy
Four - Plato & Aristotle
by Roger Solt**

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
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INTRODUCTION

Plato and Aristotle are unquestionably the two most influential figures in the Western philosophical tradition. Coming near the beginning of that tradition, they set the terms for most of the philosophical debates which would follow them, and their influence remains strongly felt down to the present. Both men were comprehensive philosophical thinkers, and much of their thought is not really relevant to our purposes. And indeed, many of their scientific and cosmological theories are now badly outdated. But their ethical and political thought remains very much alive and is strongly relevant to the debates of our day. This introduction offers a brief outline of their respective moral and political theories and will also comment briefly on contemporary applications of their ideas. This discussion will, of course, be far from comprehensive, and it makes no claim to be a substitute for one of the many good introductions to Platonic and Aristotelian thought available elsewhere. Its main purpose is to provide a context for the evidence found in this volume and also to place Plato and Aristotle's ideas into the context of contemporary academic debate.

PLATO

Plato was born into an aristocratic Athenian family around 427 B.C. As a young man, he was heavily influenced by Socrates, who was another, considerably older, Athenian philosopher. In 399 B.C., Socrates was executed for alleged impiety and for corrupting youth. Socrates' death, as well as Plato's family background, undoubtedly contributed to his subsequently expressed distaste for democracy. Plato himself had a long philosophical career, much of it lived out in the school which he founded, the Academy. Plato died in 347 B.C.

The Platonic writings which we possess are mainly in the form of dialogues, works which have long been praised for their dramatic and literary artistry. The dialogue form (which would be successfully employed by such later thinkers as Berkeley and Hume) is ideal for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints, for exploring, without necessarily committing oneself to, various ideas. This can create problems, of course, in terms of determining the actual position of the author of the work. This is complicated, in Plato's case, by the fact that he does not appear in his own dialogues. Instead, the central figure, in most if not all of the Platonic dialogues, is Socrates. For the most part it seems clear that Socrates is Plato's spokesman, but it is far less clear which of the ideas Socrates expresses in the dialogues were actually his own. It is commonly felt that in the early dialogues (including "the Apology," "the Crito," and "the Phaedo") Socrates is mainly expressing ideas which are close to his own. But in the later dialogues (such as "the Laws"), it seems likely that it is mainly Plato's own thoughts which are being expressed. In those dialogues written in the middle of Plato's career (of which "the Republic" is most important for our purposes), the line between Socrates' thought and Plato's is probably impossible to draw. Though they may in fact have differed about some important matters, they have been so closely associated in the philosophical tradition that they can, for most purposes, be treated as a single figure.

Plato's moral and political philosophy is set forth most strikingly in "the Republic." One important element is his theory of the Forms. The Forms (or Ideas) constitute the essence of something. Thus, for example, the Form of the chair embodies the idea of "chairness"--that is, the essence of what a chair is, rather than any particular chair. We tend to think of such ideas as simply being abstractions derived from a large number of particular cases, but for Plato the Forms are what is truly real. Particular chairs, to continue our example, are merely copies, or imitations, of the ultimate Form, "chair." This theory has moral significance because for Plato the most important Form is the Form of the Good. This means that for Plato the Good has an objective, transhuman existence, and it is up to each person to try to understand, and thereby live in accordance with the Idea of the Good.

A second important theme in Plato is his moral psychology or anatomy of the self. The self (or soul), as Plato describes it, is made up of a desiring element, a "spirited" element, and a rational element. The desiring element seems to correspond to the Freudian id; it is the location of the various instinctual drives. The spirited element seems to correspond to the emotions (especially aggressive emotions like those associated with the "military spirited"). The rational element seems to correspond with the self-conscious, reasoning ego. Though all three elements are clearly important, Plato believed that in a "just" person reason must rule the other two elements. This moral rationalism stands in strong contrast with a position such as Hume's, which views reason as merely the tool (or slave) of the passions.

The idea of justice within the self is paralleled by Plato's idea of justice within a larger society. Plato defends a social order structured around three classes. First, there is to be a working class, which corresponds to the desiring element in the soul. Second, there is a military class, corresponding to the soul's spirited element. Finally, third, there is to be a class of guardians, or rulers, who embody the reason or intelligence of the society. Social justice, in Plato's view, consists in each element of the body politic performing its assigned role. Thus, rulers should rule, soldiers should fight, and workers should work. Furthermore, the three classes in Plato's city are to be largely hereditary. Plato seems to allow for a small amount of social mobility, but only early in life.

The greatest benefit of this system seems to be, for Plato, that it allows for rule by the wise, those who possess true knowledge because they comprehend the Forms. The ideal form of rule, therefore, is rule by a philosopher king, that is, rule by the wisest individual available.

Plato's republic is designed to maximize social stability. Having grown up in the highly volatile world of Athenian politics, stability seems to have been Plato's primary political value, and in order to assure it, he was willing to go to considerable extremes. The Republic relies heavily on censorship and indoctrination. And, among the guardians, at least, he goes so far as to call for the abolition of the family, the family being seen as a major source of factional violence and division.

There are, of course, many criticisms of this theory. One, advanced most forcefully by Karl Popper, is that Plato's Republic would be essentially totalitarian. According to this argument, Plato completely subordinates the individual self to the collective whole. For Popper, this is fundamentally equivalent to modern fascism or communism.

Second, Plato's Republic is widely criticized for being anti-democratic. Thinkers from Aristotle to Rawls have noted that there is value in political participation in and of itself. Also, it can be argued that democracy is justified because human interests are naturally divergent. By this logic, there is no one "right" decision which the wise are most likely to find. Rather, there are a plurality of competing interests, each of which deserves recognition, and which it is the task of politics to reconcile.

Third, Plato's "utopia" seems to be almost totally stagnant, both politically and culturally. In the interests of stability, virtually all innovations are to be suppressed. There seems to be no place in this society for the kind of creative greatness which Mill, for example, extolled. And it might further be questioned whether such a static system could effectively adapt to a changing environment.

A fourth criticism is that Plato entrenches a class hierarchy. What he offers is essentially a caste system, with rigid subordination of workers and very little social mobility.

From most contemporary viewpoints, these indictments of Plato's politics are compelling, if not devastating. But Plato does have contemporary defenders. One such defender, Robin Barrow, attempts to justify Plato's politics along basically utilitarian lines. Thus, Barrow argues first that for Plato happiness is the ultimate value. Second, happiness is said to depend critically on social stability. Third, in contrast to the closed or tribal society Plato recommends, the open society of modern democratic liberalism is said to breed unhappiness. Many of the common criticisms of contemporary culture are quite compatible with a Platonic perspective. Those who view modern society as overly competitive, too commercial, too selfish, and too atomistic have much in common with Plato. Fourth, it can be argued that Plato's society is just because it aims at the overall welfare and happiness of its members--and that such happiness is best achieved if people have assigned roles and therefore know what is expected of them. Finally, it can be claimed that Plato's theory possesses some egalitarian elements. Plato essentially separates wealth and power; the guardians are in effect a priesthood, not a plutocracy. Plato's attitude towards women was also enlightened for his time. Women are to receive the same education as men and are viewed as potential rulers. Finally, the system is egalitarian because it aims at the overall good, the organic unity and preservation of the society.

The historian Will Durant argues that a system similar to Plato's was in place throughout the Middle Ages with the Catholic Church assuming the role of the guardians. Communism also has a distinctly Platonic flavor, especially in a Leninist version which stresses the role of a vanguard or communist elite. Thus, in a certain sense, it seems fair to say that Plato's Republic is "practical." To liberal sensibilities, of course, this all reeks a bit too much of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, but given the postmodern attack on liberalism, it may be that some elements of Plato's perspective will again become more common. (There is even a recent book, titled POSTMODERN PLATOS, which details the view of Plato found in such thinkers as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida.)

How can Plato's views be used in contemporary debate? First, the Platonic perspective provides the basis for a critique of liberal democracy--as too unstable, too narcissistic, and unable to produce happiness. Second, Plato's political views offer resources for those who wish to defend some form of communitarianism. Plato clearly stressed the good of the whole over the parts, society over the individual. Third, Plato offers the basis for a critique of liberal education. Social stability is seen as requiring virtue, and to achieve virtue even indoctrination is seen as legitimate. Fourth, Plato also offers justifications for censorship and various restrictions on the first amendment. If happiness is primary and if stability is key to happiness, then freedom, including freedom of speech, becomes logically subordinate.

One modern theory of justice which draws significantly from Plato has been advanced by the philosopher Robert Solomon. In *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, Solomon takes aim at social contract theory in particular and, more generally, at theories of justice which he sees as overly rationalistic. Justice, Solomon believes, must also be based on the emotions, especially emotions of altruism and empathy which he sees as more "natural" than Hobbesian egoism. In Solomon's account, Plato is praised as someone who called for the harmonization of reason and emotion. Though Solomon would presumably reject most of the details of Plato's Republic, he seems sympathetic to Plato's moral psychology.

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle was born in the town of Stagira in Macedonia in 384 B.C. As a young man, he moved to Athens and studied for a number of years with Plato at the Academy. The activities of his later life include a stint as tutor to Alexander the Great and the opening of his own school in Athens, the Lyceum. Aristotle died in 322 B.C.

Aristotle was a man of incredibly wide intellectual interests. He was the greatest logician of antiquity and one of the greatest of natural scientists. Indeed, it may have been a historical misfortune that he was so far ahead of his time in the field of the sciences. When Aristotelian thought was revived in the Middle Ages, he became so much of an authority that his thought became a barrier to intellectual advance. Thus, it was necessary to most of the major figures in early modern thought to rebel against the influence of Aristotle in order to develop their own ideas. This process of rebellion also led to certain exaggerations and distortions. For Aristotle is, in many ways, the most "modern" thinker of the ancient world. Not only did he have strong scientific interests--his approach to ethics and politics displays a strongly empirical bent, making him a seminal figure in the social as well as the natural sciences. But while his contributions to the natural sciences have been far surpassed by more recent scientific research, his ethical and political thought remains highly influential. It is to a brief outline of these theories that we now turn.

In ethics, Aristotle stressed first and foremost that happiness is the ultimate value for each person. Happiness is the one good which is complete and self-sufficient in itself; it is also the one good at which everyone aims. This seems like a straightforward teaching, but there are certain ambiguities here. The Greek word which is commonly translated into English as happiness is "eudaimonia." Apparently in the original Greek, this term conveys less the sense of subjective well-being which we associate with "happiness" and more the sense of an overall successful life, a life which has turned out well. One thing which Aristotle is definitely not is a hedonist. He regarded pleasure as a good, but definitely not as the only or the greatest good.

Second, Aristotle appears to have been, in at least a certain sense, an ethical egoist. For him, each person properly seeks his or her own happiness as the ultimate end. This Aristotelian egoism is tempered by his commitment to virtue and to politics, but Aristotle's ethic is definitely pre-Christian, what Nietzsche called a master rather than a slave morality. Justice is a central virtue for Aristotle, but charity is not.

Third, Aristotle is an ethical naturalist; that is, he believes there are objective moral standards based on human nature. Thus, there is in Aristotle little if any of the modern distinction (found, for example, in Hume and Moore) between facts and values. What ought to be is directly determined by what is.

This leads us to Aristotle's concept of human nature. For him, humans are rational animals. That is, they are animals whose distinguishing feature, or particular excellence, involves their use of reason.

And what the use of reason reveals for Aristotle is that life should be lived in accordance with the virtues. Again, translation poses something of a problem here. The Greek word which is commonly translated as "virtue" is "arete." But for Aristotle the virtue of something is its particular excellence. Thus, to live a life of complete virtue is to live the highly successful life of an excellent human being.

This is rather abstract, of course, and in practice Aristotle recommended the standard set of Greek virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, as well as others. Perhaps Aristotle's most distinctive contribution to the theory of the virtues is his doctrine of the mean. Each virtue, he argued, represents a mean between two opposing vices. Thus, for example, courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice.

Turning to his politics, Aristotle's first key point is again an appeal to human nature. People are by nature political animals, that is, living creatures who find their proper fulfillment in a political community. It follows from this that Aristotle sees government as both necessary and desirable. Not just a necessary evil, it is needed for full human flourishing.

Second, in his politics at least Aristotle is something of a communitarian. He insists that the good of the political whole is a greater good than the good of particular individuals. While his subordination of the individual is far less extreme than that of Plato, he sees the good of the individual as definitely subordinate to the good of the community.

Third, this means that Aristotle is willing to engage in a good deal of social control. He believes, for example, that the state should enforce virtue and attempt to suppress vice. Again, he is less extreme than Plato here, but still far from being a modern civil libertarian.

Still, Aristotle does uphold, to some extent at least, the standard Lockean natural rights. He recognizes liberty as a good (though only a limited good), and he upholds the value of private property. He also defends the institution of the family and rejects Plato's communism.

One of Aristotle's greatest legacies is his development of the idea of constitutionalism, meaning both the basic structure and the written charter of a political entity. Aristotle distinguishes between six basic types of constitution. Rule can be held by one person, by a few, or by many. Second, in each of these cases, the goal of such rule can be either the benefit of the whole community or it can be the benefit of a particular segment of that community. For Aristotle, who rules seems less important than the objectives at which they aim. Thus, there are three kinds of good constitution: kingship, aristocracy, and polity. And there are three kinds of bad constitution: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Aristotle also recognizes that there are certain constitutions of a mixed type, incorporating elements from one or more of the ideal types. In theory he recommends kingship as the best possible constitution, for reasons similar to Plato's -- where one man is the best and the wisest, he should rule. (Rule by women is not something Aristotle ever seems to entertain.) But, in practice, he recognizes that wider political participation is likely to be desirable. Though he is a critic of direct democracy (viewed as a system in which the masses place their own interests above the good of the whole), he might not have objected to the kind of modern representative democracy we now employ. (In Aristotle's terms, this seems to be a mixed system, with a definite aristocratic element.) The problem with representative democracy which Aristotle is likely to have seen is that it so limits the ability of most people to participate meaningfully in politics, an objection which goes, of course, to the heart of the distinction between the modern nation state and the small city state with which Aristotle was concerned.

Finally, in accordance with his constitutionalism, Aristotle is strongly committed to the rule of law. But even here, his views are pragmatic and flexible. Law, he argues, must be tempered by considerations of equity. No law can cover the full range of potential situations; thus, legal flexibility is required.

I want to turn now to some characteristic criticisms of Aristotle's ethics and politics. First, contemporary ethical thought tends to reject Aristotle's naturalism; that is, it argues that there is no pre-determined human nature or "essence." Sartrean existentialism, for instance, insists that "existence precedes essence"--that is, our life experience determines who we are, not some a priori element such as rationality.

Second, it can certainly be claimed that happiness is not the ultimate value. The Kantian, deontological argument here would be that right action (action in accordance with duty), not good or pleasant outcomes, is what morally matters. Ethical subjectivists, such as Nietzsche, Sartre, Bertrand Russell, and J.L. Mackie, would argue that values are chosen rather than objectively discovered. Happiness may be one value, but there are others (piety, rectitude, achievement, etc), and the values which I choose to live by are simply a matter of my subjective choice.

Third, it can be argued that my personal happiness is not, at any rate, paramount. The utilitarians think that it isn't a moral choice to be prejudiced in favor of my own happiness. The moral point of view requires impartiality, and this means that I should give equal weight to the happiness of others.

Fourth, it is commonly argued that Aristotle exaggerates reason. Again, the Humean view that reason is merely instrumental and the passions primary has relevance here. And the concept of reason has, of course, become far more problematic. Since Freud, there has been far more of a tendency to stress the importance of irrational factors in human life. And much of postmodern thought, of course, displays a considerable skepticism towards "reason."

The doctrine of the mean has been widely criticized on a variety of grounds. Some regard it as trivial, simply a moral truism which fails to enlighten. Others indict its quasi-mathematical formulation. Still others believe that the two opposing vices are really two different evils which virtue stands in opposition to. Finally, the idea of virtue as a mean works less well with certain virtues, such as wisdom and justice, than with others, such as courage and temperance. It's hard to imagine being too wise or too just.

Aristotle's politics also come in for criticism from a wide range of political perspectives. Egalitarians stress Aristotle's defense of slavery, his elitism, and his outdated attitude toward women. Aristotle, in this view is simply a conservative defender of class rule. Libertarians tend to admire Aristotle's ethics, but they would see him as giving far too much power to the state. Finally, there is the problem of relating Aristotle's politics of the Greek city state to the modern world.

Perhaps the strongest defense of Aristotle is simply to point out that his ideas are still taken seriously; thus, rather than reviewing each of the charges noted above, I want to turn now to some contemporary applications of Aristotelian theory. Each application constitutes, in a sense, a defense of at least some element of the Aristotelian approach.

One of the major developments in ethics over the past several decades has been the revival of "aretaic" or virtue ethics. Aristotelian thought has been central to this project. Virtue ethics stand in contrast to the ethics of acts and rules. Both modern consequentialism and modern deontology are largely rule-based systems, setting forth particular standards for how people should act. For utilitarians, the basic moral rule is the principle of utility: seek to maximize overall happiness (i.e., produce the greatest good for the greatest number). Kant, in contrast, offers the categorical imperative, in its various formulations, as the basic rule of moral conduct. (Always act on the basis of universalizable maxims; treat all people as ends in themselves.) One problem with rule ethics, it is argued, is that they tell us what to do but not what kind of people we should be. We might, for example, act out of a sense of duty without feeling the slightest bit of compassion or empathy for other people. In contrast, virtue ethics insists that we should focus on being rather than doing. We should cultivate the classic virtues, which are seen not as rules of conduct but as ongoing dispositions toward right action. Rather than relying on rigid rules, we should be guided by models of virtuous behavior --Jesus and Socrates come to mind as obvious examples.

Virtue ethics are sometimes associated with political communitarianism. (One author who makes this connection is Alasdair MacIntyre.) Aristotle's affinities with communitarian thought have already been noted. Aristotle is sometimes criticized for simply having accepted the moral standards of Athens in the fourth century B.C. But according to communitarians this is precisely how ethical thought should proceed--by being grounded in a particular cultural and community tradition. (The greatest failure of modernity, in MacIntyre's view, is precisely this loss of a moral tradition.) Also, of course, Aristotle's emphasis on the primacy of the political whole over particular individual interests is quite appealing to communitarians.

Objectivists and libertarians have also drawn on Aristotle. For Ayn Rand, Aristotle was virtually the sole intellectual influence who she would acknowledge. Much contemporary libertarian thought is grounded in ethical egoism, and here again Aristotle is an important influence.

Even liberal egalitarians have found something in Aristotle. In his theory of justice, John Rawls makes considerable use of what he calls "the Aristotelian principle." What he means by this is basically that humans find fulfillment by engaging in a complex range of activities. In Aristotelian terms, humans are functional beings who achieve happiness by exercising their characteristic excellences. For Rawls, one hallmark of a good society is that it allows for this kind of human flourishing, and, of course, he believes that his principles of "justice as fairness" provide the basic structure for such a society.

If any political label can be properly applied to Aristotle it is probably "conservative." (Of course, Aristotle is far removed from the anti-intellectualism defended and displayed by many conservatives.) So not surprisingly, Aristotle has played a role in the revival of contemporary conservative thought. Leo Strauss, Hanna Arendt, and Eric Voeglin are all recent political thinkers who display a strong Aristotelian influence.

Aristotelian thought is not only useful, however, in terms of supporting constructive positions; it also can be used to indict many contemporary theories. When critical legal studies indicts the rule of law, an Aristotelian defense is available. Likewise, when postmodernists attack reason, Aristotle offers intellectual resources to those seeking a response. In sum, the thought of Aristotle (and of Plato) is not of merely antiquarian interest. In many ways the contemporary debate between reason and skepticism which now has postmodernism at its center also took place in ancient Greece. There the leading skeptics were the sophists (men such as Protagoras, Thrysamachus, Gorgias, and Hippias, many of whom appear in the Platonic dialogues), and the great defenders of reason were Plato and Aristotle. As central sources of the Western intellectual tradition, Aristotle and Plato are pivotal reference points both for those who want to attack that tradition and those who wish to defend it. Their thought also provides an important counterpoint to the moral and political theories of the early modern period. Their virtue ethics stand in sharp contrast to the rule-ethics of Bentham and Kant. And their naturalistic and communitarian politics is an important alternative to the conventionalist and individualist politics of such social contract thinkers as Hobbes and Locke. If contemporary academic debate has not yet rediscovered classical moral and political thought, it's time that it did.

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MPP4-1 THE GREATEST GOOD IS HAPPINESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.66.

Since all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what do we take to be the end of political science - what is the highest of all practical goods? Well, so far as the name goes there is pretty general agreement. 'It is happiness', say both ordinary and cultured people; and they identify happiness with living well or doing well.

MPP4-2 HAPPINESS IS THE ULTIMATE GOOD FOR HUMANS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.73.

What is the Good for man? It must be the ultimate end or object of human life: something that is in itself completely satisfying. Happiness fits this description.

MPP4-3 HAPPINESS IS THE ONLY GOOD PURSUED SOLELY FOR ITSELF

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.73-4.

Now we call an object pursued for its own sake more final than one pursued because of something else, and one which is never choosable because of another more final than those which are choosable because of it as well as for their own sakes; and that which is always choosable for its own sake and never because of something else we call final without any qualification. Well, happiness more than anything else is thought to be just such an end, because we always choose it for itself, and never for any other reason. It is different with honour, pleasure, intelligence and good qualities] generally. We do choose them partly for themselves (because we should choose each one of them irrespectively of any consequences); but we choose them also for the sake of our happiness, in the belief that they will be instrumental in promoting it. On the other hand nobody chooses happiness for their sake, or in general for any other reason.

MPP4-4 HAPPINESS IS PERFECT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.74.

A self-sufficient thing, then, we take to be one which by itself makes life desirable and in no way deficient; and we believe that happiness is such a thing. What is more, we regard it as the most desirable of all things, not reckoned as one item among many; if it were so reckoned, happiness would obviously be more desirable by the addition of even the least good, because the addition makes the sum of goods greater, and the greater of two goods is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed.

MPP4-5 EVERYTHING IS ULTIMATELY DONE FOR THE SAKE OF HAPPINESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.87.

For us it is clear, from what has been said already, that happiness is one of those things that are precious and perfect. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that it is a first principle, since everything else that any of us do, we do for its sake; and we hold that the first principle and cause of what is good is precious and divine.

MPP4-6 ONLY HAPPINESS IS SOUGHT AS AN END IN ITSELF

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.327.

For we choose practically everything for the sake of something else, except happiness, because it is the end. To spend effort and toil for the sake of amusement seems silly and unduly childish; but on the other hand the maxim of Anacharsis, 'Play to work harder', seems to be on the right lines, because amusement is a form of relaxation, and people need relaxation because they cannot exert themselves continuously. Therefore relaxation is not an end, because it is taken for the sake of the activity. But the happy life seems to be lived in accordance with goodness, and such a life implies seriousness and does not consist in amusing oneself.

MPP4-7 HAPPINESS IS AN END IN ITSELF

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.326.

We said, then, that happiness is not a state, since if it were it might belong even to a man who slept all through his life, passing a vegetable existence; or to a victim of the greatest misfortunes. So if this is unacceptable, and we ought rather to refer happiness to some activity, as we said earlier, and if activities are either necessary and to be chosen for the sake of something else, or to be chosen for themselves: clearly we must class happiness as one of those to be chosen for themselves, and not as one of the other kind, because it does not need anything else: it is self-sufficient. The activities that are to be chosen for themselves are those from which nothing is required beyond the exercise of the activity; and such a description is thought to fit actions that accord with goodness; because the doing of fine and good actions is one of the things that are to be chosen for themselves.

MPP4-8 ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.84.

We are now in a position to define the happy men as 'one who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and who is adequately furnished with external goods, and that not for some unspecified period but throughout a complete life'.

MPP4-9 ARISTOTELIAN HAPPINESS IMPLIES A BROAD SENSE OF WELL-BEING

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.46.

But there is another view of the relation of happiness to pleasure, which is described by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (388-322 B.C.) in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. "Happiness," runs the usual translation of the first sentence in Aristotle's ethics, "is that at which all men aim." But "happiness" is not a very satisfactory translation of the Greek word *eudaimonia*, for which there is no satisfactory English equivalent, but which has to do with a state of personal well-being. Physicians have standards for physical health -- feeling good, having all one's bodily parts functioning well together, not feeling much bodily discomfort. Similarly, there are standards (though more vague) for mental health -- having a feeling of self-worth or self-esteem, setting goals and trying to achieve them, feeling a zest for life, radiating energy, being a "positive" kind of person. These would be more modern formulations of what Aristotle had in mind in speaking of *eudaimonia* (having a "good spirit").

MPP4-10 LIVING WELL IS THE ULTIMATE END IN ITSELF

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.72-3.

The right end that all of us ought to pursue is a good life. Aristotle's reasoning on this point is simple and, I think, convincing. Let me summarize it. There are certain things we do in order just to live -- such things as nourishing and caring for our bodies and keeping them healthy, for the sake of which most of us have to work to earn the money we need to buy food, clothing, and shelter. There are other things we do in order to live well. We make the effort to get an education because we think that knowing more than is necessary just to keep alive enriches our life. We do not need certain pleasures in order to keep alive, but having them certainly makes life richer and better. Both living and living well are ends for which we have to find the means. But living, or keeping alive, is itself a means to living well. It is impossible to live well without staying alive -- as long as possible or, at least, as long as it seems desirable to do so. Living, I have just said, is a means to living well. But what is living well a means to? There can be no answer to that question, Aristotle tells us, because living well is an end in itself, an end we seek for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else or for any ulterior purpose. Anything else that we can think of, anything else that we call good or desirable, is a means either to living or to living well. We can think of living as a means to living well, but we cannot think of living well as a means to anything else.

MPP4-11 HAPPINESS IS WHAT EVERYONE ULTIMATELY DESIRES

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.73.

Aristotle thinks that that should be obvious to all of us. He also thinks that our common experience shows that all of us do, in fact, agree about it. The word he uses for living well (or for a good life) has usually been translated into English by the word "happiness." Happiness, Aristotle says, is that which everyone seeks. No one, if asked whether he wants happiness, would say, "No, I want misery instead." In addition, no one, if asked why he wants happiness, can give a reason for wanting it. The only reason for wanting it would have to be some more ultimate end, for the achievement of which happiness is a means. But no more ultimate end exists. There is nothing beyond happiness, or a good life, for which happiness can serve as a means.

MPP4-12 THE GOOD IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE DESIRABLE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.76.

We know from common experience that individuals differ in their desires. We also know that in our everyday speech we use the word "good" as a label for the things we regard as desirable. If we look upon one thing as more desirable than another, we regard it as better. And of several desirable things, the one we desire most is best in our eyes. Reflection on these facts of common experience and common speech led Aristotle to the common-sense conclusion that the two notions -- the good and the desirable -- are inseparably connected. As axiomatic as Euclid's "the part is less than the whole" and "the whole is greater than the part" are "the good is desirable" and "the desirable is good."

MPP4-13 JEFFERSON'S VIEW OF THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IS ARISTOTELIAN

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.85.

To fulfill that duty or obligation, we need whatever is indispensable to making a good life for ourselves -- we need the real goods that, taken all together, constitute or make up happiness or a good life. That is why we have a right to them. If we did not have the obligation to try to live well and if we did not need certain things in order to do so, we would not have the right to them that Thomas Jefferson asserted all of us have. Thomas Jefferson thought that all human beings, having the same human nature, had the same natural rights. That amounts to saying that they all have the same natural needs -- that what is really good for any one human being is really good for all human beings. To this extent, Thomas Jefferson appears to have adopted Aristotle's view that the pursuit of happiness involves all human beings in seeking and trying to obtain the same set of real goods for themselves.

MPP4-14 RATIONALITY IS THE CENTRAL VIRTUE

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *PHILOSOPHY*, 1994, p.486.

First, Aristotle, as the representative of the objectivist and universalist stance in ethics and politics is the first to admit that not everything that is morally right and wrong is universalizable, even though fundamental virtues may be. And in my own position, as well as in the positions of those who share it, rationality is the central virtue -- just as in Aristotle, right reason fills that role. Other virtues are more contextual -- which is entirely consistent with Aristotle and with an Aristotelian approach to moral theory. Moreover, all the virtues spelled out by 'latter day liberal followers' can be conceptually related to the original virtues spelled out by Aristotle.

MPP4-15 HAPPINESS INVOLVES THE EXERCISE OF REASON

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.2.

The eudaimonism of the Ethics is found in Aristotle's statement that eudaimonia is the chief good of human life. He carefully distinguishes between eudaimonia and pleasure, thus contrasting his position with hedonism, the view that pleasure is the good. Eudaimonia is a difficult term, usually translated merely as "happiness." Unlike pleasure, which is confined to limited episodes, eudaimonia is an ingredient in a full life; it is identical with or involved in the activity of reason; and it is a rare and demanding condition.

MPP4-16 THE PROPER END OF HUMAN LIFE INVOLVES EXERCISING REASON

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.2.

The teleology of the Ethics is found in the teaching that man has a function, an end, and that his good is to fulfill it. This function, this end, is the exercise of reason -- man's distinguishing feature. However, Aristotle does not imply that natural ends are conscious purposes. Indeed, human purposes are merely one instance of the sequential ordering of means to ends which pervades nature.

MPP4-17 VIRTUE MEANS THE PERVADING OF DESIRE BY REASON

R.A. Gauthier, French philosopher, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.16.

To avoid any misunderstanding, we should begin here by making two remarks. In the first place, it is important to take note of what separates the Aristotelian conception of rightness of intention from the Kantian conception of purity of intention. For Kant, an intention is pure when the will is determined by the maxim which reason enunciates, no account being taken of inclination. Aristotle could not pose the problem in this way, since he was unaware of the concept of the will; for him, an intention is right when reason has so pervaded desire that this latter is drawn toward the very object that reason prescribes. This pervading of desire by reason is virtue itself, and this is why virtue rectifies intention.

MPP4-18 RATIONALITY IS THE "PECULIAR EXCELLENCE" OF HUMAN BEINGS

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.46-7.

Such a condition is possible only to human beings, because it depends on our peculiarly human nature. What distinguishes human nature and homo sapiens from all the other animals is rationality, the power of reason. Rationality is the distinguishing virtue of our species. "Virtue" isn't quite the word either: the Greek word *arete* means something like "peculiar excellence." The arete of a knife is that it cuts; the arete of a clock is that it tells the time. What, then, is the arete of humankind? Not the fact that we are alive, for life is something we share with all animals, as well as plants. Not the fact that we are sentient (can perceive the world through our senses), for animals, though not plants, have this power also. Our arete lies in something that we alone possess -- our rational faculty, or power of reason. Human beings are rational animals; that is a proper definition of our species. To say that is not to contend that we always use our rational powers; it is only to say that, unlike other creatures, we have such powers and the potentiality for using them.

MPP4-19 HUMANS HAVE A NATURAL DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.78-9.

Earlier in this book, I suggested that human beings differ from other animals by their capacity for asking questions with the aim of acquiring knowledge about themselves and about the world in which they live. Recognizing this fact, Aristotle begins one of his most important books with the sentence. "Man by nature desires to know." He is saying, in other words, that the desire for knowledge is as much a natural need as the desire for food.

MPP4-20 KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL IN THINKING ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE GOOD LIFE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY, 1978, p.88.

To the two kinds of goods that have already been mentioned -- bodily goods and external goods, or wealth -- Aristotle adds a third. These goods he calls goods of the soul. We might refer to them as psychological goods, as we would probably refer to the goods of the body as physical goods. The most obvious of these psychological goods are goods of the mind, such as knowledge of all sorts, including know-how and skill. Among the skills all of us need is certainly the skill of thinking. We need it not only in order to produce well-made things, but also in order to act well and live well.

MPP4-21 ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS FOUND IN THE LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.90.

And in the Nicomachean Ethics he argues that 'happiness' -- the state in which men realise themselves and flourish best -- consists in a life of intellectual activity and contemplation. Is not such a life too godlike for a mere man to sustain? No; for 'we must not listen to those who urge us to think human thoughts since we are human, and mortal thoughts since we are mortal, rather, we should as far as possible immortalise ourselves and do all we can to live by the finest element in us -- for if it is small in bulk, it is far greater than anything else in power and worth'.

MPP4-22 INTELLECTUAL EXCELLENCES ARE WHAT DISTINGUISH HUMANS

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.170-1.

Men are marked off from other animals by possessing reason and the power of thought. Men 'contain something divine -- what we call the intellect is divine', and our intellect is 'the divine within us'. Indeed, 'each of us actually is intellect, since that is our sovereign and best element'. The excellences most properly human, then, are the intellectual excellences, and eudaimonia consists primarily in activity in accordance with those excellences -- it is a form of intellectual activity. 'Thus any choice or possession of the natural goods -- of the body, wealth, friends or any other good -- which will best produce contemplation by the god [that is, by our intellect, the god within us], is best and is the finest standard; and any which, either because of deficiency or because of excess, prevents us from cultivating the god and from contemplating, is bad.'

MPP4-23 INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY IS KEY TO HUMAN FLOURISHING

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.171.

To flourish, to make a success of life, requires engagement in intellectual pursuits. Aristotle thought that such pursuits were immensely enjoyable, and that the intellectual life offered an unparalleled happiness; but his main thesis in the Ethics is not that happiness consists in intellectual activity, but that excellent intellectual activity constitutes success or flourishing for men. The intellectual giants of history may not all have been happy men, but they were all successful men -- they all flourished and achieved eudaimonia.

MPP4-24 THE DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE IS PART OF HUMAN NATURE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.177.

The pleasure of learning is thus an important ingredient in the productive sciences. Contemplation or the actuality of knowing is the prime component of eudaimonia, which is the goal of the practical sciences. Truth and knowledge are the direct aim of the theoretical sciences. The desire for knowledge, which Aristotle thought to be part of every man's nature and which was patently the dominant aspect of his own personality, informs and unifies the tripartite structure of Aristotelian philosophy.

MPP4-25 THE HUMAN GOOD IS THE LIFE ACCORDING TO REASON

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, CLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1989, p.135-6.

Having rejected these two conceptions of happiness, Aristotle offers his own account. He claims that the good for a human being must be the exercise of the human 'function' (or 'characteristic activity', *ergon*). To find a person's function he appeals to his views on the form and essence of a human being. The general view of form implies that a creature's form is the goal, the pattern of activity for which the creature's different states and capacities are organized. The relevant pattern of activity specifying the form or function of a human being is life guided by reason; hence the good for a human being must be a good life guided by reason. A life that is not guided by reason might be good for some other sort of creature, but not for a human being. This sketch of the human good can claim support from the common beliefs that undermined the other two conceptions of happiness. The argument against pleasure suggested that I would be worse off if I sank to the condition of a fool or a child or a victim of severe brain-damage, and no longer realized the capacities of a rational human agent. Mere contentment or pleasure at a low level of rational activity does not seem to be the best condition for a human being; and to that extent we agree with Aristotle in believing that a human being's good must involve some expression of his essentially (though not exclusively) rational nature. Moreover, we reject the Socratic claim, in so far as a virtuous person in unfavourable conditions loses opportunities for rational activity.

MPP4-26 RATIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL DESIRES SHOULD BE HARMONIZED

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.136.

Control and organization should not result in the suppression of non-rational desires, or in a permanent struggle and conflict. The completeness of happiness implies that the satisfaction of non-rational desires -- for example, the desires for food, drink, and sex, or for honour and reputation -- has a legitimate place in a human being's life. A life to which these satisfactions are added is, to that extent, better than one that lacks them; and since happiness is a complete life, it should include these goods. The virtuous person, then, allows the proper place to these nonrational desires, and keeps them in harmony, not in conflict, with his rational plans. When Aristotle says that virtue should aim at a 'mean' (or 'intermediate state') of feelings and appetites, between total suppression and total indulgence, this is the sort of harmony and moderation that he has in mind.

MPP4-27 CONTEMPLATIVE ACTIVITY IS THE HIGHEST FORM OF HAPPINESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.328.

If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable to assume that it is in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether this is the intellect or something else that we regard as naturally ruling and guiding us, and possessing insight into things noble and divine - either as being actually divine itself or as being more divine than any other part of us - it is the activity of this part, in accordance with the virtue proper to it, that will be perfect happiness. We have already said that it is a contemplative activity.

MPP4-28 CONTEMPLATION IS THE HIGHEST FORM OF ACTIVITY

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.328.

For contemplation is both the highest form of activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects that it apprehends are the highest things that can be known), and also it is the most continuous, because we are more capable of continuous contemplation than we are of any practical activity. Also we assume that happiness must contain an admixture of pleasure; now activity in accordance with (philosophic) wisdom is admittedly the most pleasant of the virtuous activities; at any rate philosophy is held to entail pleasures that are marvelous in purity and permanence; and it stands to reason that those who possess knowledge pass their time more pleasantly than those who are still in pursuit of it.

MPP4-29 THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE IS THE HIGHEST

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.330-1.

So if the intellect is divine compared with man, the life of the intellect must be divine compared with the life of a human being. And we ought not to listen to those who warn us that 'man should think the thoughts of man', or 'mortal thoughts fit mortal minds'; but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us; for even if it is small in bulk, in power and preciousness it far excels all the rest. Indeed it would seem that this is the true self of the individual, since it is the authoritative and better part of him; so it would be an odd thing if a man chose to live someone else's life instead of his own. Moreover, what we said above will apply here too: that what is best and most pleasant for any given creature is that which is proper to it. Therefore for man, too, the best and most pleasant life is the life of the intellect, since the intellect is in the fullest sense the man. So this life will also be the happiest.

MPP4-30 ARISTOTLE BELIEVED IN OBJECTIVE MORALITY

R.A. Gauthier, French philosopher, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.18.

In a sense, then, it is accurate to say that for Aristotle it is objective morality which is primary. First of all there are virtuous 'things', that is, objective ways of acting defined and prescribed by reason, of which the very rationality makes up the 'beauty', that is, the value; and it is this objective value which is imparted to our acts by means of intention.

MPP4-31 THE PROPER LIFE PLAN APPLIES TO ALL PERSONS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.81.

Since natural needs, based on our common human capacities and tendencies, are the same in all human beings, what is really good for any one person is really good for any other. That is why human happiness is the same for all human beings: it consists in the possession of all the things that are really good for a person to have, accumulated not at one time but in the course of a lifetime. And that is why the one right plan for living well is the same for all human beings.

MPP4-32 NATURALISM, TELEOLOGY, AND EUDAIMONISM ARE THE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.2.

Naturalism, teleology, and eudaimonism -- together perhaps with the statement that virtue is a mean between extremes -- are the most prominent and characteristic features of Aristotle's moral philosophy. They are the features most readily compared to other moral philosophies, and they may be what the student finds most important.

MPP4-33 ARISTOTLE REJECTS THE FACT/VALUE DISTINCTION

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.148.

Every activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good; for by 'the good' or 'a good' we mean that at which human beings characteristically aim. It is important that Aristotle's initial arguments in the *Ethics* presuppose that what G.E. Moore was to call the 'naturalistic fallacy' is not a fallacy at all and that statements about what is good -- and what is just or courageous or excellent in other ways -- just are a kind of factual statement. Human beings, like the members of all other species, have a specific nature; and that nature is such that they have certain aims and goals, such that they move by nature towards a specific *telos*. The good is defined in terms of their specific characteristics. Hence Aristotle's ethics, expounded as he expounds it, presupposes his metaphysical biology.

MPP4-34 ARISTOTLE IS A MORAL NATURALIST

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.1-2.

Aristotle is fundamentally a "naturalist" because he treats man as a natural creature -- the most highly developed of the animals but still an animal rather than a supernatural soul temporarily sojourning here below. Although Aristotle invites man to become godlike, his appeal is to reason and experience -- not to divine commands or sanctions. The rules which the good man obeys stem from his own reason, not from religious revelation or a vision of transcendental ideals; and the satisfactions of the good life are natural elements of the situation, not divinely bestowed rewards. Consequently, man, like the other animals, can act only through the activation of appetites; moral motivation thus cannot be reduced to the struggle of reason as such against appetites as such. Similarly, since pleasure naturally accompanies the successful completion of characteristic animal and human activities, asceticism is ruled out. Aristotle can also be called "naturalistic" in another sense of the term "naturalism": that is, as contrasted with emotivism or prescriptivism as a theory of the meaning of ethical language. While Aristotle does not explicitly discuss such theories, he seems quite clearly to suppose that a main task of ethical language is to convey empirically determinable facts about human nature rather than to express attitudes or prescribe actions alone.

MPP4-35 ARISTOTLE WAS AN ETHICAL EGOIST

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.31. Aristotle's eudaimonism in fact differs from classical Utilitarianism in one crucial respect which my exposition has so far deliberately suppressed. The happiness which Aristotle expects the virtuous agent to pursue is not, as the Utilitarians would have it, the general happiness of the sentient world, but rather the individual happiness of the agent himself. Happiness is to be my goal, not in the generous sense that I am to aim at a general increase in the commodity, but in the selfish sense that I am to seek the enlargement of my own portion of it. The good man is a producer of happiness - but of his own happiness and not, or at best incidentally, that of others. This theory, which might be called egoistic eudaimonism, is worlds away from the noble sentiments of Bentham and Mill; and it is, I think, well removed from anything that we might be tempted to think of as a system of morality.

MPP4-36 ARISTOTLE RECOMMENDS ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.32-3.

This ambiguity in Aristotle's thought can, I think, be resolved; and its resolution leads to a fuller understanding of Aristotle's task in the *Ethics*. Roughly, the position is this: It is a fact of human nature that men must act for their own happiness - that is to say, men always aim at what they take to be their own happiness; and since nature always arranges things for the best (1099b29), it is a reasonable and proper thing for men to behave in this way. But by and large men have incomplete or mistaken notions of what their happiness consists in; and they find, with dispiriting frequency, that it does not lie where they take it to lie. That fact gives scope for a prescriptive Ethics: Aristotle's prescriptions can serve a practical end by completing and correcting those ordinary notions of happiness; and thus they will ensure a more frequent and a more satisfactory achievement of the natural human end (see I.4) and at the same time enable even the morally fastidious to contemplate with approval our actions of enlightened self-love.

MPP4-37 WE HAVE A DUTY TO MAKE A GOOD LIFE FOR OURSELVES

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.85.

Now if a good life as a whole is one that involves having all the things that are really good for us, then we ought to desire to live well -- to achieve happiness or a good life. Since anything that is really good for us is something we ought to desire, the sum total of real goods is certainly something we ought to desire. The word "ought" expresses the notion of a duty or an obligation. We have a duty or an obligation to do what we ought to do. To say that we ought to pursue happiness as the ultimate goal of our life is to say that we have a duty or obligation to try to live well or to make a good life for ourselves.

MPP4-38 WHILE RIGHTS ARE UNIVERSAL, THE GOOD LIFE FOR ONESELF IS PRIMARY

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.109.

Rights are rights. If any one human being has them, based upon needs that he or she shares in common with all other human beings, then all the others have the same rights, too. It makes no difference whether you think first of your own rights or first of the rights of others. However, there is a sense in which you do come first. First in the order of thinking about what you should do. The ultimate goal that should control all your practical thinking, your choices, and your action is a good life for yourself. You are under an obligation to live as well as it is humanly possible to do -- to obtain and possess, in the course of a lifetime, all the things that are really good for you.

MPP4-39 VIRTUOUS CONDUCT EXPRESSES SELF-LOVE

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS*, 1989, p.36-7.

In reply to Rawls we might begin by noting what Aristotle said on the subject of self-love: . . . if a man were always anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other of the virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself the honorable course, no one will call such a man a lover of self or blame him. But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at all events he assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best and gratifies the most authoritative element in himself and in all things obeys this; and just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore the man who loves this and gratifies it is most of all of a lover of self. This is the first clue I wish to advance toward a better understanding of classical egoism. But it may be asked, Why call this 'egoism' in the first place? Because in the end the ultimate beneficiary of moral conduct is the agent, in that he or she will be the best person he or she can be. The point of morality or ethics is to provide human beings with a guide to doing well in life, to living properly, to conducting themselves rightly.

MPP4-40 ARISTOTLE IS NOT A UTILITARIAN

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.31. All this may suggest that a moral philosophy is, after all, firmly embedded in the first Book of the Ethics, and in particular that Aristotle is offering a fairly refined species of Utilitarianism: the only ultimately good thing in the world is the happiness of sentient beings; and the only ultimate moral rule is one enjoining us to maximize the sum of that happiness. Aristotle is thus a precursor of the great English Utilitarians, Bentham and J. S. Mill. This conclusion, however, is premature. Utilitarianism has no place in the Ethics; it is not assessed or even described, let alone recommended. Indeed, despite the political and social ambience of the Ethics, Aristotle shows a remarkable indifference to the effects of the good man's actions on his fellows; even where such eminently social virtues as generosity or munificence are under discussion, it is, one feels, the character of the virtuous man rather than the effects of his virtuous actions that excites Aristotle's interest.

MPP4-41 THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTION IS THE GOOD

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.63-4.

If, then, our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends - if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for this will involve an infinite progression, so that our aim will be pointless and ineffectual) - it is clear that this must be the Good, that is the supreme good. Does it not follow, then, that a knowledge of the Good is of great importance to us for the conduct of our lives? Are we not more likely to achieve our aim if we have a target? If this is so, we must try to describe at least in outline what the Good really is, and by which of the sciences or faculties it is studied.

MPP4-42 FOR ARISTOTLE, THE GOOD IS A COMPLETE HUMAN LIFE

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.149.

For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its best and the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life nor a mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life. We thus cannot characterize the good for man adequately without already having made reference to the virtues. And within an Aristotelian framework the suggestion therefore that there might be some means to achieve the good for man without the exercise of the virtues makes no sense.

MPP4-43 HONOR IS SUBORDINATE TO GOODNESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.68.

Cultured people, however, and men of affairs identify the Good with honour, because this is (broadly speaking) the goal of political life. Yet it appears to be too superficial to be the required answer. Honour is felt to depend more on those who confer than on him who receives it; and we feel instinctively that the Good is something proper to its possessor and not easily taken from him. Again, people seem to seek honour in order to convince themselves of their own goodness; at any rate it is by intelligent men, and in a community where they are known, and for their goodness, that they seek to be honoured; so evidently in their view goodness is superior to honour.

MPP4-44 PLEASURE IS A GOOD

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.314.

On the other hand those who contend that what all creatures try to obtain is not a good are surely talking nonsense; for we hold that what everyone believes is so; and the man who tries to destroy this belief is not likely to have a more convincing account of his own. If it were only irrational creatures that are attracted by pleasure, there might be something in the theory; but if intelligent beings are attracted too, how can it be taken seriously? Presumably there is even in the lower animals some instinct superior to their own natures which tries to attain their proper good.

MPP4-45 PLEASURE PERFECTS LIFE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.322.

One may suppose that everyone feels drawn towards pleasure, because everyone is eager to live. Life is a form of activity, and each individual directs his activity to those objects, and by means of those faculties, that he likes best: e.g. the musician occupies himself with the sounds of music by the use of his hearing, and the student with the objects of study by the use of his intellect, and similarly with all the other examples. The pleasure perfects the activities, and so perfects life, to which all are drawn. It is quite reasonable, then, that they should also be eager for pleasure; because it perfects life for each individual, and life is a thing to choose. Whether we choose life on account of pleasure or pleasure on account of life is a question that may be dismissed at the moment; for it appears that they are closely connected and do not admit of separation: as pleasure does not occur without activity, so every activity is perfected by its pleasure.

MPP4-46 PHYSICAL PLEASURES ARE FINE IN MODERATION

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.255.

Probably the necessary pleasures are good in the sense that even what is not bad is good; or perhaps they are good up to a point; because although you cannot have excessive pleasure from those states and processes that do not admit of excess above the limit of goodness, you can have excessive pleasure from those that do admit of excess. Now you can have an excess of bodily goods; and it is the pursuit of this excess, not that of the necessary pleasures, that makes a man bad; because everyone enjoys tasty food and wine and sex in some degree, but not everyone to the right degree.

MPP4-47 PLEASURE IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF HAPPINESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.254.

This is why everybody assumes that the happy life is a pleasant life, net makes pleasure a constituent of happiness - with good reason. For no activity is perfect if it is impeded, and happiness is a perfect thing. That is why the happy man needs (besides his other qualifications) physical advantages as well as external goods and the gifts of fortune, so that he may not be hampered by lack of these things. (Those who maintain that, provided he is good, a man is happy on the rack or surrounded by great disasters, are talking nonsense, whether intentionally or not.) It is because happiness needs fortune too that some people think that it is the same as good fortune; but it is not, because even good fortune itself when excessive, is an impediment, and presumably loses its right to be called good fortune, since we estimate good fortune in relation to happiness.

MPP4-48 SINCE PAIN IS EVIL, PLEASURE MUST BE A GOOD

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.253.

Further, it is admitted also that pain is an evil, and to be avoided; because it is either absolutely an evil or in some sense an impediment. But the contrary of that which is to be avoided, qua to be avoided, and evil, is good. Therefore pleasure must be a good.

MPP4-49 PLEASURE CAN REINFORCE, RATHER THAN IMPEDING, GOOD CONDUCT

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.252.

Neither thought nor any other activity, is hindered by its proper pleasure, but only by pleasures of a different origin. Indeed the pleasures that we derive from contemplation and learning will encourage us to contemplate and learn more.

MPP4-50 THE HARMS OF PLEASURE DON'T PROVE IT BAD IN ITSELF

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.252.

The argument (2b) that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are injurious to health, is the same as saying that healthful things are bad because some healthful things are bad for the pocket. Both are bad in this limited sense, but that does not prove them to be bad in themselves, since even contemplation is sometimes injurious to health.

MPP4-51 PLEASURE ISN'T THE HIGHEST GOOD

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.68.

To judge by their lives, the masses and the most vulgar seem - not unreasonably - to believe that the Good or happiness is pleasure. Accordingly they ask for nothing better than the life of enjoyment. (Broadly speaking, there are three main types of life: the one just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative.) The utter servility of the masses comes out in their preference for a bovine existence; still, their view obtains consideration from the fact that many of those who are in positions of power share the tastes of Sardanapalus.

MPP4-52 PLEASURE ISN'T THE ONLY GOOD

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.313-4.

He thought that it was no less evident from consideration of its contrary, because pain, he thought, is in itself some thing to be shunned by all, and therefore similarly its contrary is to be chosen. He held also that the most desirable thing is that which we choose neither as a means to, nor for the sake of, something else; and that pleasure is, by common consent, a thing of this kind; for no one ever asks a man why he is enjoying himself, because it is assumed that pleasure is desirable in itself. He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good thing - e.g. just or temperate conduct - makes it more desirable; but what is good is only increased by itself. Now this particular argument seems only to show that pleasure is a good, no more good than any other; because any good thing is more desirable when accompanied by another than it is by itself. In fact Plato uses this sort of argument to refute the view that pleasure is the Good; for he says that the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence than without it; and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the Good; because no addition of anything else to the Good makes it more desirable. And clearly nothing else can be the Good either, if it becomes more desirable when accompanied by something that is good in itself. What, then, is there that cannot be made better by the addition of some good, and yet is something in which we share? because it is something of this sort that is the object of our inquiry.

MPP4-53 PLEASURE ISN'T THE ONLY GOOD

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.317-8.

Nobody would choose to live out his life with the mentality of a child, even if he continued to take the greatest pleasure in the things that children like; nor would anyone choose to find enjoyment in doing something very disgraceful, even if there were no prospect of painful consequences. Besides, there are many things that we should be eager to have even if they brought no pleasure with them - e.g. sight, memory, knowledge, and the several kinds of excellence. It makes no difference if these are necessarily accompanied by pleasure, because we should choose to have them even if we got no pleasure from them.

MPP4-54 ARISTOTLE REJECTS HEDONISM

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.30. Secondly, it is worth noting that happiness is not the same thing as pleasure: the man who follows the advice of the Ethics will, according to Aristotle, live an enjoyable life (e.g. 1099a7-21), but he will not live a life of pleasure, in the common sense of that phrase. Aristotle brusquely rejects the view that happiness consists in a constant succession of pleasures - such a view advocates a 'life suitable for cattle' (1095b20). If Aristotle is a eudaimonist, he is certainly not a hedonist.

MPP4-55 VIRTUE IS KEY TO HAPPINESS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.94-5.

That is why Aristotle thinks that virtue plays such a special role in the pursuit of happiness. That is why he regards moral virtue as the principal means to happiness and as the most important of all the things that are really good for us to have. Moral virtue is also an unlimited good. You cannot have too much of it. Habits of making right choices and decisions can never be too firmly formed.

MPP4-56 VIRTUE AND GOOD FORTUNE ARE BOTH NEEDED FOR A GOOD LIFE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.98.

A good life, it has been said, is one in which a person has everything that he or she desires, provided that he or she desires nothing amiss. In order to desire nothing amiss, one must have moral virtue. But one must also have goods that lie beyond the reach of choice -- the goods bestowed on us by good luck, in addition to the goods acquired by good habits of choice. Among these goods of fortune are things that depend on the physical environment and on the society in which we are born, brought up, and live our lives. Aristotle never lets us forget that we are social animals as well as physical organisms. Having a good family and living in a good society are as important as living in a good climate and having good air, good water, and other physical resources available.

MPP4-57 MORAL VIRTUES ARE HABITS NEEDED FOR A GOOD LIFE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.90-1.

Good habits of the kind exemplified by skills of one sort or another are virtues of the mind, or intellectual virtues. Good habits of the kind exemplified by a settled disposition to choose or decide correctly constitute a person's character, and so Aristotle calls them moral virtues. Both kinds of virtue are real goods that we need for a good life. But moral virtue plays a very special role in our pursuit of happiness, so special that Aristotle tells us that a good life is one that has been lived by making morally virtuous choices or decisions.

MPP4-58 VIRTUE IS NEEDED TO NOT BE A VICTIM ONE'S EMOTIONS

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.149.

But this happy gift of fortune is not to be confused with the possession of the corresponding virtue; for just because it is not informed by systematic training and by principle even such fortunate individuals will be the prey of their own emotions and desires. This victimization by one's own emotions and desires would be of more than one kind. On the one hand one would lack any means of ordering one's emotions and desires of deciding rationally which to cultivate and encourage, which to inhibit and reduce; on the other hand on particular occasions one would lack those dispositions which enable a desire for something other than what is actually one's good to be held in check. Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways but also to feel in particular ways. To act virtuously is not as Kant was later to think to act against inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues.

MPP4-59 THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE A PRODUCT OF HABIT

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.91.

Moral goodness, on the other hand, is the result of habit, from which it has actually got its name, being a slight modification of the word *ethos*. This fact makes it obvious that none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation. For instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency downwards, cannot be habituated to rise, however often you try to train it by throwing it into the air; nor can you train fire to burn downwards; nor can anything else that has any other natural tendency be trained to depart from it. The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by nor contrary to nature; we are constituted by nature to receive them, but their full development in us is due to habit.

MPP4-60 VIRTUE AND VICE ARE THE PRODUCTS OF HABIT

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.94.

Good habits, or moral virtues, are habits of making the right choices among goods, real and apparent. Bad habits, which Aristotle calls "vices," are habits of making the wrong choices. Every time you make a right choice and act on it, you are doing something that moves you toward your ultimate goal of living a good life. Every time you make a wrong choice and act on it, you are moving in the opposite direction. The virtuous person is one who makes the right choices regularly time and time again, although not necessarily every single time.

MPP4-61 COURAGE IS THE MEAN BETWEEN COWARDICE AND RASHNESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.103.

In the field of Fear and Confidence the mean is Courage; and of those who go to extremes the man who exceeds in fearlessness has no name to describe him (there are many nameless cases), the one who exceeds in confidence is called Rash, and the one who shows an excess of fear and a deficiency of confidence is called Cowardly.

MPP4-62 LIBERALITY IS THE MEAN BETWEEN PRODIGALITY AND ILLIBERALITY

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.103.

In the field of Giving and Receiving Money the mean is Liberality, the excess and deficiency are Prodigality and Illiberality; but these show excess and deficiency in contrary ways to one another: the prodigal man goes too far in spending and not far enough in getting, while the illiberal man goes too far in getting money and not far enough in spending it.

MPP4-63 TEMPERANCE IS THE MEAN BETWEEN LICENTIOUSNESS AND INSENSIBILITY

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.103.

In the field of Pleasures and Pains - not in all, especially not in all pains the mean is Temperance, the excess Licentiousness; cases of defective response to pleasures scarcely occur, and therefore people of this sort too have no name to describe them, but let us class them as insensible.

MPP4-64 TEMPERANCE IS A KEY MORAL VIRTUE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.95.

Aristotle calls one aspect of moral virtue temperance. It consists in habitually resisting the temptation to overindulge in pleasures of all sorts or the temptation to seek more than is good for us of any limited good, such as wealth. One reason why bodily pleasures tempt us is that we can usually enjoy them right away. Having temperance enables us to resist what appears to be good in the short run for the sake of what is really good for us in the long run. Having temperance also enables us to seek wealth in the right amount -- only as a means to other goods, and not for its own sake as if it were an end in itself and an unlimited good.

MPP4-65 ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF VIRTUE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.101-2.

So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it. It is a mean between two kinds of vice, one of excess and the other of deficiency; and also for this reason, that whereas these vices fall short of or exceed the right measure in both feelings and actions, virtue discovers the mean and chooses it. Thus from the point of view of its essence and the definition of its real nature, virtue is a mean; but in respect of what is right and best, it is an extreme.

MPP4-66 THE VIRTUES ARE DESTROYED BY DEFICIENCY OR EXCESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.94.

First, then, we must consider this fact: that it is in the nature of moral qualities that they are destroyed by deficiency and excess, just as we can see (since we have to use the evidence of visible facts to throw light on those that are invisible) in the case of <bodily> health and strength. For both excessive and insufficient exercise destroy one's strength, and both eating and drinking too much or too little destroy health, whereas the right quantity produces, increases and preserves it. So it is the same with temperance, courage and the other virtues. The man who shuns and fears everything and stands up to nothing becomes a coward; the man who is afraid of nothing at all, but marches up to every danger, becomes foolhardy. Similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and refrains from none becomes licentious; but if a man behaves like a boor and turns his back on every pleasure, he is a case of insensibility. Thus temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved by the mean.

MPP4-67 THE MEAN CAN'T BE FOUND MATHEMATICALLY, ONLY IN PRACTICE

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.103.

Aristotle did tell us that the desirable point, "the mean," is not necessarily to be found midway between the extremes. Courage is nearer to rashness than it is to cowardice; generosity is nearer to prodigality than it is to niggardliness. But to be generous in the right degree, to the right person, at the right time -- that is what is difficult, and no exact specifications for this can be given that will cover all cases. We simply make mistakes and then learn from experience. Virtue (the Golden Mean) can be attained by practicing virtuous actions until skill in their performance is derived, just as swimming can be learned only by getting in the water and trying, not by reading manuals on how to swim.

MPP4-68 HUMANS ARE POLITICAL ANIMALS

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.59-60.

It follows that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. Any one who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman - he is like the war-mad man condemned in Homer's words as 'having no family, no law, no home'; for he who is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in a game of draughts.

MPP4-69 HUMANS ARE BY NATURE SOCIAL ANIMALS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.101.

As we have seen, our aim as human beings should be not merely to stay alive but to live well -- as well as possible. Staying alive, of course, is indispensable to living well. Not being solitary but social animals, human beings must associate with one another in order to sustain and preserve their lives and to bring into the world another generation that must be cared for and protected during infancy.

MPP4-70 SOCIETY IS NATURAL IN THAT IT SERVES NATURAL HUMAN NEEDS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.102.

Does not Aristotle contradict himself by saying that families, tribes, and states are both voluntary and natural? He would be contradicting himself if he thought that families, tribes, and states were natural in the same way that beehives and ant mounds are natural -- the product of instinct. But, according to Aristotle, there is another way in which a society can be natural. It can be natural in the sense that it must be formed to serve some natural need -- the need to stay alive or the need to live well. A society can be natural in this sense and also be voluntarily, purposefully, and thoughtfully formed -- to serve the need that makes the society natural.

MPP4-71 SOCIAL EXISTENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN SURVIVAL

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.110.

In his concern with what is good and bad, Aristotle is concerned with good and bad societies as well as with good and bad human beings and with their good and bad lives. What has already been said about society itself being good is, for him, a simple commonsense observation. We cannot get along at all without living in society. Beginning there, Aristotle then goes on to consider what makes a particular society good or one society better than another. And just as his ultimate question about human life is about the best life that each of us can live, so his ultimate question about society is about the best society in which we can live and pursue happiness.

MPP4-72 LIVING IN A GOOD SOCIETY ENHANCES HAPPINESS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY, 1978, p.99.

Living in a good society contributes greatly to the individual's pursuit of his own happiness because a good society is one that deals justly with the individuals who are its members. It also requires the individual to deal justly with other individuals and to act for the good of society as a whole. That good is a good in which all the members of society participate. Persons who are not temperate and courageous injure themselves by habitually making the wrong choices. Persons who habitually make the wrong choices will also be unjust and injure others as well as the society in which they live. The reason for this is that those who firmly aim at a really good life for themselves will regularly make choices that carry out that aim. Choices so directed will also aim directly at a really good life for others and at the welfare of the society in which others share as well as themselves.

MPP4-73 ASSOCIATION IN A STATE PRODUCES BOTH SURVIVAL AND HAPPINESS

Aristotle, THE POLITICS, Penguin Books, 1981, p.187.

At the beginning of this work, when we drew a distinction between household-management and mastership, we also stated that by nature man is a political animal. Hence men have a desire for life together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. Nevertheless, common interest too is a factor in bringing them together, in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually; but they form and continue to maintain a political association for the sake of life itself. Perhaps we may say that there is an element of good even in mere living, provided that life is not excessively beset with troubles. Certainly most men, in their desire to keep alive, are prepared to face a great deal of suffering, as if finding in life itself a certain well-being and a natural sweetness.

MPP4-74 HUMAN HAPPINESS REQUIRES LIFE IN A COMMUNITY

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 1963, p.379.

The closing sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics effect a transition to the Politics. Like most Greeks of his own and earlier times, Aristotle could not conceive of a good life for man that did not involve social relations and institutions. "Man is a creature by nature adapted for life in a *polis*, or city-state," he says; so we may paraphrase the famous sentence that is usually quoted as "Man is by nature a political animal." Aristotle is the ultimate authority for the almost proverbial saying, found in the Essays of Francis Bacon, that "he that delighteth in solitude is either a wild beast or a god." Aristotle's aspirations after a more-than-human happiness, expressed in Book X of the Ethics, do not obscure or contradict his conviction that the specific happiness of man as a human being must be aimed at in the life of a community.

MPP4-75 A GOOD LIFE REQUIRES SOCIAL INTERCOURSE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY, 1978, p.88.

Less obvious, perhaps, are the psychological goods that we need because we are social animals as well as thinking animals. We cannot live well in complete solitude. A solitary life is not a good life, any more than the life of a slave or of a man in chains is a good life. Just as we naturally desire to acquire knowledge, so we naturally desire to love other human beings and to be loved by them. A totally loveless life -- a life without friends of any sort -- is a life deprived of a much-needed good.

MPP4-76 HUMANS ARE POLITICAL ANIMALS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY, 1978, p.103.

When Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal, he is saying more than is meant by the statement that man is a social animal. There are other social animals, such as bees and ants, wolves that hunt in packs, and lions that live in families. But only men organize their societies voluntarily, purposefully, and thoughtfully and establish laws or customs that differ from one human society to another. That is one meaning of the statement that man is a political animal. He is a custom-making and lawmaking animal. There is another meaning. When Aristotle declares that man is by nature a political animal, he is also saying that human beings cannot live well, cannot achieve the best kind of lives for themselves, by living together only in families and in tribes. To do that, Aristotle thinks they must live together in cities or states. The Greek word for a city or state is "*polis*," from which we get the English word "political." The Latin word for a city or state is "*civis*," from which we get the English words "civil" and "civilized." Being political by nature, men must live in states to live as well as possible. The good life is the civil or civilized life.

MPP4-77 SOCIETY AND STATE ARE MANIFESTATIONS OF HUMAN NATURE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.171.

Intellectual activity is not enough. Men are not isolated individuals, and the human excellences cannot be practiced by solitary hermits. 'Man', Aristotle says, 'is by nature a social animal' (the word I translate as 'social' is usually rendered by 'political'). That remark is no casual aphorism, but a piece of biological theory. 'Social animals are those which have some single activity common to them all (which is not true of all gregarious animals); such are men, bees, wasps, ants, cranes.' 'What is peculiar to men, compared to the other animals, is that they alone can perceive the good and bad, the just and the unjust, and the rest -- and it is partnership in these things which makes a household and a State.' Society and the State are not artificial trappings imposed upon natural man: they are manifestations of human nature itself.

MPP4-78 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IS AN END IN ITSELF

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.139.

These criticisms reflect a more general ethical demand on political life, arising from Aristotle's claims about friendship. In his view, co-operative activity is a part of a person's own good, not a disagreeable obligation that he must undertake to avoid unwelcome consequences. The state is therefore not just a necessity or a convenience; it is also an area for active co-operation. Even a proof that philosopher-rulers would be more efficient than any other regime would not, in Aristotle's view, show that philosophers should rule and other citizens should have no share in ruling; for to deprive them of a share in government is to deprive them of part of their good.

MPP4-79 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IS ESSENTIAL TO FREEDOM

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.159.

What are political relationships? The relationships of free men to each other, that is the relationships between those members of a community who both rule and are ruled over. The free self is simultaneously political subject and political sovereign. Thus to be involved in political relationships entails freedom from any position that is mere subjection. Freedom is the presupposition of the exercise of the virtues and the achievement of the good.

MPP4-80 CITIZENSHIP IS KEY TO EQUALITY AND FREEDOM

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.113.

Those who are ruled by a despot are subjects, not citizens with some voice in their own government. Those who are ruled by a tyrant are no better off than slaves. In both cases, they are ruled as inferiors, not equals. Only those who, being citizens, are ruled by other citizens whom they have chosen to hold public office for a time are ruled as equals, and as free men should be ruled.

MPP4-81 GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE COMMON PURPOSES

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.111.

It has been said, by some who lack Aristotle's common sense, that government is not necessary at all. They fail to see that human beings -- being as they are, not as one might wish they were -- cannot live together peacefully and act together for a common purpose without living under a government having the power to enforce laws and to make decisions. It is not only that criminals must be restrained. In order that a number of individuals may act together for a common purpose, there must also be some machinery for making the decisions that their concerted actions require.

MPP4-82 GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED FOR HARMONIOUS SOCIAL LIFE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.111.

It seems obvious to him that a good state is one that is governed well. That, for Aristotle, is as obvious as it is to say that a good life is one that is lived well. For him, a state cannot exist without government. Human beings cannot live together peacefully and harmoniously in the absence of government. That might not be true if all human beings were friends and loved one another. It might not even be true if all humans were perfectly just, so that there was no need for the enforcement of just laws to prevent one individual from injuring another. But Aristotle knew from common experience that all human beings are not bound together by love or friendship, that most human beings are not perfectly just, and that some are quite unjust in their selfishness. That is why his common-sense conclusion was that government is necessary for the existence of a state or a political society. Being necessary, government itself is good, just as society itself, being necessary, is good. However, as we have seen, a particular society may be bad or not as good as it should be. So, too, a particular form of government may be bad or not as good as it should be.

MPP4-83 GOVERNMENT ISN'T JUST A NECESSARY EVIL
Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.111-2.

It has also been said that, although government may be necessary, it is a necessary evil because it involves the use of coercive force (the force used in the enforcement of laws) and because it involves limitations on the freedom of the individual. Those who say this fail to understand the very important points that Aristotle makes about the enforcement of laws and about the limitations on the liberty of individuals in a society. According to Aristotle, the good man -- the virtuous man who is just -- obeys just laws because he is virtuous, not because he fears the punishment that may follow from his breaking the law or disturbing the peace. He obeys laws and keeps the peace voluntarily, not under the coercion of law enforcement. He is not coerced by government, and so for him government is not an evil as it is for the bad man. Nor does the good man feel that his freedom is limited by government. He does not want more freedom than he can use without injuring others. Only the bad man wants more freedom than that, and so only he feels that his freedom to do as he pleases, without regard for others, is limited by government.

MPP4-84 THE STATE IS NATURAL

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.59.

Therefore every state exists by nature, as the earlier associations too were natural. This association is the end of those others, and nature is itself an end; for whatever is the end-product of the coming into existence of any object, that is what we call its nature - of a man, for instance, or a horse or a household. Moreover the aim and the end is perfection; and self-sufficiency is both end and perfection.

MPP4-85 THE STATE IS NATURAL BECAUSE IT SATISFIES THE IMPULSE TOWARD MORAL PERFECTION

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.xlix.

If Aristotle uses the language of growth in the beginning of the *Politics*, and speaks of the growth of the household into the village and of villages into the state, he does not rest his belief in the natural character of political society on the simple fact of such growth. What makes the State natural, in his view, is the fact that, however it came into existence, it is as it stands the satisfaction of an immanent impulse in human nature towards moral perfection -- an immanent impulse which drives men upwards, through various forms of society, into the final political form.

MPP4-86 FAMILY, TRIBE, AND STATE ARE NATURAL INSTITUTIONS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE HUMAN LIFE
Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.102-3.

Families, according to Aristotle, originated from the need of human beings to stay alive and to protect and rear their young. Groups of families, or tribes, being a little larger and involving more human beings working together, came into being in order to serve that same need a little more effectively. The even larger organization of the state, which originally grew out of combinations of families and tribes, not only served that same need still more effectively but also served the additional purpose of enabling some individuals, if not all, to live well. Life itself being secure, attention and effort could be turned to improving life and making it richer and better.

MPP4-87 THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE IS TO SECURE A GOOD LIFE

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.59.

The final association, formed of several villages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process is now complete; self-sufficiency" has been reached, and while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good life.

MPP4-88 THE STATE GOES BEYOND CONTRACT AND MUTUAL DEFENSE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.197-8.

It is clear therefore that the state is not an association of people dwelling in the same place, established to prevent its members from committing injustice against each other, and to promote transactions. Certainly all these features must be present if there is to be a state; but even the presence of every one of them does not make a state *ipso facto*. The state is an association intended to enable its members, in their households and the kinships, to live well, its purpose is a perfect and self-sufficient life.

MPP4-89 THE BEST STATE MAXIMIZES THE POSSIBILITIES OF HAPPINESS

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.428.

It is clear then that all men aim at happiness and the good life, but some men have an opportunity to get it, others have not. This may be due to their nature, or to some stroke of fortune, for the good life needs certain material resources (and when a man's disposition is comparatively good, the need is for a lesser amount of these, a greater amount when it is comparatively bad). Some indeed, who start with the opportunity go wrong from the very beginning of the pursuit of happiness. But as our object is to find the best constitution, and that means the one whereby a state will be best ordered, and since we call that state best ordered in which the possibilities of happiness are greatest, it is clear that we must keep constantly in mind what happiness is.

MPP4-90 THE STATE SHOULD SEEK TO PROMOTE THE GOOD LIFE

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE*, 1963, p.379.

Aristotle arrives at this conception by applying his usual philosophical principles. He asks what is the purpose of the state and insists, in this as in other fields of investigation, that nature is to be understood in terms of purpose. The city is necessary even to the bare survival of mankind because the individual man and the individual family are both too weak and too limited to be self-supporting. But once it has come into being for the sake of mere life, the city is preserved for the sake of the good life. The city provides an environment in which the individual can achieve the proper *telos* of a man; and this, as we have learned from the *Ethics*, consists in the enjoyment of happiness in the exercise of the intellectual and moral virtues. What is more, the city has its own *telos*; it is complete and finished in itself and does not need to be supplemented by or absorbed in any larger community. There is no further and better term in the series that runs from the individual through the family and the clan to the city-state.

MPP4-91 GOOD GOVERNMENTS SERVE THE COMMON GOOD

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.112.

The fact that government itself is necessary and good does not make all forms of government good, or as good as they should be. For Aristotle, the line that divides good from bad forms of government is determined by the answers to the following questions. First, does the government serve the common good of the people who are governed, or does it serve the selfish interests of those who wield the power of government? Government that serves the self-interest of the rulers is tyrannical. Only government that promotes the good life of the ruled is good.

MPP4-92 THE STATE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROMOTE ITS CITIZENS' HAPPINESS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.114-5.

Even though he made the mistake of thinking that only some human beings had the right to be ruled as citizens, Aristotle ought that those human beings had a right to expect more from the state in which they lived. The best state, in his opinion, was one that did everything it could do to promote the pursuit of happiness by its citizens. That remains true whether only some human beings of all should be citizens.

MPP4-93 THE GOAL OF THE STATE IS TO PROMOTE THE GOOD LIFE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.172-3.

A State, however constituted, must be self-sufficient, and it must achieve the goal or end for which States exist. It is evident that a State is not a sharing of locality for the purpose of preventing mutual harm and promoting trade. Those things must necessarily be present if a State is to exist; but even if they are all present a State does not thereby exist. Rather, a State is a sharing by households and families in a good life, for the purpose of a complete and self-sufficient life. The 'good life', which is the goal of the State, is identified with eudaimonia, which is the goal of individuals. States are natural entities, and like other natural objects they have a goal or end. Teleology is a feature of Aristotle's political theory no less than of his biology.

MPP4-94 LAWS SHOULD REQUIRE SUPPORT FOR THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.106-7.

However, the state does make and enforce laws that require the individual to act positively for the welfare of the community as a whole. The welfare of the community affects the pursuit of happiness by its members. A good society, a society in which the common good of the people is served and advanced, contributes to the good life of its individuals. Aristotle says in so many words that the end that the good state should serve is the happiness of the individuals who compose it. It should promote their pursuit of happiness. When, therefore, we, as individuals, obey laws that direct us to behave for the welfare of the community as a whole, we are indirectly helping to promote the pursuit of happiness by our fellow human beings. What we do directly for a few others out of our love for them, we do indirectly for all the rest by obeying laws that require us to act for the welfare of the community in which they, as well as we, live.

MPP4-95 THE GOOD STATE PROVIDES A SAFETY NET, BUT CAN'T REQUIRE VIRTUE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.115.

The main ways in which a good state and a good government can help its individuals in their pursuit of happiness is to do what it can to overcome deprivations they suffer as a result of bad luck or misfortune, not as a result of fault on their part. It should do for them what they cannot, by choice and effort, do for themselves. The best state and the best government are those that do the most in this direction. The one thing that no state or government can do, no matter how good it is, is to make its citizens morally virtuous. Whether or not they acquire moral virtue depends almost entirely upon the choices each of them makes. The best state and the best government can, therefore, only give its citizens external conditions that enable and encourage them to try to live well. It cannot guarantee that, given these conditions, they will all succeed. Their success or failure ultimately depends on the use they make of the good conditions under which they live their lives.

MPP4-96 CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS BEST

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.113.

This brings us to a third question. It applies to government that is neither tyrannical nor despotic, but constitutional -- a government based on laws, in which even those who govern are ruled by laws. About such government we have to ask: Is the constitution -- the fundamental law on which government itself is, based a just constitution? And are the laws made by that government just laws? Any government that is not tyrannical is to that extent good. Among nontyrannical governments, a constitutional government is better than a despotic one. And, among constitutional governments, the best is the one with a just constitution and with just laws. In praising constitutional government; Aristotle speaks of it as the government of free men and equals. He also speaks of it as that form of government in which the citizens rule and are ruled in turn.

MPP4-97 GOOD GOVERNMENT RESTS ON CONSENT, NOT FORCE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.112-3.

Second, does the government rest merely on the power at the disposal of the rulers, or does it rest on laws that have been made in a way to which the ruled have agreed and in the making of which they have had a part? Government that rests solely on might or force, whether it be in the hands of One man or more than one, is despotic, even when it is benevolent or well-disposed rather than tyrannical. To be good, government must have authority that those who are ruled acknowledge and accept, not merely power or force that they fear and submit to from fear. Government that is good in this way Aristotle called constitutional government or political government. By calling such government political, he meant to suggest that it is the only form of government that is proper for states or political societies.

MPP4-98 A CORRECT CONSTITUTION SEEKS THE COMMON GOOD, NO MATTER WHO IS SOVEREIGN
 Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.189-90.
 Sovereignty necessarily resides either in one man, or in a few, or in the many. Whatever the one, the few, or the many rule with a view to the common good, these constitutions must be correct; but if they look to the private advantage, be it of the one or the few or the mass, they are deviations. For either we must say that those who do not participate are not citizens, or they must share in the benefit.

MPP4-99 THE STATE SHOULD SEEK THE COMMON GOOD

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.189.

It is clear then that those constitutions which aim at the common good are right, as being in accord with absolute justice, while those which aim only at the good of the rulers are wrong. They are all deviations from the right constitutions. They are like the rule of master over slave, whereas the state is an association of free men.

MPP4-100 THERE ARE THREE TYPES OF GOOD CONSTITUTION

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.190.

The usual names for right constitutions are as follows: (a) Monarchy aiming at the common interest: kingship. (b) Rule of more than one man but only a few: aristocracy (so called either because the best men rule or because it aims at what is best for the state and all its members). (c) Political control exercised by the mass of the populace in the common interest: polity.

MPP4-101 THERE ARE THREE TYPES OF BAD CONSTITUTION

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.190.

The corresponding deviations are: from kingship, tyranny; from aristocracy, oligarchy; from polity, democracy. For tyranny is monarchy for the benefit of the monarch, oligarchy for the benefit of the men of means democracy for the benefit of the men without means. None of the three aims to be of profit to the common interest.

MPP4-102 STABILITY IS AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF A GOOD CONSTITUTION

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.373.

The task confronting the lawgiver, and all who seek to set up a constitution of such a kind, is not only or even mainly, to establish it, but rather to ensure that it is preserved intact. (Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two.) We should therefore turn back to our previous inquiries into the factors which make for the continued preservation of a constitution and those which make for its dissolution. On this basis we shall try to provide for stability; we shall be on our guard against those features which we find to be destructive, and we shall lay down those laws, written and unwritten, which shall embrace the greatest number of features that preserve constitutions.

MPP4-103 CONSTITUTIONS ARE ERODED IN SMALL STEPS

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.323-4.

Now in constitutions that are well-blended it is essential to take many precautions, and certainly against anything being done contrary to the laws; and it is essential in particular to guard against the insignificant breach. Illegality creeps in unobserved; it is like small items of expenditure which when oft-repeated make away with a man's possessions. The spending goes unnoticed because the money is not spent all at once, and this is just what leads the mind astray. It is like the sophistic argument which says 'If each is small, all is small', which is true and not true: the whole or the all may be made up of small amounts without being small itself. One precaution to be taken, then, is in regard to the beginning; and equally we must not trust those arguments of sophistry that are designed to delude the multitude, for the facts prove them false.

MPP4-104 TYRANNY IS THE WORST FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.239.

As to these three deviations, which is worst and which second worst - this is obvious, for the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst. Now kingship, unless it is receiving a name to which it is not entitled, must exist in virtue of the great superiority of the person who reigns. Accordingly, tyranny is the worst, and is farthest away from polity; oligarchy comes second, for aristocracy is very different from this kind of constitution; while democracy is the most moderate of the deviations.

MPP4-105 THE STATE HAS PRIORITY OVER THE INDIVIDUAL

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.60-1.

Furthermore, the state has a natural priority over the household and over any individual among us. For the whole must be prior to the part. Separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they will no longer be hand or foot except in name, as one might speak of a 'hand' or 'foot' sculptured in stone. That will be the condition of the spoilt hand, which no longer has the capacity and the function which define it. So, though we may say they have the same names, we cannot say that they are, in that condition, the same things. It is clear then that the state is both natural and prior to the individual. For if an individual is not fully self-sufficient after separation, he will stand in the same relationship to the whole as the parts in the other case do. Whatever is incapable of participating in the association which we call the state, a dumb animal for example, and equally whatever is perfectly self-sufficient and has no need to (e.g. a god), is not a part of the state at all.

MPP4-106 THE GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE GOOD OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.64.

For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime.

MPP4-107 JUSTICE REQUIRES LAW

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.188.

For justice is only found among those whose mutual relations are controlled by law, and law is only found among those who are liable to injustice; for legal justice consists in distinguishing between what is just and what is unjust.

MPP4-108 LAWS ARE NEEDED TO ENFORCE RIGHTS AND PROTECT JUSTICE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.106.

That is why laws are made to prescribe what the members of a state should or should not do in order to deal justly with one another. If everyone had the habit of being just in all his dealings with others, there would be no need for such laws or for their enforcement by the state. But since few individuals are perfectly just, and since some are habitually inclined to be unjust, laws that prescribe just conduct must be enforced by the state to prevent one individual from seriously injuring another by violating his or her rights.

MPP4-109 RULE OF LAW IS NEEDED TO CHECK DEMAGOGUES

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.250.

It is the demagogues who bring about this state of affairs. When states are democratically governed according to law, there are no demagogues, and the best citizens are securely in the saddle; but where the laws are not sovereign, there you find demagogues. The people becomes a monarch, one person composed of many, for the many are sovereign, not as individuals but as an aggregate.

MPP4-110 OBEDIENCE TO LAW IS KEY TO JUSTICE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.173.

Since the lawless man is, as we saw, unjust, and the law-abiding man just, it is clear that all lawful things are in some sense just; because what is prescribed by legislation is lawful, and we hold that every such ordinance is just.

MPP4-111 RULE OF LAW IS NEEDED TO CHECK DESPOTISM

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.188.

But injustice implies unjust conduct (although unjust conduct does not always imply injustices); and this consists in assigning to oneself too much of what is generally good and too little of what is generally bad. That is why we do not allow a man to rule, but the principle <of law>; because a man does so for his own advantage, and becomes a despot, whereas the ruler is the upholder of justice, and if of justice, of equality.

MPP4-112 RULE OF LAW SHOULD PREVAIL

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.206.

These matters may be regarded as settled in that way; but we must look back at our original problem, from which nothing emerges so clearly as the fact that the laws if rightly established ought to be sovereign and also that officials whether individually or as a body ought to have sovereign power to act in all those various matters about which the laws cannot possibly give detailed guidance; for it is never easy to frame general regulations covering every particular.

MPP4-113 ARISTOTLE STRESSES THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND MORAL FLEXIBILITY

R.A. Gauthier, French philosopher, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.27.

No doubt this insistence is explained in part by the very nature of ethical subject-matter; as changing and elusive as life itself, it is not easily enclosed in rigid frameworks, and one must restrict oneself to more flexible formulae which the circumstances will make precise. The law, Aristotle says neatly, can never be anything but a leaden rule, such as the stone masons of Lesbos use: it must be able to take the shape of the twists and turns of life.

MPP4-114 CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY SHOULD OVERRIDE STRICT APPLICATION OF LAW

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.199.

Thus justice and equity coincide, and although both are good, equity is superior. What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice. The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this way errors are made. And the law is none the less right; because the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the case; for the raw material of human behaviour is essentially of this kind. So when the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is exceptional, then it is right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his language has erred in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling such as the legislator himself would have given if he had been present there, and as he would have enacted if he had been aware of the circumstances.

MPP4-115 ARISTOTLE REJECTS ETHICAL ABSOLUTISM

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.21-2.

It is worth underlining the fact that Aristotle is here adopting an extreme position, not unlike the one taken up by some existentialist thinkers: morals, he implies, cannot by any means be reduced to a set of universal principles; any principle that may be formulated is liable to exception, any universal moral judgement (strictly construed) is false. The most we can hope for is a group of roughly accurate generalizations - principles which will meet most ordinary situations but which are always liable to come unstuck. If they do come unstuck, we may abandon them for more satisfactory principles (if we can find any), or we may rely on some sort of 'moral intuition', or we may perhaps simply confess our incapacity to determine the moral issue. However that may be, we must not indulge in the vain fancy that a set of true and universal principles is somewhere waiting to be found: ethical absolutism, in that sense, is an illusion.

MPP4-116 MORAL RULES CAN NEVER ENCOMPASS ALL SITUATIONS

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.21. Why did Aristotle hold this view? He was inclined to believe that the biological sciences in general did not admit universally valid judgements, so that anthropology and human psychology would not furnish the moralist with anything stronger than generalizations; and he was also impressed by the seemingly infinite variety of human circumstances and situations. He must have inferred from this that any ethical proposition of the universal form 'Every F is G' ('Every courageous act is praiseworthy', 'Every promise is to be kept') would sooner or later be refuted by the occurrence of a situation in which, unusually but indisputably, an F failed to be G. To cater for this perpetual possibility the moralist falls back upon the phrase 'for the most part' or 'as a rule'; for 'As a rule, F's are G's' will survive a limited number of cases in which F's are not G's.

MPP4-117 JUSTICE IS KEY TO A GOOD LIFE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.98-9.

Up to this point, we have been considering the pursuit of happiness as if it were a solitary affair -- as if it were something each of us could do by himself or herself alone, with no thought of others. That is hardly the way things are. Since we cannot live well in complete solitude, we must think of what we have to do in order to live well with others. We must also think of what others can and should do to help us in our effort to lead a good life. The pursuit of happiness is selfish to the extent that the good life it aims at directly is one's own good life, not the good life of anybody else. But when we realize that we cannot succeed in the pursuit of happiness without considering the happiness of others, our self-interest becomes enlightened. We cannot be entirely selfish and succeed. That is why, according to Aristotle, the two aspects of moral virtue that we have so far considered are not enough. In addition to temperance and courage, there is justice. Justice is concerned with the good of others, not only of our friends or those whom we love, but of everyone else. Justice is also concerned with the good of the all-enveloping society in which we live -- the society we call the state.

MPP4-118 JUSTICE IS ESSENTIAL FOR HARMONIOUS INTERACTION

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.104.

If justice did not intervene when love failed or fell short of perfection, the members of the family might not stay together, or at least they would not live together peacefully and harmoniously, trying to share in the enjoyment of goods common to them all. What has just been said is even truer of states in which the members are, for the most part, not related by friendship or love. Where love is absent, justice must step in to bind men together in states, so that they can live peacefully and harmoniously with one another, acting and working together for a common purpose.

MPP4-119 THE ULTIMATE GOOD AT WHICH THE STATE AIMS IS JUSTICE

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.207.

In every kind of knowledge and skill the end which is aimed at is a good. This good is greatest, and is a 'good in the highest sense, when that knowledge or skill is the most sovereign one. i.e. the faculty of statecraft.' In the state, the good aimed at is justice, and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community.

MPP4-120 JUSTICE INVOLVES DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO MERIT

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.195.

First we must grasp what definitions of oligarchy and democracy men put forward, and in particular what is the oligarchic and what is the democratic view of justice. For all adhere to a justice of some kind, but they do not proceed beyond a certain point, and are not referring to the whole of justice in the sovereign sense when they speak of it. Thus it is thought that justice is equality; and so it is, but not for all persons, only for those that are equal. inequality also is thought to be just; and so it is, but not for all, only for the unequal. We make bad mistakes if we neglect this 'for whom' when we are deciding what is just. The reason is that we are making judgements about ourselves, and people are generally bad judges where their own interests are involved. So, as justice is relative to people, and applies in the same ratio to the things and to the persons (as pointed out in my *Ethics*), these disputants, while agreeing as to equality of the thing, disagree about the persons for whom, and this chiefly for the reason already stated, that they are judging their own case, and therefore badly.

MPP4-121 JUSTICE MEANS DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO MERIT

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.178.

This is also clear from the principle of assignment according to merit. Everyone agrees that justice in distribution must be in accordance with merit in some sense, but they do not all mean the same kind of merit: the democratic view is that the criterion is free birth; the oligarchic that it is wealth or good family; the aristocratic that it is excellence.

MPP4-122 JUSTICE IS THE MEAN BETWEEN HAVING TOO MUCH AND TOO LITTLE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.186.

We have now described what justice and injustice are. Now that these distinctions have been drawn we can see that just behaviour is intermediate between doing injustice and suffering it; for the one is to have more and the other to have less than one's share. And justice is a sort of mean state, only not in the same way as the other virtues are, but because it aims at a mean, whereas injustice aims at the extremes.

MPP4-123 THERE IS BOTH NATURAL AND LEGAL JUSTICE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.189-90.

There are two sorts of political justice, one natural and the other legal. The natural is that which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend upon acceptance; the legal is that which in the first place can take one form or another indifferently, but which, once laid down, is decisive: e.g. that the ransom for a prisoner of war shall be one mina, or that a goat shall be sacrificed and not two sheep; and also any enactments for particular circumstances, such as the sacrifices in honour of Brasidas, and decisions made by special resolution.

MPP4-124 JUSTICE IS COMPLETE VIRTUE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.173.

Justice in this sense, then, is complete virtue; virtue, however, not unqualified but in relation to somebody else. Hence it is often regarded as the sovereign virtue, and 'neither evening nor morning star is such a wonder'. We express it in a proverb: In justice is summed up the whole of virtue.

MPP4-125 THAT WHICH PROMOTES THE HAPPINESS OF A POLITICAL ASSOCIATION IS JUST

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.173.

The laws prescribe for all the departments of life, aiming at the common advantage either of all the citizens or of the best of them, or of the ruling class, or on some other such basis. So in one sense we call just anything that tends to produce or conserve the happiness (and the constituents of the happiness of a political association).

MPP4-126 JUSTICE ENTAILS BOTH LAWFULNESS AND FAIRNESS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.172.

Let us begin, then, by taking the various senses in which a man is said to be unjust. Well, the word is considered to describe both one who breaks the law and one who takes advantage of another, i.e. acts unfairly. Then evidently also both the law-abiding man and the fair man will be just. So just means lawful and fair; and unjust means both unlawful and unfair.

MPP4-127 JUSTICE IS ESSENTIAL FOR TAMING HUMAN SAVAGERY

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.61.

Among all men then there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association; and the first man to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice. Injustice armed is hardest to deal with; and though man is born with weapons which he can use in the service of practical wisdom and virtue, it is all too easy for him to use them for the opposite purposes. Hence man without virtue is the most savage the most unrighteous and the worst in regard to sexual licence and gluttony. The virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice decides what is just.

MPP4-128 IGNORING JUSTICE VIOLATES SELF-INTEREST

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.138.

Aristotle therefore answers the attack on justice, not by urging us to sacrifice our own good to the claims of justice, but by showing that we sacrifice our own good if we ignore the claims of justice. Thrasymachus argues against justice by arguing that it sometimes requires me to sacrifice my good for the good of the community. Aristotle agrees that justice sometimes requires the sacrifice of some goods; but he argues that it actually advances my good. His general strategy is similar to Plato's; but his account of the benefits of friendship and community supports his own characteristic defence of justice.

MPP4-129 COOPERATIVE ACTION IS NEEDED FOR A GOOD LIFE

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.138.

Aristotle defends this claim in his discussion of friendship. Friendship of the best type requires concern for another person for his own sake; and when we act on this concern, we are capable of concerns, achievements, and co-operative activities that would otherwise be denied to us. I will not derive much enjoyment from playing in a team, or in an orchestra, or working on some collaborative project, if I care only about my own success. If I care about the success of others too, I can take pleasure in their success, and in collective successes, not simply in my own. By expanding the range of my concerns, co-operative altruism expands the range of my possible activities, and thereby allows me to achieve my good more completely. Since happiness requires a complete and self-sufficient life, and since a solitary person with aims confined to himself cannot achieve such a life, the happy life requires friendship.

MPP4-130 CONCERN FOR OTHERS DERIVES FROM HUMAN NATURE

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.138.

A human being, he claims, is a political animal in so far as human capacities and aims are completely fulfilled only in a community; the individual's happiness must involve the good of fellow members of a community. Aristotle does not mean that everyone always desires the good of others as well as his own good. He means that someone lacks a complete life, fulfilling human nature, without some concern for the good of other people. If we are indifferent to the good of others, we deny ourselves the relations of co-operation and mutual concern and trust that are necessary for the fulfillment of human capacities.

MPP4-131 ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE, JUSTICE DOESN'T REQUIRE POSITIVE AID TO OTHERS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.106.

Do others have a right to expect us to act positively to help them in their pursuit of happiness? Not interfering with, impeding, or obstructing their efforts to obtain or possess the real goods they need is one thing. Helping them to obtain such goods is another. Have they a right to claim our help? According to Aristotle's understanding of the difference between love and justice, the answer is no. It is the generosity of love, not the obligations of justice, that impels one individual to help another to obtain or possess the real goods needed for a good life. That is why the laws that the state enforces do not require individuals to help one another by taking positive action to promote the pursuit of happiness by others.

MPP4-132 DESPOILING THE RICH IS UNJUST

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.200.

Thus suppose the poor use their numerical superiority to make a distribution of the property of the rich: is not that unjust? 'No, by Zeus,' it may be said, it has been done justly, by a decision of the sovereign power.' But what else can we call the very height of injustice? And if the majority, having laid their hands on everything, again distribute the possessions of the few, they are obviously destroying the state. But virtue does not destroy its possessor, nor is justice destructive of the state. So it is clear that this law too cannot be just. Or, secondly, if it is just, any actions taken by a tyrant also must be just: his superior strength enables him to use force, just as the mass of the people use force on the rich. Thirdly, is it just for the few and the wealthy to rule? If so, and they too do this and plunder and help themselves to the goods of the mass, then that is just. And if that is so, then it is just in the former case also. The answer clearly is that all these three states of affairs are bad and not just.

MPP4-133 ACTING UNJUSTLY IS WORSE THAN SUFFERING INJUSTICE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.201-2.

It is also evident that being treated unjustly and acting unjustly are both evils, because the former is to have less and the latter to have more than the mean, whereas acting justly corresponds to what is conducive to health in the case of medical science and what is conducive to fitness in the case of physical training; but nevertheless acting unjustly is the worse, because it implies vice and is censurable (the vice being either complete and absolute or nearly so - for not every voluntary act of injustice implies vice), whereas being unjustly treated does not imply vice or injustice. So being unjustly treated is in itself the lesser evil, although there is no reason why it should not be incidentally the greater misfortune.

MPP4-134 ONLY VOLUNTARY ACTS CAN BE JUST OR UNJUST

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.191.

Since just and unjust acts are as we have described them, it is only when a person acts voluntarily that he does a just or unjust act. When he acts involuntarily his action is neither just nor unjust, except incidentally; because people do perform actions to which justice and injustice are incidental. Thus just and unjust conduct are distinguished by being voluntary or involuntary, because it is when an act is voluntary that it is blamed, and then also that it becomes an unjust act.

MPP4-135 JUSTICE IS THE SOLE OTHER-REGARDING VIRTUE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.174.

And for this same reason - that it implies a relation to somebody else - justice is the only virtue that is regarded as someone else's good, because it secures advantage for another person, either an official or a partner. So the worst person is the one who exercises his wickedness towards both himself and his friends, and the best is not the one who exercises his virtue towards himself but the one who exercises it towards another; because this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not a part of virtue but the whole of it, and the injustice contrary to it is not a part but the whole of vice.

MPP4-136 RIGHTS DERIVE FROM LEGITIMATE HUMAN NEEDS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.106.

All these things, and more of the same sort, can be summed up by saying that others have a right to expect from us that we do nothing that might impede or obstruct their pursuit of happiness -- nothing that might interfere with or prevent their obtaining or possessing the real goods they need to make good lives for themselves. It is their need for these real goods that gives them a right to them, and it is their right to them that we are obliged to respect -- if we ourselves are just. We may not always be just, at least not perfectly just. Some persons are the very opposite of just. Instead of having the habit of respecting the rights of others, they are habitually inclined in the opposite direction -- to get things they want for themselves even when to do so they must run roughshod over the rights of others.

MPP4-137 RIGHTS ARE UNIVERSAL BECAUSE THEY REFLECT UNIVERSAL HUMAN NATURE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.109.

Your rights and the rights of others, with which justice is concerned, are based on the things that are really good for any human being because they fulfill needs inherent in human nature. Thinking about what is good, and especially about what is really good, must precede thinking about rights. For example, if you did not think that having a certain amount of wealth, having a satisfactory degree of health, and having freedom are really good for you, you would not be led to say that everyone has a right to these things, not only as means to living but also as means to living well. What you have a right to expect from others is, therefore, the same as what they have a right to expect from you. Rights are the same because everyone's rights are the same and because what is really good for you is really good for every other human being. And that is so because all of us are human, all of us have the same human nature, inherent in which are the same fundamental needs calling for fulfillment.

MPP4-138 LIBERTY IS A FUNDAMENTAL GOAL OF THE STATE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.173.

That notion of the goal of the State is linked to another high ideal. 'A fundamental principle of democratic constitutions is liberty...One form of liberty is to rule and be ruled turn and turn about...Another form is to live as one wishes; for men say that is the aim of liberty, since not to live as one wishes is the mark of a slave.

MPP4-139 FOR ARISTOTLE, THE STATE EXISTS FOR THE GOOD OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Jack Wheeler, Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Southern California, *THE PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT OF AYN RAND*, Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, eds., 1984, p.94.

Aristotle's mature position is that the state for the good of the individual: "A political association . . . should exist for the sumpheron, advantage, of its members." He looks upon egoistic moral admiration as the proper foundation for a community: It is the consciousness of oneself as agathon that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore, a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living together, and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to one another for this is the meaning of living together as applied to human beings; it does not mean merely feeding in the same place as it does when applied to cattle.

MPP4-140 NEO-ARISTOTELIANISM JUSTIFIES HUMAN RIGHTS

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *PHILOSOPHY*, 1994, p.483.

Both Locke, and especially his contemporary neo-Aristotelian natural rights followers argue that in every human community the same kind of beings reside. Thus they require certain conditions so that everyone may embark upon a fully human life, upon flourishing. And since human nature involves, at its very essence, rationality -- something the exercise of which involves making free choices -- human rights to life, liberty and property amount to the proper constituents of a human polity.

MPP4-141 NEO-ARISTOTELIAN HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY CAN DEAL WITH EXCEPTIONS

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *PHILOSOPHY*, 1994, p.485.

In the neo-Aristotelian support given to natural human rights, the rigid rule ethics vulnerable to the criticism based on anomalies is rejected. For example, industry might be a virtue but sometimes one ought, first, to practice the virtue of courage. Moderation is sound policy but clearly not in preference to justice. Yet, some very fundamental moral imperative, such as right reason or phronesis, will enable one to rank these virtues of particular cases and make it possible to manage anomalies, accordingly. In other words, it is not possible to find any kind of specific behaviour or conduct, outside of following the very general policy of being rational, that will always be the right one for the situation, especially when the situation is extraordinary.

MPP4-142 ARISTOTLE ACCEPTED FREE WILL

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *PHILOSOPHY*, 1994, p.487.

Second, Aristotle does address the issue of choice-making in his distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues. The latter require choice which makes sense, since morality involves self-responsible conduct or neglect, something that could not be without the capacity for choice. Aristotle did have a doctrine of free will -- only it was not a major aspect of his moral theory. He located freedom of the will in the process of deliberation. As Jaeger notes, 'Aristotle's notion of free will is the exact complement of the notion of most perfect deliberation in the *Epinomis*'. And David Ross notes that 'On the whole we must say that [Aristotle] shared the plain man's belief in free will but that he did not examine the problem very thoroughly, and did not express himself with perfect consistency.'

MPP4-143 ARISTOTLE DEFENDED PRIVATE PROPERTY AND OPPOSED COMMUNISM

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.173.

Aristotle argues at length against communism. 'Evidently', he concludes, 'it is better that property should be private, but that men should make it common in use.' But he immediately adds that 'it is the task of the legislator to see that the citizens become like that'. Aristotle's State will not own the means of production, nor will it direct the economy; but the legislature will ensure that the citizens' economic behaviour is properly governed.

MPP4-144 PRIVATE PROPERTY ENHANCES PERSONAL SATISFACTION

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.115.

Moreover there is an immense amount of pleasure to be derived from the sense of private ownership. It is surely no accident that every man has affections for himself: nature meant this to be so. Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. So excessive fondness for money is condemned, though nearly every man is fond of everything of that kind. And a further point is that there is very great pleasure in helping and doing favours to friends and strangers and associates; and this happens when people have property of their own. None of these advantages is secured by those who seek excessive unification of the state.

MPP4-145 PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IS NEEDED TO ENCOURAGE INDUSTRY

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.114.

These then are some of the difficulties inherent in the common ownership of property. Far better is the present system - provided that it has the added attraction of being a matter of habit and of being controlled by sound laws. If so, it will have the advantages of both systems, both the communal and the private. For, while property should up to a point be held in common, the general principle should be that of private ownership. Responsibility for looking after property, if distributed over many individuals, will not lead to mutual recriminations; on the contrary, with every man busy with his own, there will be increased effort all round.

MPP4-146 COMMON OWNERSHIP LEADS TO GENERAL NEGLECT

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.108.

There is further harm in the doctrine: the greater the number of owners, the less the respect for common property. People are much more careful of their personal possessions than of those owned communally; they exercise care over common property only in so far as they are personally affected. Other reasons apart, the thought that someone else is looking after it tends to make them careless of it, (This is rather like what happens in domestic service: a greater number of servants sometimes does less work than a smaller.) Each citizen acquires a thousand sons, but these are not one man's sons, any one of them is equally the son of any person, and as a result will be equally neglected by everyone.

MPP4-147 HAPPINESS REQUIRES AT LEAST SOME EXTERNAL GOODS

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.79-80.

Nevertheless it seems clear that happiness needs the addition of external goods, as we have said; for it is difficult if not impossible to do fine deeds without any resources. Many can only be done by the help of friends, or wealth, or political influence. There are also certain advantages, such as good ancestry or good children, or personal beauty, the lack of which mars our felicity; for a man is scarcely happy if he is very ugly to look at, or of low birth, or solitary and childless; and presumably even less so if he has children or friends who are quite worthless, or if he had good ones who are now dead. So, as we said, happiness seems to require this sort of prosperity too; which is why some identify it with good fortune, although others identify it with virtue.

MPP4-148 SOME MEASURE OF WEALTH IS ESSENTIAL FOR LIVING WELL

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.87-8.

The bodily goods that have been mentioned are means to the ultimate end of happiness or a good life. But they are also themselves ends for which other goods serve as means. For the sake of our bodily health, vitality, and pleasure, we need food, drink, shelter, clothing, and sleep. Aristotle lumps all these things together under one heading which he calls external goods or wealth. Wealth according to Aristotle, is a real good because it is a necessary means to bodily health, vitality, and pleasure. Without a certain amount of wealth, we cannot enjoy health, vitality, or pleasure, and without these things we cannot live well. Individuals who are starving, who are freezing or sweltering, individuals who are deprived of sleep or whose bodies are consumed by the effort to keep alive from moment to moment, individuals who lack the externals that give them the simple comforts of life, cannot live well. They are as badly off as individuals who are forced to work as slaves, who are in chains, or who are confined by prison walls. The lack of a certain amount of wealth is as much an obstacle to living well and achieving happiness as the deprivation of a certain amount of freedom.

MPP4-148 REAL GOODS ARE NEEDED FOR A GOOD LIFE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.89.

I have now almost completely enumerated the real goods that Aristotle thinks go to make a good life as a whole. They are the component parts of that whole, and as such they are the means we must use to achieve that whole for ourselves. This is Aristotle's first answer to the question about how to succeed in achieving happiness. To the extent that we manage to obtain and possess all these real goods, we succeed in our effort to live well and make a good life for ourselves.

MPP4-150 GENERAL PROSPERITY IS NEEDED TO PRESERVE DEMOCRACY

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.375.

For the duty of the true democrat is to see that the population is not destitute; for destitution is a cause of a corrupt democracy. Every effort therefore must be made to perpetuate prosperity. And, since that is to the advantage of the rich as well as the poor, all that accrues from the revenues should be collected into a single fund and distributed in block grants to those in need, if possible in lump sums large enough for the acquisition of a small piece of land, but if not, enough to start a business, or work in agriculture. And if that cannot be done for all, the distribution might be by tribes or some other division each in turn.

MPP4-151 FREEDOM AND WEALTH ARE BOTH LIMITED GOODS

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.88.

In both cases I have said, as Aristotle would say, "a certain amount." He does not say that unlimited freedom is needed to live well, nor does he say that unlimited wealth is needed. The reason for the limitation is not the same, but both are limited, not unlimited, goods, just as bodily pleasure is also a limited good, of which we can want too much for our own ultimate good.

MPP4-152 COMPLETE FREEDOM OF CHOICE IS UNDESIRABLE

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.369.

For this dependence, and not allowing a man to follow all his own decisions, are beneficial. (Freedom to do exactly what one likes cannot do anything to keep in check that element of badness which exists in each and all of us.) The inevitable result is this most valuable of principles in a constitution: ruling by respectable men of blameless conduct, and without detriment to the populace at large.

MPP4-153 ARISTOTLE'S ECONOMIC THEORY IS ANTI-CAPITALIST

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.lvi.

Such economic theory, subordinated as it is to political theory, which in turn is subordinated to (or, perhaps one should rather say, is the crown of) ethics, admits of no isolation of the economic motive, and of no abstraction of economic facts as a separate branch of inquiry. It is a theory of the ways in which households and cities can properly use the means at their disposal for the better living of a good life. Wealth, on this basis, is a means to a moral end; as such a means, it is necessarily limited by the end, and it must not be greater -- as equally it must not be less -- than what the end requires. This is not socialism, but it is a line of thought inimical to capitalism (which involves the unlimited accumulation of wealth), and through the influence of Ruskin and others it has, in its measure, tended to foster modern socialism.

MPP4-154 FOR ARISTOTLE, THE MORAL LIFE REQUIRES THE FAMILY AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.1.

Plato refuses private property and family life to the guardians of the Republic, because he believes that they would interfere with the moral life of the guardians, and therefore with the moral life of the state, and therefore with the true order of nature. Aristotle vindicates for every citizen both private property and family life, and regards them both as institutions belonging to all by the order of nature, because he believes that the moral life of every citizen requires the 'equipment' of private property and the discipline of family life.

MPP4-155 THE FAMILY IS NEEDED FOR MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.lviii.

Plato would have women emancipated from household drudgery for political service in his ideal state. In speculation of this order the emancipation of women was connected with community of wives, and it was assumed that women could only be free if the institution of marriage and the monogamous family were abolished. It was the negative assumption rather than the positive proposal, which attracted attention and criticism; and Aristotle, for example, in his criticism of Plato's proposal, discusses only the question whether wives and children should be common to all citizens. Upon this line of argument he defends the private family as vigorously as he defends private property, and on the same ground: the family is justified by the moral development which it makes possible. This is very true but the problem of the position of women is not solved by the justification of the family.

MPP4-156 THE STATE IS STRONGEST WHEN MIDDLE CLASS ELEMENTS DOMINATE

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.267.

It is the middle citizens in a state who are the most secure: they neither covet, like the poor, the possessions of others, nor do others covet theirs as the poor covet those of the rich. So they live without risk, not scheming and not being schemed against. Phocylides' prayer was therefore justified when he wrote, 'Those in the middle have many advantages; that is where I wish to be in the state.' It is clear then both that the best partnership in a state is the one which operates through the middle people, and also that those states in which the middle element is large, and stronger if possible than the other two together, or at any rate stronger than either of them alone, have every chance of having a well-run constitution.

MPP4-157 BALANCED DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH MAXIMIZES SOCIAL STABILITY

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.268.

For this reason it is a most happy state of affairs when those who take part in the constitution have a middling, adequate amount of property; since where one set of people possess a great deal and the other nothing, the result is either extreme democracy or unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny due to the excesses of either. For tyranny often emerges from an over-enthusiastic democracy or from an oligarchy, but much more rarely from intermediate constitutions or from those close to them. The reason for this we will speak of later when we deal with changes in constitutions.

MPP4-158 LAW PROPERLY ENFORCES VIRTUE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.176.

For, broadly speaking, most of the acts laid down by law are enjoined from the point of view of virtue as a whole, because the law directs us to live in accordance with every virtue, and refrain from every kind of wickedness. Also the things that promote virtue in general are the regulations laid down by law with a view to education in citizenship.

MPP4-159 LAWS NEED TO REGULATE THE WHOLE OF LIFE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.337.

But presumably it is not enough to have received the right upbringing and supervision in youth; they must keep on observing their regimen and accustoming themselves to it even after they are grown up; so we shall need laws to regulate these activities too, and indeed generally to cover the whole of life; for most people are readier to submit to compulsion and punishment than to argument and fine ideals.

MPP4-160 THE STATE SHOULD EDUCATE FOR VIRTUE

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.337.

Education in goodness is best undertaken by the state. But to obtain a right training for goodness from an early age is a hard thing, unless one has been brought up under right laws. For a temperate and hardy way of life is not a pleasant thing to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason upbringing and occupations should be regulated by law, because they will cease to be irksome when they have become habitual.

MPP4-161 LAW SHOULD REQUIRE DECENT BEHAVIOR

Aristotle, *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.338.

Now the orders that a father gives have no forceful or compulsive power, nor indeed have those of any individual in general, unless he is a king or somebody of that sort; but law, being the pronouncement of a kind of practical wisdom or intelligence, does have the power of compulsion. And although people resent it when their impulses are opposed by human agents, even if the latter are in the right, the law causes no irritation by enjoining decent behaviour. Yet in Sparta alone, or almost alone, the lawgiver seems to have concerned himself with upbringing and daily life. In the great majority of states matters of this kind have been completely neglected, and every man lives his life as he likes, 'laying down the law for wife and children', like the Cyclopes.

MPP4-162 THE STATE SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH PROMOTING VIRTUE

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.196-7.

But all who are anxious to ensure government under good laws make it their business to have an eye to the virtue and vice of the citizens. It thus becomes evident that that which is genuinely and not just nominally called a state must concern itself with virtue. Otherwise the association is a mere military alliance, differing only in location and restricted territorial extent from an alliance whose parties are at a distance from each other; and under such conditions law become a mere agreement or as Lycophron the sophist put it, 'a mutual guarantor of justice', but quite unable to make citizens good and just.

MPP4-163 THE STATE PROPERLY SERVES AS A MORAL EDUCATOR

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.li.

A state which is meant for the moral perfection of its members will be an educational institution. Its laws will serve 'to make men good': its offices ideally belong to the men of virtue who have moral discernment: its chief activity will be that of training the young and sustaining the mature in the way of righteousness. That is why we may speak of such a state as really a church: like Calvin's Church it exercises a 'holy discipline'. Political philosophy thus becomes a sort of moral theology.

MPP4-164 LAW SHOULD PROHIBIT CERTAIN VICES

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.150.

Moreover Aristotle takes that part of morality which is obedience to rules to be obedience to laws enacted by the city-state -- if and when the city-state enacts as it ought. Such law prescribes and prohibits certain types of action absolutely and such actions are among those which a virtuous man would do or refrain from doing. Hence it is a crucial part of Aristotle's view that certain types of action are absolutely prohibited or enjoined irrespective of circumstances or consequences.

MPP4-165 LIKE PLATO, ARISTOTLE ALLOWS STRONG STATE REGULATION OF MORALS

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.li.

The 'limit of state-interference' never suggested itself to the Greek philosophers as a problem for their consideration. They seek to regulate the family, and the most intimate matters of family life, no less than art and music. Plato's austerities are famous; but even Aristotle can define the age for marriage and the number of permissible children. Whatever has a moral bearing may come under moral regulation.

MPP4-166 ARISTOTLE DEFENDED PUBLIC EDUCATION

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.lviii.

It has already been noted that the state which is intended for the moral perfection of its members is by its very nature an educational institution. Aristotle's theory of education is thus an integral and essential part of his theory of the *polis*. He holds that education should be conducted by the state (and not by individuals or voluntary associations), and should be directed to the making of character; and he holds in consequence -- the consequence was readily apparent to Greeks living in a great age of art, and sensitive to its influence -- that the curriculum of education (apart from its higher and scientific ranges) should be in the domain of aesthetics, and especially of noble music, such as might insensibly infect the mind and mould the character by its own nobility.

MPP4-167 THE STATE SHOULDN'T SEEK TOTAL UNITY

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.116.
The cause of Socrates' fallacy lies in his incorrect principle. Certainly there must be some unity in a state, as in a household, but not an absolutely total unity. There comes a point where the state, if it does not cease to be a state altogether, will certainly come close to that and be a worse one; it is as if one were to reduce concord to unison or rhythm to a single beat. As we have said before, a state is a plurality, which must depend on education to bring about its common unity.

MPP4-168 EXCESSIVE UNITY DESTROYS THE NATURE OF THE STATE

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.104.

I am referring to the assumption made by Socrates, "It is best that the whole state should be as much of a unity as possible." But obviously a state which becomes progressively more and more of a unity will cease to be a state at all. Plurality of numbers is natural in a state; and the farther it moves away from plurality towards unity, the less a state it becomes and the more a household, and the household in turn an individual. (We would all agree that the household is more of a unity than the state and the individual than the household.) So, even if it were possible to make such a unification, it ought not to be done; it will destroy the state.

MPP4-169 PLATO'S REPUBLIC WOULD BE PRONE TO CLASS CONFLICT

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.118.

The inevitable result would be two States within one, and these in some degree in opposition to each other. For on the one side he puts the Guardians like a garrison, on the other the farmers, craftsmen and the rest, as citizens. This can only lead to disputes and litigation and all the other evils that he speaks of as arising in other states. And yet Socrates says that, thanks to education, there will be no need for a large number of regulations such as those governing the wardenship of the city and the market, and the like, and this while giving that education only to the Guardians. Again, he makes the farmers owners of their property but requires them to pay rent; but in that position they are likely to be much more troublesome and bumptious than the helots, serfs and slaves in some places nowadays.

MPP4-170 THE WHOLE REPUBLIC CAN'T BE HAPPY IF THE SEPARATE PARTS ARE UNHAPPY

Aristotle, *THE POLITICS*, Penguin Books, 1981, p.119.

Again, though he denies to the Guardians even happiness, he maintains that it is the duty of a lawgiver to make the whole city happy. But it is impossible for the whole to be happy, unless the majority, if not actually all, or at any rate some, parts possess happiness. For happiness is a very different thing from evenness: two odd numbers added together make an even number, but two unhappy sections cannot add up to a happy state. And if the Guardians are not happy, who will be? Certainly not the skilled workers and the general run of mechanics. These are some, but by no means the most serious, of the drawbacks inherent in the kind of constitution described by Socrates.

MPP4-171 PLATO'S ORGANIC MODEL OF THE STATE IS MISGUIDED

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.139.

Aristotle, like Plato, wants to show how his ethical conclusions imply further consequences about the proper aims of a political community, and about its appropriate form of government. He criticizes Plato for wanting the ideal state to be more unified than a state should be; Plato models the unity of the state on the unity of a single organism, and Aristotle thinks this is entirely the wrong model. He rejects Plato's abolition of private property, complaining that Plato removes the sort of discretion and freedom that is necessary for friendship and generosity: how can I benefit my friends, or be generous to the right causes if I have no resources at my disposal? Plato makes an equally grave mistake when he concentrates power and political initiative in a small class of philosopher-rulers; Aristotle answers that all the citizens should share in political initiative.

MPP4-172 ARISTOTLE REJECTED PLATO'S TOTALITARIAN VIEW OF THE STATE

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE*, 1963, p.380.

This contrast between Plato and Aristotle is seen at its plainest when we consider Plato's revised blueprint for human society in the *Laws*, in which he explicitly maintains that all private concerns must be subordinated to the good of the community as a whole. Aristotle, on the other hand, believed that too much unity was as damaging as too little unity to the well-being of a city, and that complete unity would be tantamount to the annihilation of the city.

MPP4-173 UNLIKE PLATO, ARISTOTLE STRESSES INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE*, 1963, p.380.

His most fundamental objection to Plato's ideal republic is based on his conception of happiness as an activity of the individual human being. Plato had concentrated on producing a happy community and had not given due weight to the overriding claims of individual men. Aristotle thought that the state existed for the sake of the citizen and not the citizen for the sake of the state; accordingly, he rejects the scheme for the communal ownership of wives, children, and property that Plato had prescribed for his guardians. Not only is Aristotle opposed to this proposal for theoretical reasons, he also criticizes it on the very practical grounds that "what is everybody's business is nobody's business" and that men will inevitably show less concern for property, persons, and political and social duties if there are no personal ties and personal possessions.

MPP4-174 ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY ISN'T OUT OF DATE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.xi.

There may be some persons who regard Aristotle's antiquity as a disadvantage. They may feel that it would be much better to select as a teacher someone alive today -- someone acquainted with the world in which we live, someone who knows what modern science has discovered about that world. I do not agree with them. Though Aristotle was a Greek who lived twenty-five centuries ago, he was sufficiently acquainted with the main outlines of the world in which we live to talk about it as if he were alive today. As an aid to our being able to think philosophically, Aristotle would not be a better teacher even if he were acquainted with everything that modern scientists know.

MPP4-175 ARISTOTLE'S POSITIONS AREN'T OBSOLETE

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.144.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to suppose that Aristotle's philosophical position as a whole is undermined by this sort of criticism; and the revival of Aristotle's reputation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is partly the result of a more discriminating attitude to him. No one could now reasonably regard him as the supreme authority; but neither could anyone reasonably agree with Hume's estimate. The questions that he tries to answer, about matter, form, causation, teleology, body, soul, happiness, and morality, are philosophical questions that persist, with surprisingly little change, through changes in science, religion, and culture. Aristotle's answers to them are not obsolete. On the contrary, his claim to defend the reality and non-eliminability of forms and souls, and his account of the place of morality in the human good, present reasonable options that have sometimes been prematurely abandoned, and have not yet been adequately explored.

MPP4-176 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS RETAIN CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.179.

But in biology and in logic Aristotle is outdated. If we want to learn biology or logic, we no longer turn to Aristotle's treatises: they are now of historical interest only. The same is not true of Aristotle's more philosophical writings. The essays in the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics* and the *Ethics* are less sure, less perfect, less scientific than the logic and the biology; but they are, paradoxically, more alive. For here Aristotle has not yet been overtaken. The *Ethics*, for example, can indeed be read as a historical document -- as evidence for the state of practical philosophy in the fourth century BC. But it can also be read as a contribution to current debate, and modern philosophers still treat Aristotle as a brilliant colleague. The philosophical treatises are rich, difficult, exciting: they are still studied as urgent commentary on matters of permanent concern.

MPP4-177 ARISTOTLE'S THOUGHT STILL HAS RELEVANCE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.xiii.

Human beings have learned a great deal since Aristotle's day, mainly through the discoveries of modern science. Applied science has created a world and a way of life very different from his world and his way of life. He did not have an automobile, could not talk on the telephone, never saw what can be seen through a microscope or a telescope, did not have a close view of the surface of the moon, and never heard a description of its surface by men walking on it. But Aristotle had the same common experiences in his day that we have in ours. The kind of thinking he did about them enabled him to understand them better than most of us do. That and that alone is the reason he can help us to understand these common experiences better and help us to understand ourselves and our lives, as well as the world and the society in which we live, even though our way of life, our world, and our society are different from his.

MPP4-178 THE PROBLEMS ARISTOTLE TREATED REMAIN CONTEMPORARY

Thomas Sinclair, Professor of Greek, University of Belfast, introduction to Aristotle's *THE POLITICS* (Penguin Books), 1962, p.18.

For mathematicians the interest of Euclid is largely antiquarian; he is a part of the history of mathematics. Nor is Aristotle's biology any longer taught. Why is his *Politics* worth studying today for its own sake? Broadly speaking the reasons are first, that the problems posed by ethical and political philosophy are not of a kind that can be solved once and for all and handed on to posterity as so much accomplished; and second, that the problems are still the same problems at bottom however much appearances and circumstances may have altered in twenty-three centuries.

MPP4-179 ARISTOTLE'S THOUGHT HAS CONTRIBUTED THE MOST TO HUMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, *THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY*, 1933, p.72-3.

But after all, these are quite inessential criticisms of what remains the most marvelous and influential system of thought ever put together by any single mind. It may be doubted if any other thinker has contributed so much to the enlightenment of the world. Every later age has drawn upon Aristotle, and stood upon his shoulders to see the truth.

MPP4-180 ARISTOTLE HAD THE GREATEST ANALYTICAL MIND IN HUMAN HISTORY

R.J. Hollingdale, *WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION*, 1979, p.89-90.

Beyond any doubt, Aristotle possessed the greatest analytical mind the world has yet known. Socrates inspired imitation by living according to the lights of reason. Plato invited the world to philosophise and gave it its great philosophical model in a series of thrilling and dazzling works. But Aristotle, duller perhaps than these and more professorial, set philosophy on its feet and its feet on the ground. Western philosophy would have been possible (if very different) without Plato. Without Aristotle it is difficult to see how it could have come into existence at all.

MPP4-181 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL SYSTEM IS HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.9. The system which Aristotle expounds and advocates in the *Nicomachean Ethics* stands as one of the most celebrated and influential of moral philosophies. Since its construction in the fourth century B.C. it has had a profound and lasting effect: by later philosophers it has been fervently embraced and critically rejected, but never coldly ignored; and in certain crucial respects it has helped to shape and mould the common moral consciousness.

MPP4-182 MODERN SCIENCE IS ARISTOTELIAN

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.178-9.

It is worth adding that our modern notion of scientific method is thoroughly Aristotelian. Scientific empiricism -- the idea that abstract argument must be subordinate to factual evidence, that theory is to be judged before the strict tribunal of observation -- now seems a commonplace; but it was not always so, and it is largely due to Aristotle that we understand science to be an empirical pursuit. The point needs emphasizing, if only because Aristotle's most celebrated English critics, Francis Bacon and John Locke, were both staunch empiricists who thought that they were thereby breaking with the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle was charged with preferring flimsy theories and sterile syllogisms to the solid, fertile facts. But that charge is unjust; and indeed it could only have been brought by men who did not read Aristotle's own works with proper attention and who criticised him for the faults of his successors.

MPP4-183 ARISTOTLE EXEMPLIFIES AN IDEAL OF HUMAN EXCELLENCE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.179.

Finally, Aristotle set before us, explicitly in his writings and implicitly in his life, an ideal of human excellence. Aristotelian man may not be the sole paragon or the unique ideal, but he is surely an admirable specimen, emulation of whom is no low ambition.

MPP4-184 IT WAS THE FAULT OF ARISTOTLE'S SUCCESSORS THAT THEY OVER-ESTEEMED HIM
Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, 1945, p.159.

In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways: with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous. For his demerits, however, his successors are more responsible than he is. He came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal.

MPP4-185 ARISTOTLE HAD A SOUND CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 1933, p.60.

He is realistically simple in his ethics. His scientific training keeps him from the preachment of superhuman ideals and empty counsels of perfection. "In Aristotle," says Santayana, "the conception of human nature is perfectly sound; every ideal has a natural basis, and everything natural has an ideal development.

MPP4-186 ARISTOTLE HAS A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 1963, p.284.

Aristotle paints man entire, not just man as intellect or man as moral hero. He prizes all that is good in and for man: chiefly his intellectual and moral capacities, but also the proper fulfillment of his physical and social nature. We still speak of "the good things of life" as naturally as we speak of "the good life," but we feel a contrast between these two phrases which Aristotle, freeing himself from Plato's authority and not yet subject to Christian influence, would have used in the same breath and the same tone of voice.

MPP4-187 ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF THE SELF IS VALID

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS, 1989, p.31.

In place of the Hobbesian idea of the 'atomistic', isolated human self, the classical conception of the individual -- suggested initially by Aristotle's self-sufficient, self-loving human being -- is invoked. I mean the idea that human beings are thinking, choosing animals who can flourish only by relying on considered action. This idea seems to me to be far more sensible than the Hobbesian, much closer to what we know about human beings.

MPP4-188 ARISTOTELIANISM IS THE MOST POWERFUL PRE-MODERN MODE OF MORAL THOUGHT

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, AFTER VIRTUE, 1984, p.118.

The role of Aristotelianism in my argument is not entirely due to its historical importance. In the ancient and medieval worlds it was always in cornice with other standpoints, and the various ways of life of which it took itself to be the best theoretical interpreter had other sophisticated theoretical protagonists. It is true that no doctrine vindicated itself in so wide a variety of contexts as did Aristotelianism: Greek, Islamic, Jewish and Christian and that when modernity made its assaults on an older world its most perceptive exponents understood that it was Aristotelianism that had to be overthrown. But all these historical truths, crucial as they are, are unimportant compared with the fact that Aristotelianism is philosophically the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral thought. If a premodern view of morals and politics is to be vindicated against modernity, it will be in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all.

MPP4-189 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ARE AS PLAUSIBLE AS ANY MODERN THEORY

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, 1945, p.181.

Let us now try to decide what we are to think of the merits and demerits of the Ethics. Unlike many other subjects treated by Greek philosophers, ethics has not made any definite advances, in the sense of ascertained discoveries; nothings in ethics is known in a scientific sense. There is therefore no reason why an ancient treatise on it should be in any respect inferior to a modern one. When Aristotle talks about astronomy, we can say definitely that he is wrong, but when he talks about ethics we cannot say, in the same sense, either that he is wrong or that he is right.

MPP4-190 UNLIKE PLATO, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS APPEAL TO COMMON EXPERIENCE AND OPINION

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 1963, p.281.

Recent writers also share Aristotle's concern with received opinions and ways of speaking, which is nowhere more fundamental to his thought than in his writings on morals. Plato was influenced by the conviction of Socrates that the road to moral knowledge was narrow and steep; and he was led ultimately to an exaggerated form of the Socratic view that goodness is a special skill or branch of knowledge, accessible only to the gifted and highly trained philosopher. Aristotle held fast to the common-sense view that the good life is within the reach of ordinary men. At each stage of his inquiry, he appeals to common experience and common opinion, and he will abandon these *endoxa* for some philosopher's paradox only if the reasons are very strong indeed. In particular, he makes clear that some of the main features of Plato's ethical philosophy are quite unacceptable to him.

MPP4-191 ARISTOTLE MADE ETHICS PRACTICAL

W.K.C. Guthrie, *THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS*, 1950, p.150-1.

And so with Aristotle ethics was brought out of the clouds and anchored in the facts of everyday life. In the first book of his *Ethics* he attacks the Platonic Ideas (although, he says, 'it is uphill work to do so, seeing that the authors of the doctrine are our friends'). There is not just one thing, 'the good'. There is a different good for different classes, different aim for different types of action. Moreover the aim of ethical study is practical, not scientific; and if our aim in it is to make men and their actions better, then *ex hypothesi* the material of our study is that which can be changed. But where the object of study is not immutable, the philosophic aim of truth or knowledge is unattainable. Truth and knowledge are strangers to the realm of the contingent. Again and again he is at pains to point out that ethics is not really a part of philosophy at all. All that can be done is to give some practical rules which, having been arrived at empirically, will probably work.

MPP4-192 ARISTOTLE APPEALS TO THE PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE PRUDENT INDIVIDUAL

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.289.

Aristotle, however, who kept the common man more in mind than Plato had done, had another guide to the mean. In his definition he said that the mean is as the prudent man would determine it. The ability of the prudent man is not the theoretic ability of the philosopher, but the practical ability of a man of experience. The example of such a man can show ordinary people just how far each tendency should be allowed free play in the virtuous life.

MPP4-193 ARISTOTLE DRAWS ON COMMONPLACE EXPERIENCE

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.xi.

In an effort to understand nature, society, and man, Aristotle began where everyone should begin -- with what he already knew in the light of his ordinary, commonplace experience. Beginning there, his thinking used notions that all of us possess, not because we were taught them in school, but because they are the common stock of human thought about anything and everything.

MPP4-194 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ARE INTERNALLY CONSISTENT

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.182.

Let us examine these three questions in turn, as regards the ethical theory set forth in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (1) On the whole, the book is self-consistent, except in a few not very important respects. The doctrine that the good is happiness, and that happiness consists in successful activity, is well worked out.

MPP4-195 ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC RESPECTS CONTEXT

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.154.

To judge *kata ton orthon logon* is indeed to judge of more or less and Aristotle tries to use the notion of a mean between the more or the less to give a general characterization of the virtues: courage lies between rashness and timidity, justice between doing injustice and suffering injustice, liberality between prodigality and meanness. For each virtue therefore there are two corresponding vices. And what it is to fall into a vice cannot be adequately specified independently of circumstances the very same action which would in one situation be liberality could in another be prodigality and in a third meanness. Hence judgment has an indispensable role in the life of the virtuous man which it does not and could not have in, for example, the life of the merely law-abiding or rule-abiding man.

MPP4-196 ARISTOTELIAN EGOISM ISN'T ANTI-SOCIAL
Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS*, 1989, p.32-3.

Classical egoism, based on a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, is not so vulnerable to the standard criticisms. In the revised classical egoist position, the basic principle of morality arises from a consideration of what will guide human beings toward living their lives successfully, properly, and thus in the end to their benefit, since ethics is seen here to arise in response to the question, 'How should I live my life?' There is no pretense that, in order to make it successful, egoism can or need be turned into altruism, or egalitarianism, or even utilitarianism. But I do plan to argue that if the human individual or ego is understood correctly, the idea that everyone ought to strive to benefit himself or herself first and foremost in life will not imply that a person's egoistic conduct will result in substantial antisocial, avaricious, callous, or deceptive behavior, as is argued by critics of the standard form of egoism.

MPP4-197 THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN ISN'T ABSTRACT OR EMPTY

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE*, 1963, p.285.

This is the answer, by implication, to those who complain of the triviality of the doctrine of the mean. The doctrine is not to be read as an abstract and empty formula, but as a principle unifying and clarifying what we shall recognize to be right conduct in each of the separate concrete spheres of feeling, choice, and action. Throughout the *Ethics* it is the same: the general formula kills; but for the spirit that gives life and understanding, we must look to the detail that Aristotle supplies in such abundance and that we can find, in rich plenty, in reflecting on our own observation and experience of human life, human nature, and human conduct.

MPP4-198 ARISTOTLE CONSIDERED THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN A USEFUL TOOL, NOT AN ABSOLUTE
R.J. Hollingdale, WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION, 1979, p.89.

The "doctrine of the mean" as a test of morality was one which Aristotle propounded with reservations. He was well aware that many moral actions cannot be defined as a mean between two vices: there is, for instance, no mean between telling the truth and telling lies. But he considered it a useful tool for determining the reasonable (and therefore virtuous) attitude on many moral questions.

MPP4-199 ARISTOTLE'S USE OF THE MEAN IS SIMPLY A METAPHOR

R.A. Gauthier, French philosopher, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.15.

Here again, the terminology 'excess,' 'the mean,' 'deficiency' is only convenient imagery. To neglect one's wife is deficiency, to love her, the mean, to love one's neighbor's wife, excess. If one were on the quantitative level, it would be more correct to say, as did the facetious doctor of Frederick II in the remark by St. Bonaventure, "Not to love any woman is the deficiency, to love them all is the excess, and the mean is to love one out of every two!" In reality, we are on the qualitative level: to love one's wife is an action conforming to the moral rule, to neglect her or to love another man's wife is an action which does not conform to the moral rule. But to say that the one is deficiency and the other excess is only a metaphor. Aristotle uses this metaphor because it is classic; he is not taken in by it.

MPP4-200 ARISTOTLE IS A KEY SOURCE OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, 1946, p.lxi.

If we ask ourselves, at the end of this summary review of the substance and argument of the Politics, 'What has been, and still is, the nature of the legacy which it bequeathed to the common thought of Europe?', the answer may almost be compressed in a single word. The word is 'constitutionalism'. That is the fundamental nature of the legacy derived from the Politics, and especially from its third book on 'the theory of citizenship and constitutions'. A famous saying of Dr. Johnson, reported by Boswell, is that 'the first Whig was the devil'. Lord Acton suggested an emendation: not the devil, but St. Thomas Aquinas, was the first Whig. But St. Thomas drew his Whig principles in no small measure from Aristotle; or at any rate, as it is perhaps juster to say, he used Aristotle to corroborate a medieval trend towards constitutionalism already expressed in the purpose of Magna Carta -- the purpose 'that the king is, and shall be, below the law'.

MPP4-201 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS ARE HIGHLY ATTENTIVE TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCE

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 1963, p.381.

On all these points, and on numerous other questions both of principle and of detail, it will be clear that Aristotle is paying very close attention to the institutions of the actual city-states of his own time. Once again we notice the importance to Aristotle of the description of how things are as an essential element in any reflection on how things ought to be. In the later books, when he makes his own proposals for an ideal community, he is as down-to-earth, as directly concerned with the light that the actual concrete specimens can throw on the abstract consideration of the formal and the ideal, as in his works on biology, ethics, and literature.

MPP4-202 ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZED SOME LEGITIMATE CLAIMS OF DEMOCRACY

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, 1946, p.liv.

Apart from this misinterpretation Aristotle is, on the whole, less critical of democracy than Plato. He recognizes, towards the middle of the third book of the Politics, that there is, after all, much to be said on behalf of the mass of people. They have a faculty of collective judgement, which hits the mark, alike in questions of art and matters of politics; 'some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all. They know again, from their own experience, how government and its actions pinch; and that knowledge has its value, and deserves its field of expression. These things suggest that the people should have their share in the government of the state; and Aristotle would assign to them those functions of electing the magistrates, and of holding the magistrates to account at the end of their term of office, which their faculty of judgement and their experience of the pressure of government both fit them to discharge.

MPP4-203 ARISTOTLE PREFERRED DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.172.

In certain circumstances Aristotle favoured monarchy. 'When either a whole family or an individual is so remarkable in point of excellence that his excellence exceeds that of everyone else, then it is just that that family or that individual should be king and sovereign over all matters.' But such circumstances are rare, and in practice Aristotle preferred democracy. 'The view that the multitude, rather than a few good men, should be sovereign . . . would seem perhaps to be true. For although each member of the multitude is not a good man, still it is possible that, when they come together, they should be better -- not as individuals but collectively, just as communal dinners are better than those supplied at one man's expense.'

MPP4-204 ARISTOTLE DOESN'T NEGLECT NON-RATIONAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE
Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE*, 1963, p.283-4.

Aristotle does indeed urge men to "aspire after divinity as far as a man may," and he firmly rejects the traditional maxim that men must "think mortal thoughts." But this is quite consistent with his general view of the nature and purpose of man as we find it in the earlier books of the *Ethics*. For him, as for Plato, the reason in man is divine, and its fulfillment transcends the limits of the rest of man's nature; but the rest of our nature is not to be denied or neglected. Even the most accomplished sage can achieve divine contemplation only rarely and briefly; at most times he is a man like the rest of us. We must not allow Aristotle's special remarks about the contemplative life to blind us to the importance he attaches to the state of moral and intellectual virtue that is the highest to which most men can aspire and that even the sage is rarely able to transcend.

MPP4-205 ARISTOTLE DEFENDS RATIONALITY AS A STANDARD

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.172-3.

The crude version of the attack is that made by Bertrand Russell. It is because his actions embody principles, conform or fail to conform to precepts of reason in a way that those of no other species do, that Aristotle defines man as a rational animal. Russell's comment upon this is to invoke the history of human folly and irrationality: men just are not rational in fact. But this is to miss Aristotle's point massively. For Aristotle is in no sense maintaining that men always act rationally, but that the standards by which men judge their own actions are those of reason. To call human beings irrational, as Russell rightly does, is to imply that it makes sense and is appropriate to judge men as succeeding or failing in the light of rational standards, and when Aristotle calls men rational beings, he is simply pointing out the meaningfulness and appropriateness of the application of predicates which refer to such standards.

MPP4-206 ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZED HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.lv.

Aristotle has a sense of historic development, which is as implicit in his general philosophy as the demand for radical reconstruction is embedded in the philosophy of Plato. The growth of potential capacity into actual 'form' or 'end', which is the general formula of his philosophy, leaves room for a large appreciation of history and the value of moving time: the Platonic conception of the impress of a timeless and eternally perfect Idea upon receptive matter, which may take place at any moment when that Idea is apprehended, is inimical to any belief in gradual development.

MPP4-207 ARISTOTLE DOESN'T SUBORDINATE THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE STATE

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.l-li.

It is easy to glide into the view that the state and its 'well-being' (in the full Greek sense of that term) are thus made into a higher end to which the individual and his personal development are sacrificed. Generally stated, such a view is erroneous: it involves a return, in another form, of that antithesis between political society and the individual which Plato and Aristotle refuse to recognize. The state (they believe) exists for the moral development and perfection of its individual members: the fulfillment and perfection of the individual means -- and is the only thing which means -- the perfection of the state; there is no antithesis.

MPP4-208 ARISTOTLE'S DEFENSE OF SLAVERY DOESN'T UNDERMINE HIS TOTAL THEORY

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.162.

We have in the course of this account identified a number of points at which Aristotle's account of the virtues can be seriously put in question. Some of these concern parts of Aristotle's theory which not only have to be rejected, but whose rejection need not carry any large implications for our attitudes to his overall theory. So it is, I have suggested, with Aristotle's indefensible defence of slavery.

MPP4-209 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS IS A COLLECTION OF PLATITUDES

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, *THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY*, 1933, p.72.

Aristotle's ethics is a branch of his logic: the ideal life is like a proper syllogism. He gives us a handbook of propriety rather than a stimulus to improvement. An ancient critic spoke of him as "moderate to excess." An extremist might call the *Ethics* the champion collection of platitudes in all literature; and an Anglophobe would be consoled with the thought that Englishmen in their youth had done advance penance for the imperialistic sins of their adult years, since both at Cambridge and at Oxford they had been compelled to read every word of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

MPP4-210 ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC ISN'T UNIVERSAL

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.5.

Perhaps his most surprising challenge concerns the doctrine of the mean, which he regards as a mere metaphor. In addition to challenging scholarship, Gauthier presents a Catholic critique of Aristotle. From this point of view, Aristotle is presumptuous in supposing that sin can be suppressed and forgotten, and he lacks a proper understanding of the nature and role of the will. Gauthier concludes that Aristotle, despite his efforts to do justice to the animal basis of human life, was trapped within the aristocratic intellectualism of the Socratic tradition and did not produce an ethics for all men.

MPP4-211 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS DISPLAY EMOTIONAL POVERTY

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.184.

More generally, there is an emotional poverty in the Ethics, which is not found in the earlier philosophers. There is something unduly smug and comfortable about Aristotle's speculations on human affairs; everything that makes men feel a passionate interest in each other seems to be forgotten. Even his account of friendship is tepid. He shows no sign of having had any of those experiences which make it difficult to preserve sanity; all the more profound aspects of the moral life are apparently unknown to him. He leaves out, one may say, the whole sphere of human experience with which religion is concerned. What he has to say is what will be useful to comfortable men of weak passions; but he has nothing to say to those who are possessed by a god or a devil, or whom outward misfortune drives to despair. For these reasons, in my judgement, his Ethics, in spite of its fame, is lacking in intrinsic importance.

MPP4-212 ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC IS LACKING IN BENEVOLENCE

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.183-4.

There is in Aristotle an almost complete absence of what may be called benevolence or philanthropy. The sufferings of mankind, in so far as he is aware of them, do not move him emotionally; he holds them, intellectually, to be an evil, but there is no evidence that they cause him unhappiness except when the sufferers happen to be his friends.

MPP4-213 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH MODERN EGALITARIANISM

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.183.

When we come to compare Aristotle's ethical tastes with our own, we find, in the first place, as already noted, an acceptance of inequality which is repugnant to much modern sentiment. Not only is there no objection to slavery, or to the superiority of husbands and fathers over wives and children, but it is held that what is best is essentially only for the few -- proud men and philosophers. Most men, it would seem to follow, are mainly means for the production of a few rulers and sages.

MPP4-214 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS APPEAL TO THE MEDIOCRE

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.172-3.

The views of Aristotle on ethics represent, in the main, the prevailing opinions of educated and experienced men of his day. They are not, like Plato's, impregnated with mystical religion; nor do they countenance such unorthodox theories as are to be found in the Republic concerning property and the family. Those who neither fall below nor rise above the level of decent, well-behaved citizens will find in the Ethics a systematic account of the principles by which they hold that their conduct should be regulated. Those who demand anything more will be disappointed. The book appeals to the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling it cannot but be repulsive.

MPP4-215 ARISTOTLE WAS A MORAL CONVENTIONALIST

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.174.

Aristotle's opinions on moral questions are always such as were conventional in his day. On some points they differ from those of our time, chiefly where some form of aristocracy comes in. We think that human beings, at least in ethical theory, all have equal rights, and that justice involves equality; Aristotle thinks that justice involves, not equality, but right proportion, which is only sometimes equality.

MPP4-216 ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC EXAGGERATES REASON AND UNDERSTRESSES WILL

R.A. Gauthier, French philosopher, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.29.

But, besides pure reason, Aristotle's psychology is aware only of desire; and since this desire is irrational in essence and thus in itself is entirely animal, there can be only one way for it to become a human value, and that is by becoming reasonable in obeying reason. Thus, in the last analysis, reason remains the sole source of value, and Aristotle's attempt to escape from intellectualism falls short. Thus he did not know how to establish true liberty, or to set up an order of values independent of the strictly rational values. He could only have succeeded in that by discovering that the mind itself is not only reason, but also, and above all, will. In that case, after having proclaimed that happiness ought to be accessible to everyone, he would not have had to exclude the bulk of mankind from it. For if the heights of strictly rational contemplation are doubtless always forbidden to the bulk of mankind, the highest adherence to the good is open to the liberty of all men of good will.

MPP4-217 ACTING IN ACCORD WITH REASON ISN'T SUFFICIENT TO MAKE AN ACT MORAL

Frederick Siegler, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.41.

Furthermore, if Aristotle thinks that human good, or what is morally praiseworthy in human action, is activity in accordance with the efficient functioning of man, then it follows from his argument that an action is morally praiseworthy if and only if it is performed in accordance with the efficient functioning of the peculiar ability of reasoning. But that conclusion does not seem to be correct. For as we have suggested, a man might reason well about evil aims, thereby using well his peculiar ability and not be morally praiseworthy. To act on well designed reasons may be a necessary condition but it is certainly not a sufficient condition for moral praise.

MPP4-218 REASON ISN'T SUFFICIENT FOR MORALITY
Frederick Siegler, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.42.

And as I have suggested, it may be a necessary condition for moral praise that a man be able to reason well about his aims, but that is not sufficient. He must have the right aims. And having the right aims is unfortunately not any more peculiar to human beings than having the wrong aims. But to be a moral man one must be more than an efficient reasoner.

MPP4-219 THE EXERCISE OF REASON DOESN'T NECESSARILY LEAD TO GOODNESS

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.198.

The view that reason is the characteristic quality of man was held by Aristotle, who held that reason was the best excellence in accordance with which man's soul may be developed. Now it is certainly a fact that, without a certain amount of deliberate reflection (which is a combination of Aristotle's reason and Hegel's self-consciousness) a man could not be regarded as fully human and would certainly be incapable of those plans for the betterment of others and his own self-improvement which are characteristic of the good man. Yet it is hard to believe that moral goodness is in an unusual degree characteristic of those who carry this deliberate reflection to extreme forms in the more abstract analyses of logic and metaphysics.

MPP4-220 THE GREEK VIEW OF GOODNESS IS OVERLY RATIONALISTIC

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.290.

The outcome of the teaching of the Greek philosophers on virtue may be expressed in modern language by saying that goodness implies a certain point of view, and this would be generally accepted among moralists. A man who does good deeds simply by impulse or from outside pressure can hardly be regarded as truly virtuous. The view of the Greeks that this point of view is predominantly intellectual or rational, so that coherent reasoning must always be the dominant guide, is not so generally acceptable in modern times except among idealists who have been influenced by Hegel. In the lives of good men the point of view implied in goodness has been more often religious than intellectual. The religious outlook, in the case of the higher religions at any rate, does imply that the good life is rational and consistent, but it implies a great deal more for it holds that goodness gets its inspiration from a personal loyalty rather than from the need of being intellectually consistent.

MPP4-211 ARISTOTLE HAS TOO LIMITED A VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.41-2.

A third line of criticism is, I think, more telling. We might wonder whether Aristotle's view of human reason, and of human nature in general, is adequate and well rounded. It will occur to many readers that the life of the intellectual searcher is, despite Aristotle's contrary assertion, no less pleasant than that of the knower: the joys and excitement of the chase usually equal and often exceed those of the tranquil review, and it is by no means clear that contemplation is a better or more perfect activity than study and ratiocination. More generally, it is not unnatural to suppose that such features as affection and sympathy for other people, and sensibility to and appreciation of beautiful things, may claim a place alongside purely intellectual activity as pre-eminently human characteristics. If that is so, the 'happy' man will be a lover of men and an admirer of beauty as well as a contemplator of truth - a friend and an aesthete as well as a thinker. Human excellence, in short, runs in a broader and more amiable stream than Aristotle imagined.

MPP4-212 ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE IS TOO AHISTORICAL

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.159.

This blindness of Aristotle's was not of course private to Aristotle; it was part of the general, although not universal, blindness of his culture. It is intimately connected with another form of limitation. Aristotle writes as if barbarians and Greeks both had fixed natures and in so viewing them he brings home to us once again the ahistorical character of his understanding of human nature.

MPP4-213 ARISTOTLE STRESSED THE HUMAN ESSENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF INDIVIDUALITY

Tibor Machan, Professor of Philosophy, Auburn, *INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS*, 1989, p.46-7.

It makes sense to designate this as the core of the concept of good: being in a position to complete the nature of what something is makes that something a good one of its kind. The human good, at its most complete, would be the most fully, consistently realized manifestation of human nature. We would have an excellent human being if we found one who most fully and consistently realized human nature. The distinction between this view and Aristotle's may be noted here: we are resting human goodness on human nature, not merely human essence. Aristotle's Platonic intellectualism came from his essentialist rather than naturalist conception of the human good. Human nature is richer, less specialized than human essence. When we consider human nature, then, a person's individuality is of as much significance as his or her common humanity.

MPP4-224 ARISTOTLE EXAGGERATES THE UNITARY NATURE OF HAPPINESS

J.L. Mackie, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, *ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1977, p.139.

The utilitarian calculus is a myth, and not, I think, a helpful one. There are and no doubt always will be considerable differences between people about what they value or think worthwhile in human life, about what could be called their concepts of happiness or eudaimonia; and if we say, with Aristotle, that everyone aims at eudaimonia we run the risk of deceiving ourselves by a mere verbal trick into thinking that human purposes are more unitary than they are or ever will be.

MPP4-225 HAPPINESS ISN'T THE PURPOSE OF OUR LIVES

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.204.

The suggestion in eudaemonism that happiness, a kind of higher pleasure, is the end of the moral life takes us back into many of the limitations and difficulties of hedonism. It is probably true to say about happiness what we have already said about pleasure; just as pleasure is not the aim of our actions but an accompaniment of their normal and successful performance, so happiness is not the aim of our lives but it is an accompaniment of the normal and successful carrying out of the duties of our station, to use again Bradley's phrase.

MPP4-226 ARISTOTLE'S DEPICTION OF THE VIRTUES IS TOO INDETERMINATE

J.L. Mackie, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, *ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1977, p.186.

As guidance about what is the good life, what precisely one ought to do, or even by what standard one should try to decide what one ought to do; this is too circular to be very helpful. And though Aristotle's account is filled out with detailed descriptions of many of the virtues, moral as well as intellectual, the air of indeterminacy persists. We learn the names of the pairs of contrary vices that contrast with each of the virtues, but very little about where or how to draw the dividing lines, where or how to fix the mean. As Sidgwick says, he 'only indicates the whereabouts of virtue'. We must, then, take this mainly as a formal sketch of the structure of the good life, which leaves the specific content still to be filled in.

MPP4-227 SOME OF ARISTOTLE'S VIRTUES ARE JUST CULTURE SPECIFIC

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.78.

So agreeableness is a general human virtue, although we may come across an occasional people, such as the bad-tempered Dobuans, who may not rate it as such. But toward the other end of the scale there are virtues which are more or less optional, so to speak, which belong to particular contingent social forms, or which are matters of purely individual choice. The non-Aristotelian, but Christian virtues of loving one's enemies and of humility, with the practice of turning the other cheek, appear to belong in the latter category; the English and much more Aristotelian public school virtue of being "a gentleman" in the former. These differences Aristotle does not recognize, and so we find side by side in Aristotle's list virtues which anyone would find it hard not to recognize as virtues and alleged virtues which are difficult to comprehend outside Aristotle's own social context and Aristotle's own preferences within that context.

MPP4-228 ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE IS ONLY POSSIBLE FOR A FEW

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.176.

Whatever may be thought of the magnanimous man, one thing is clear: there cannot be very many of him in a community. I do not mean merely in the general sense in which there are not likely to be many virtuous men, on the ground that virtue is difficult; what I mean is that the virtues of the magnanimous man largely depend upon his having an exceptional social position. Aristotle considers ethics a branch of politics, and it is not surprising, after his praise of pride, to find that he considers monarchy the best form of government, and aristocracy the next best. Monarchs and aristocrats can be "magnanimous," but ordinary citizens would be laughable if they attempted to live up to such a pattern.

MPP4-229 NOT ALL VIRTUES CORRESPOND TO A GOLDEN MEAN

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.173-4.

We now come to the famous doctrine of the golden mean. Every virtue is a mean between two extremes, each of which is a vice. This is proved by an examination of the various virtues. Courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness; liberality, between prodigality and meanness; proper pride, between vanity and humility; ready wit, between buffoonery and boorishness; modesty, between bashfulness and shamelessness. Some virtues do not seem to fit into this scheme; for instance, truthfulness. Aristotle says that this is a mean between boastfulness and mock-modesty (1108a), but this only applies to truthfulness about oneself. I do not see how truthfulness in any wider sense can be fitted into the scheme. There was once a mayor who had adopted Aristotle's doctrine; at the end of his term of office he made a speech saying that he had endeavoured to steer the narrow line between partiality on the one hand and impartiality on the other. The view of truthfulness as a mean seems scarcely less absurd.

MPP4-230 THE IDEA OF THE GOLDEN MEAN IS OVERLY ABSTRACT

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.66-7.

Moreover, there is a falsely abstract air about the doctrine. For Aristotle does not, as he might seem to, think that there is one and only one right choice of emotion or action, independent of circumstances. What is courage in one situation would in another be rashness and in a third cowardice. Virtuous action cannot be specified without reference to the judgment of a prudent man -- that is, of one who knows how to take account of circumstances. Consequently, knowledge of the mean cannot just be knowledge of a formula, it must be knowledge of how to apply the rules to choices. And here the notions of excess and defect will not help us.

MPP4-231 THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN IS SIMPLY A PLATITUDE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.26. The Doctrine of the Mean is incapable of advising because it enshrines an analytic truth. 'Acting virtuously requires observation of the mean' is analytic: once the metaphor of the mean is understood, it is clear that observing the mean is included in the concept of acting virtuously. And acting viciously includes, by the same token, the notion of overdoing or underdoing something. Thus stated, the Doctrine of the Mean is seen as a piece of meta-ethics; it teaches that it is part of the concepts of virtue and vice that virtues and vices come in triads - every virtuous disposition to do X in just the right way is flanked by two vicious dispositions, one to overdo X-ing and the other to underdo it. Such a theory, though unhelpful practically, might at least seem to be conceptually illuminating; unfortunately, as Aristotle's own analysis quickly reveals, the light fails: once the Doctrine is literally expressed it becomes platitudinous.

MPP4-232 ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN HAS NO PRACTICAL FORCE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, introduction to *THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE* (Penguin Books), 1976, p.24. What, then, is the mean 'relative to us'? It is, it appears, whatever is neither too much for us nor too little for us. If I am offered a steak of any weight between half a pound and a pound and a half I shall not, in Aristotle's sense, follow the mean by plumping for a pound; rather, I must order the weight that happens to suit me, whatever it may be - I must choose what is neither too much for my system to take nor too little to sustain my physique. It follows (though Aristotle does not draw the inference) that the moralist's mean need not be the middle point of a continuum in any reasonable sense of 'middle': any point at all may turn out to be the 'mean' relative to me. I may 'observe the mean' with regard to exercise by doing absolutely nothing or by exercising for all I am worth; the 'mean' amount of port may, for me, be none. Thus understood, the Doctrine of the Mean has no practical or advisory force: if you ask me how much cake you should help yourself to, and I reply 'Neither too much nor too little', your choice has hardly been eased. It is as though I were to hand a man a pack of cards and urge him to choose a middle one - adding that by 'middle' I meant 'middle relative to the chooser', and that any card in the pack may be middle in this sense.

MPP4-233 ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN RELIES ON A FALSE GEOMETRICAL ANALOGY

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.103.

What Aristotle intends to present his method of determining the moral good or virtue as a quasi mathematical-geometrical operation is shown by his saying that although it is possible to find what is good or a virtue, it is not easy: "It is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find the middle point in anything: for instance, not everybody can find the center of a circle, but only someone who knows geometry." To determine the good is, in principle, the same problem as to determine the middle point of a straight line or the center of a circle. The quantification of the moral value, the three-partite scheme of "too much," "mean," "too little," the essential presupposition of a mathematical-geometrical method of determining the good, is a fallacy. In the realm of moral values there are no measurable quantities as in the realm of reality as object of natural science. Ethics deals with qualities only -- with the qualities of good and evil, right and wrong, just or unjust, virtuous or vicious; that is to say, with conformity and nonconformity to a norm presupposed as valid.

MPP4-234 VIRTUE ISN'T NECESSARILY A MID-POINT
Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.108.

Since the two extremes between which virtue lies as a "mean with respect to us" are not so determined as the two extreme points of a line must be determined in order that we can determine the point equidistant from them -- since the two vices are characterized only as "too much" and "too little" -- all we can say of the virtue we are looking for is that it lies somewhere between them. There is no reason to assume that the virtue lies exactly in the middle and not nearer to the one or the other vice.

MPP4-235 VIRTUE ISN'T A MATTER OF DEGREE
Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.104.

The statement that a virtue is the mean between a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess, as between something that is too little and something that is too much, implies the idea that the relationship between virtue and vice is a relationship of degrees. But, since virtue consists in conformity, and vice in nonconformity of a behavior to a moral norm, the relationship between virtue and vice cannot be that of different degrees. For with respect to this conformity or nonconformity no degrees are possible. A behavior can neither "too much" nor "too little" conform, it can only conform or not conform to a (moral or legal) norm; it can only contradict or not contradict a norm. If we presuppose the norm: men shall not lie, or -- expressed positively -- men shall tell the truth, a definite statement made by a man is true or is not true, is a lie or is not a lie. If it is true, the man's behavior is in conformity with the norm; if it is a lie, the man's behavior is in contradiction to the norm. But the behavior cannot be in different degrees in conformity with or in contradiction to the norm. It cannot be more or less and, hence, not too much or too little in conformity or contradiction to the norm.

MPP4-236 RIGHTNESS IS ADHERENCE TO A NORM, NOT A MATTER OF DEGREE

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.105.

The feeling which accompanies or causes a certain behavior may be capable of different degrees of intensity but not the conformity or nonconformity of this behavior with the moral norm which constitutes the virtue or the vice, the quality of being right or wrong. Neither of these degrees or amounts is, in itself, "too much" or "too little," or represents excess or deficiency. To be "too much" or "too little," are value judgments which are possible only if one presupposes that a certain degree or "amount" is the "right" one. And a certain degree or amount of feeling is "right" because the behavior accompanied or caused by this feeling is right, that is, in conformity with the moral norm. What is right or wrong is the behavior in its relation to the moral norm; and this relation is not capable of degrees. This is why Aristotle cannot consistently maintain his statement that the virtue is a mean, and, as such, opposed to the extremes, but has to admit that virtue is an extreme itself.

MPP4-237 THE IDEA OF THE MEAN IS JUST A FIGURE OF SPEECH

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.105-6.

The ideas of "too much" and "too little," designating a quantitative distance from the good, are merely figures of speech, a special metaphor in presenting the relation of a human behavior to a moral (or legal) norm. Aristotle compares the fact that a certain behavior corresponds to a presupposed norm with the middle point of a line, and the fact that a behavior does not correspond to a presupposed norm with the two ends of the line. When the phenomenon is described without using a metaphor, the tripartite scheme of the mesotes formula must immediately be replaced by a bipartite scheme: the antagonism of good and evil, right and wrong, conformity and nonconformity. "Too much" and "too little" are not -- as the doctrine of the mean presents them -- two different quantities of the same moral substratum, but two different expressions designating one and the same quality, namely nonconformity -- the fact that a certain behavior contradicts a norm. Virtue means: to comply with a moral norm, vice: to violate a moral norm.

MPP4-238 THE FORMULA OF THE MEAN DISTORTS THE TRUE MORAL PROBLEM

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.106-7.

In the spatial metaphor that virtue is the mean between two vices as two extremes, one conformity is brought in relation to two nonconformities, without expressing the fact that there are two different norms which the two patterns of behavior, characterized as "vices," are violating. The mesotes doctrine creates the appearance as if it were one and the same norm which one violates by, so to speak, remaining below, or by going beyond the line determined by it. The mesotes formula veils the problem it pretends to solve. Since the norms of a given moral system are very often in conflict with one another, it is necessary, in order to act morally, to restrict the sphere of validity of the different norms in the proper way. That "virtue" is the "mean" between two vices means that morally correct is only the behavior by which the one of the conflicting norms is obeyed without the other being violated. The true problem is to show how this is possible, how, for example, a man's behavior can conform to the norm of courage and at the same time to that of prudence. To this question the mesotes doctrine gives no answer; nor to any question aiming at a determination of the moral value.

MPP4-239 THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN IS SIMPLY A TAUTOLOGY

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.108.

The statement that a virtue lies somewhere between two vices is a figure of speech. Its meaning, without the use of a metaphor, is: if we compare a virtue with two vices, the virtue is neither the one nor the other vice. The mesotes formula amounts to the tautology that: if something is correct it is not too much and not too little -- or, in other words, that a virtue is not a vice, that good is not evil, right is not wrong.

MPP4-240 THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN SIMPLY JUSTIFIES THE EXISTING ORDER

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.109.

Although the ethics of the mesotes doctrine pretends to establish in an authoritative way the moral value, it leaves the solution of its very problem to another authority: the determination of what is evil or a vice, and, consequently, also the determination of what is good or a virtue. It is the authority of the positive morality and the positive law -- it is the established social order. By presupposing in its mesotes formula the established social order, the ethics of Aristotle justifies the positive morality and the positive law which, as a matter of fact, determine what is "too much" and what "too little," what are the extremes of evil or wrong, and thereby what is the mean, that is, good and right. In this justification of the established social order lies the true function of the tautology which a critical analysis of the mesotes formula reveals.

MPP4-241 THE VIRTUES DON'T ACTUALLY FALL BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.103.

Are the qualities Aristotle recommended really situated between extremes? Cowardice may be lack of courage, but is rashness too much courage? It would seem that rashness is more like courage without the use of intelligence, which places it on a different continuum. Prodigality isn't just being too generous, but is rather being generous without using rational judgment.

MPP4-242 ARISTOTLE'S COURAGE EXAMPLE FAILS

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.106.

By characterizing the vice of rashness compared with the virtue of courage as "too much" we express the idea that the behavior contradicts a norm other than the one whose fulfillment constitutes the virtue concerned. Only rashness, the "too much," not cowardice, the "too little," is a violation of the norm prescribing courage. A rash man is courageous, whereas a coward is not. The former is courageous but he has too much confidence. In this sense he is "too" courageous; and that means that he, by being courageous, violates another norm, the one prescribing prudence, the duty to take into consideration the possibility of success, the principle that the value we risk to destroy should be in a certain proportion to the value we try to realize by our action.

MPP4-243 ARISTOTLE DEFENDED NATURAL SLAVERY
Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.173.

But liberty is severely restricted in Aristotle's State. It is the prerogative of citizens, and a large majority of the population does not possess citizenship. Women have no liberty. And there are slaves. Some men, according to Aristotle, are slaves by nature, and it is therefore permissible to make them slaves in fact. 'Someone who, being a man, belongs by nature not to himself but to someone else, is a slave by nature. He belongs to someone else if, being a man, he is an article of property -- and an article of property is an instrument which aids the actions of and is separable from its owner.' Slaves may enjoy a good life -- they may have kind masters. But they have no liberty and no rights.

MPP4-244 ARISTOTLE FALSELY ACCEPTED SLAVERY AS NATURAL

Mortimer Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research, *ARISTOTLE FOR EVERYBODY*, 1978, p.113.

At this point in his thinking, Aristotle made a serious mistake. Living at a time and in a society in which some human beings were born into slavery and treated as slaves, as well as a society in which women were treated as inferiors, he made the mistake of thinking that many human beings had inferior natures. He did not realize that those who appeared to be inferior appeared to be so as the result of the way in which they were treated, not as a result of inadequate native endowments.

MPP4-245 ARISTOTLE'S NATURALISM JUSTIFIED RACISM AND SEXISM

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE*, 1963, p.381.

Like Plato and nearly all other ancient thinkers, Aristotle accepts the institution of slavery almost as a matter of course. His treatment of the topic provides a very good example of the application to politics of his general philosophical doctrine. He maintains that some men are by nature fitted only to be slaves, or "living tools," and that they are therefore achieving their own proper *telos* by performing servile duties for other and higher beings. Here he shows the understandable but regrettable prejudice of the Greeks that they were by nature superior to non-Greek, "barbarian," peoples. He is also typically Greek in his reaffirmation, as against Plato, of the superiority of men over women.

MPP4-246 ARISTOTLE WAS SEXIST AND ELITIST

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.139-40.

Aristotle admits that slavery is unjust if it is the result of conquest; but he thinks there are 'natural slaves', who lack the developed rational capacities of a normal human being; and for a natural slave, he holds, slavery is not only excusable, but even beneficial to the slave himself. Unlike Plato, Aristotle assumes that women must in principle be excluded from a share in political activity, because of presumed natural differences. In general, he believes that the natural differences between human beings are sharp enough to make the restriction of political activity both expedient and just.

MPP4-247 ARISTOTLE WAS AN ELITIST

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.121.

Aristotle was an elitist who didn't believe that everyone was capable of the virtues; some people were worthless, natural slaves. Even for those who were capable of developing moral dispositions, external circumstances could prevent them from reaching the goal of happiness. The moral virtues were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for happiness. One must, in addition to being virtuous, be healthy, wealthy, wise, and have good fortune.

MPP4-248 ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF THE VIRTUES IS RACIST AND CLASSIST

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *AFTER VIRTUE*, 1984, p.159.

What is likely to affront us-and rightly-is Aristotle's writing off of non-Greeks, barbarians and slaves, as not merely not possessing political relationships, but as incapable of them. With this we may couple his view that only the affluent and those of high status can achieve certain key virtues, those of munificence and of magnanimity; craftsmen and tradesmen constitute an inferior class, even if they are not slaves. Hence the peculiar excellences of the exercise of craft skill and manual labor are invisible from the standpoint of Aristotle's catalogue of the virtues.

MPP4-249 ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC DISPLAYS STRONG CLASS BIAS

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.68.

Aristotle's social bias is thus unmistakable. This bias would not matter philosophically but for the fact that it prevents Aristotle from raising the questions, How do I decide what is in fact included in the list of the virtues? could I invent a virtue? is it logically open to me to consider a vice what others have considered a virtue? And to beg these questions is to suggest strongly that there just are so many virtues -- in the same sense that at a given period there just are so many Greek states.

MPP4-250 ARISTOTLE WAS A RICH CONSERVATIVE

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.68.

Thus at every point where a reference to Socrates occurs in Aristotle we find none of Plato's respect, although a deep respect for Plato himself is shown. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that what we see here is Aristotle's class-bound conservatism silently and partisanly rewriting the table of the virtues, and so from yet another point of view suspicion is cast upon the doctrine of the mean.

MPP4-251 ARISTOTLE CALLED FOR CONTINUOUS SOCIAL INTERVENTION BY THE STATE

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.173-4.

The voice of the State, muted in economic affairs, is strident in social matters. The State intervenes before birth: 'since the legislator must from the start consider how the children who are reared are to have the best physique, he must first pay attention to sexual union, determining when and between what sort of people marital relations may exist'. Interference continues during childhood, especially in connection with education. No one would dispute that the legislator must busy himself especially about the education of the young . . . Since the whole city has one goal, it is evident that there must also be one and the same education for everyone, and that the superintendence of this should be public and not private . . . Public matters should be publicly managed; and we should not think that each of the citizens belongs to himself, but that they all belong to the State.

MPP4-252 ARISTOTLE'S STATE IS HIGHLY AUTHORITARIAN

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.174.

Aristotle describes in considerable detail the various ways in which the State should regulate the lives of its citizens. Each regulation, however benevolent in purpose, is a curtailment of liberty -- and in Aristotle's claim that the citizens 'all belong to the State' the reader may detect the infant voice of totalitarianism. If Aristotle loved liberty, he did not love it enough. His State is highly authoritarian.

MPP4-253 USING THE STATE TO PROMOTE THE GOOD LIFE LEADS TO REPRESSION

Jonathan Barnes, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.174.

What has gone wrong? Some may suspect that Aristotle erred at the very first step. He confidently assigns a positive function to the State, supposing that its goal is the promotion of the good life. Given that, it is easy to imagine that the State, eager to ameliorate the human condition, may properly intervene in any aspect of human life and may compel its subjects to do whatever will make them happy. Those who see the State as a promoter of Good often end up as advocates of repression. Lovers of liberty will prefer to assign a negative function to the State and to regard it rather as a defence and protection against Evil.

MPP4-254 ARISTOTLE'S STATE DESTROYS MORAL AUTONOMY

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.li.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle allows weight to the fundamental consideration that moral action which is done *ad verba magistri* ceases to be moral. The state should indeed promote morality; but the direct promotion of morality by an act of state-command is the destruction of moral autonomy. The good will is the maker of goodness; and the state can only increase goodness by increasing the freedom of the good will.

MPP4-255 PLATO AND ARISTOTLE REMAIN PATERNALISTIC

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.li-iii.

But after all we do an injustice to the theorists of the city-state if we compare them with the theorists of the great modern state. Their state, we have always to remind ourselves, was a church as well as a state; and most churches believe in moral guidance and stimulus. Indeed there is a stage of moral growth, when the good will is still in the making, at which it is a great gain to be habituated by precept in right-doing. Any state which undertakes an educational function, like every parent, must recognize the existence of this stage, and must include 'the strengthening of character' in the curriculum of its schools. Yet it is but a stage. The grown man must see and choose his way. Plato and Aristotle perhaps treated their contemporaries too much as if they were 'always children'.

MPP4-256 ARISTOTLE'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY SIMPLY DEFERS TO THE JUDGEMENTS OF THE STATE

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.116.

Since a rationalistic moral philosophy is not capable of determining the content of a just order, of answering the questions what is good and what is evil, which differences between individuals are relevant and which irrelevant, who is equal and what is equal, it must presuppose these determinations. This means: leave it to the state (that is, to the positive legislator) who establishes a legal order' a system of general norms to be applied by the judge.

MPP4-257 ARISTOTLE SIMPLY GLORIFIES POSITIVE LAW

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.9.

Likewise, his analysis of justice as proportional reciprocity is reduced to "the apparently in significant truism 'to each his own.'" It is the ruler of the state who is left to determine what concrete criteria of desert are applicable. Thus, Aristotle gives us "an unconditional glorification of positive law" -- a justification for whatever laws are actually in effect in a state at any given time. For Kelsen, this is the outcome of empty rationalism in moral philosophy, an orientation which links the conservative Aristotle to the radical St. Augustine, as well as to St Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant.

MPP4-258 ARISTOTLE DEFENDS AN OVERLY PAROCHIAL VIEW OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.83.

All Aristotle's conceptual brilliance in the course of the argument declines at the end to an apology for this extraordinarily parochial form of human existence. At once the objection will be made: this is to judge Aristotle against the background of our values, not of his. It is to be guilty of anachronism. But this is not true. Socrates had already presented an alternative set of values in both his teaching and his life; Greek tragedy presents other, different possibilities; Aristotle did not choose what he chose for lack of knowledge of alternative views of human life. How, then, are we to understand this union in the *Ethics* of philosophical acumen and social obscurantism? To answer this we must look at his work in a wider perspective.

MPP4-259 ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF DEMOCRACY IS MISGUIDED

Ernest Barker, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge, *THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE*, 1946, p.liii-iv.

It is this fact rather than aristocratic leanings -- it is a dislike of what they regard as anarchy, because anarchy is blank negation -- which makes them both (but Plato far more than Aristotle) the critics of democracy. We can understand the rigour of their criticism; but we can hardly admit its justice. Democratic government in the fourth century did not mean anarchy. The Athenian citizens had their defects: they loved the free theatre almost more than the free city; yet the last days of Athenian freedom were not a disgrace either to the city-state or to the democratic constitution, and the career of Demosthenes was an answer to the strictures of Plato and Aristotle. Discipline and order were abroad in the days before and after Chaeronea: neither Eubulus nor Lysicles was a demagogue; and, indeed, the statesmen of the fourth century in general stand as a proof that the Athenian people had some sense of merit and its desert. Nor can Aristotle's censure upon 'extreme' democracy, that it means the overthrow of established law by temporary decrees of the sovereign people, be justified at the bar of history. It is a misconception of the facts.

MPP4-260 ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE IS EMPTY

James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, Columbia and University of California, Riverside, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, 1967, p.8-9.

Kelsen claims that Aristotle's treatment of justice as a mean between extremes tells us nothing about justice. It tells us merely that everyone should get what he deserves to get. No one would think of doubting that "too much" and "too little" are to be avoided, and "what is just right" is to be sought. But what is "just right"? This is the crucial question, and Aristotle fails to answer it.

MPP4-261 ARISTOTLE IGNORES THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION OF JUSTICE

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.112.

To illustrate his formula of distributive justice Aristotle refers to the "principle of assignment by desert." He says: "All are agreed that justice in distributions must be based on desert of some sort, although they do not all mean the same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion free birth; those of oligarchical sympathies, wealth or, in other cases, birth; upholders of aristocracy make it virtue." But his moral philosophy is not capable and considers itself not competent to answer the question which of these criteria is the just one. This, however, is the very question of justice.

MPP4-262 ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE FAILS

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.115.

That retribution is considered as a principle of justice may be explained by the fact that it originates in one of the most primitive instincts of man, his desire for revenge. Aristotle's objection against the rule "like for like" as principle of justice, is that the relation between merit and reward, crime and punishment is not equality but proportionality. Return service shall not be equal to the service, the punishment not equal to the crime -- this is impossible -- but "proportional," which means that the one should be in an adequate proportion to the other. But this again is merely a presentation, not the solution, of the problem. The decisive question as to what is corrective justice remains unanswered. The pretended answer is a mere sham answer. It is again the tautology of the formula, "To each his own."

MPP4-263 THE IDEA OF PROPORTIONAL JUSTICE ISN'T USEFUL

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.111.

There is no equality in nature. Nor is there equality in society. Equality as a social category, the statement that two individuals are socially equal, does not mean that there are no differences between these individuals, but that certain differences which really exist, as for instance differences concerning age, sex, race, wealth, are considered to be irrelevant. The decisive question as to social equality is: Which differences are irrelevant? To this question Aristotle's mathematical formula of distributive justice has no answer. Nor to the other essential question as to which rights the legislator ought to allot to the individuals in order to be just.

MPP4-264 ARISTOTLE'S FORMULA FOR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IS COMPATIBLE WITH ANY SOCIAL ORDER

Hans Kelsen, *ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ISSUES AND INTERPRETATIONS*, James Walsh and Henry Shapiro, eds., 1967, p.111-2.

Aristotle's formula of distributive justice says only, that if rights are allotted, and if two individuals are equal, equal rights shall be allotted to them. According to this formula a capitalistic as well as a communistic legal order is just, and a legal order which confers political rights only to men who have a certain income, or who belong to a certain race, or are of noble birth is as just as a legal order which confers the same rights to all human beings who are of a certain age without regard to other differences. Any privilege whatever is covered by this formula. When a legal order reserves all possible rights to one single individual (the ruler) and assigns only duties to all others (the ruled), such a legal order too is just, since the difference between the ruler and the ruled is considered to be decisive, so that the ruled cannot be considered as equal to the ruler.

MPP4-265 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS LACK CONTEMPORARY UTILITY

Bertrand Russell, *Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.184.

Aristotle's *Politics* is both interesting and important -- interesting, as showing the common prejudices of educated Greeks in his time, and important as a source of many principles which remained influential until the end of the Middle Ages. I do not think there is much in it that could be of any practical use to a statesman of the present day, but there is a great deal that throws light on the conflicts of parties in different parts of the Hellenic world.

MPP4-266 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS ARE DESIGNED FOR SMALL CITY-STATES

Jonathan Barnes, *Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Aristotle," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.171-2.

Societies appear in different forms. The first thing to be stressed in connection with Aristotle's idea of a State is its size. 'A State cannot be made from ten men -- and from 100,000 it is no longer a State.' The Greek city-states whose histories formed the factual background to Aristotle's political theory were, most of them, of pygmy proportions. They were frequently torn by faction, and their independence was ultimately destroyed by the advance of Macedonian power. Aristotle was familiar with the evils of faction (Book V of the *Politics* is given over to an analysis of the causes of civil strife), and he was intimate with the Macedonian court; yet he never lost his conviction that the small city-state was the right -- the natural -- form of civil society.

MPP4-267 HAPPINESS IS THE OVERRIDING VALUE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.88-9.

Finally it is necessary to establish that the principle of happiness is supreme and must override the claims of any other principle that may be put forward, should they happen to clash. I shall put forward three arguments to this end, although the third is merely the reverse side of the second and cannot be fully completed until the examination of the principles of freedom and equality in the next two chapters is completed. The arguments are: (a) that the notion of justice presupposes, and, apart from procedural principles, only presupposes, the principle of happiness; (b) that the principle of happiness is the only principle that commands universal assent and therefore does not need proof; and (c) that the other principles put forward by the liberal-democrats as being of equal significance to the principle of happiness, namely the principles of freedom and equality, cannot be substantiated except by reference to and as subordinate to the principle of happiness.

MPP4-268 ONLY HAPPINESS IS UNIVERSALLY DESIRED

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.93.

In short: the principle of happiness must be accepted as the supreme principle because enmeshment, and hence happiness, is the only thing that all men necessarily desire, and hence is the only thing that all men can accept as morally desirable; and in lieu of any formal proof to establish the validity of any principle, we must accept the universal agreement of mankind. In addition commitment to any other moral principle presupposes that adherence to it will promote the kind of situation with which the individual who commits himself may enmesh.

MPP4-269 ALL PEOPLE SEEK HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.86.

In claiming, then, that all men pursue their own happiness we are saying that, in any situation which offers a choice of activities to a man, he will select that course of activity which, it seems to him, will cause him least frustration, anxiety, guilt, envy or generically dissatisfaction. A man will not choose what he considers to be more rather than less unhappiness, but, of course, whether obeying the dictates of a sense of duty, or showing gratitude, will seem to him to be more or less necessary to feeling relatively happy than, say, pursuing immediate pleasures, will depend on the individual. We accept that some individuals are so constituted as to calculate their happiness by intensity and some by duration; some look further ahead than others; and all make mistakes at some time. But we say that 'in so far as a person really acts, rather than being acted upon, he acts on his own evaluation to try to make the world more nearly what he would like it to be' and he will not want it to be what he would judge as frustrating, etc.

MPP4-270 TRUTH IS SUBORDINATE TO HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.98-9.

To stifle opinions is certainly to risk stifling the truth and one might therefore, in the interests of truth, argue that no opinion, however inflammatory, ought to be stifled. But to say this is to argue that the pursuit of truth is more important than the principle of utility, or else that the business of pursuing the truth must, on balance, contribute to happiness, which, apart from being inherently dubious cuts no ice in the face of the Republic, which is perfectly happy. The pursuit of truth is certainly something that most philosophers, not least Plato, are drawn towards. But to argue that therefore a Hitler ought to be allowed to incite a nation by expressing his opinions is to leave the principle of utility far behind.

MPP4-271 PLATO'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IS ESSENTIALLY UTILITARIAN

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.1.

The view that I shall put forward is that utilitarianism is the only acceptable ethical theory and that this was recognised by Plato in the Republic. What is particularly important about Plato is his ability to take a comprehensive view of the logical consequences for society of his ethical standpoint, and hence his ability to consider education in the context of ethical, social and political considerations rather than in isolation. Stated simply his ethical and political philosophy is based upon the principle that all men are equally entitled to happiness and that consequently provision should be made for the happiness of all men in the ideal state. This ultimate moral principle has the immediate consequence for education that its prime object should be to produce adults who may successfully contribute to the happiness of the whole community, while themselves enjoying happiness within that community. This in turn leads to the view that the claims of freedom must be subordinated to the claims of happiness and consequently (if the argument is accepted) that various terms currently lauded in educational circles that are essentially regarded as desirable under the aegis of freedom, such as 'autonomy' and 'self-development', have to be reassessed as educational objectives.

MPP4-272 SOCIAL STABILITY IS ESSENTIAL FOR HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.70-1.

In view of the facts, it is scarcely surprising that Plato aimed at a stable state and physical security. A stable political situation cannot be regarded as necessary for the happiness of all men, since some individuals may be so constituted as to enmesh with a fluctuating and exciting scene of turmoil, but it is surely legitimate to claim that such individuals as a matter of empirical fact are relatively rare, and for the rest the conditions of an unstable state necessarily militate against their happiness, since, if the situation is permanently changing, the character of the individual must also continually adapt to enmesh with new situations; anxiety and insecurity are likely to afflict most people.

MPP4-273 JUSTICE REQUIRES SOCIAL UNITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.71.

Stasis, which for Plato has come to mean any conflict, arises out of an unjust state of affairs, for an unjust state of affairs gives rise to resentment and hatred justice on the other hand, being rational, removes due cause for resentment and promotes unity. To remove stasis it is necessary to remove the causes of conflicting interests between people, notably acquisitiveness for limited goods; envy and hatred do not arise amongst a unified group.

MPP4-274 PLATO SAW ENFORCED HOMOGENEITY AS KEY TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE STATE

W.K.C. Guthrie, *THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS*, 1950, p.85.

The measures proposed were the logical conclusion of the city-state, and Plato saw that it had no chance of survival unless it were pushed to its logical conclusion and deprived of the individual vagaries which, in the circumstances of the time, only gave room for the operation of the destructive forces already at work within it. Only if it preserved a homogeneity, or rather a harmony as Plato would have preferred to express it, based on the acceptance by each citizen of an allocation of function according to character and capacity, could it hope for salvation.

MPP4-275 THE STATE CAN AND SHOULD MAXIMIZE HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.87.

It is, therefore, now necessary to establish both that the state can maximise the happiness of members of the community and that it ought to do so. There is no doubt that it can, provided that it has control over both variables -- the individual and the situation. Happiness, being dependent on enmeshment between the two, can only be guaranteed where the pattern, values, rules and demands of the community are such as the individual is drawn to: acceptance of the norms of society that make demands on one is a necessary part of complete happiness.

MPP4-276 NOT ENSURING EQUAL HAPPINESS IS FUNDAMENTALLY UNJUST

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.167.

But we would go further than this and say that any society, such as our own, which, because of commitment to an incoherent principle of freedom, or for any other reason, fails to ensure equal happiness for all is fundamentally unjust. For it has been argued, and implicitly acknowledged by liberal-democratic theory, that there are no good grounds for discriminating between people in this respect.

MPP4-277 THE REPUBLIC IS JUST BECAUSE IT ENSURES EQUAL HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.166.

The Republic is a just society because it ensures equal happiness for all citizens, which we must demand in lieu of the production of relevant grounds for discriminating between people in this respect. It is just because, in the light of this aim, its specific distributions of roles, material advantages and rights are based on the relevant criteria of needs and wants and abilities; it is impartial and gives equal consideration to all. It is just because it guarantees that an irrelevant criterion such as birth or specific talent shall not govern the distribution of material advantages, and that an irrelevant criterion such as wealth shall not govern the distribution of power or elective rights.

MPP4-278 A HAPPY COMMUNITY REQUIRES ACCEPTANCE OF MORAL NORMS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.181.

A happy community is dependent in part upon the acceptance by the individuals within it of the moral norms that are put into practice in the rules and conventions of their society. This is a purely formal point, arising out of the Platonic analysis of happiness, and one that has validity regardless of one's view of the status of moral norms.

MPP4-279 PLATO'S MORAL NORMS ARE THE BEST AVAILABLE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.181.

The norms that ought to be accepted are the Platonic norms: that is to say, the belief or conviction that happiness is the supreme value and that there are no good grounds, a priori, for so organising any aspect of community life so as to treat people unequally in respect of happiness. In addition, the belief that the criterion of aptitude, or ability and interest, is the right and proper criterion for the distribution of activities within the community; and, finally, the assumption that freedom is an unhelpful concept, and that freedom is desirable only where and when men have clearly shown themselves able and willing to put the claims of equal happiness before all other claims.

MPP4-280 ALLOCATING SOCIAL ROLES BASED ON APTITUDE MAXIMIZES HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.69-70.

Plato believed that a just social arrangement would concentrate on allocating social roles in society according to aptitude rather than any other criterion, and since this is the basis of his society's arrangements and he claims to be promoting happiness, it follows that he thinks that the happiness of individuals is promoted by suiting the individual to his role in society, and with this view, which Popper has done nothing to discredit, we see reason to agree. True happiness is not achieved simply by keeping one's place, but happiness will necessarily be diminished in proportion to the extent that the individual is not suited to or enmeshed with the way of life he is expected to lead.

MPP4-281 POPPER DOESN'T DENY THAT PLATO'S STATE PRODUCES HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.70.

But, in point of fact, all that Popper then goes on to say supports the thesis that a closed or tribal society is at least more likely to promote happiness than an open society. Popper's objections, which obviously will have to be met later, are of an altogether different order: fundamentally they boil down to the claim that there are moral principles, particularly that of freedom, which ought to stop Plato doing what he intends to do; but such an argument, however valid, clearly does not show that Plato 'erred in his fundamental claim' that he could restore happiness.

MPP4-282 PLATO'S IDEAL WAS A COOPERATIVE PEACEFUL COMMUNITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.20.

Plato clearly does not distinguish, in respect of worthiness, between the trader, the farmer or the labourer, and he is content that all men should occupy some such role. For this austere city is for Plato the 'real city' -- 'the healthy city, so to speak' (372 E). And the reason for this judgment is clear: there is no luxury and so there is no corruption -- no tendency to aggrandisement; there is no competition, only co-operation, and therefore there is no envy. Essentially it is at peace and not torn by any kind of conflict: 'They will sit down to feast with their children on couches of myrtle . . . they will enjoy each other's company. . . they will lead a peaceful and healthy life' (372 B). There is no argument, and Plato knows well enough that his picture is little more than a wish-fulfillment dream. But this first city gives us a fair indication of one of Plato's central ideals: a co-operative peaceful community.

MPP4-283 PLATO SEEKS THE WELFARE OF THE TOTAL COMMUNITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.25-6.

The passage is important because, although it is purely formal (nothing has been said, for instance, about what the interests of the community are, beyond the fact that one aspect of the perfect state - will be harmony and stability), it makes it absolutely clear that Plato's ultimate criterion of good government is the interest of the community. This formal criterion is to be contrasted, as it is in Book 9, with the specific criteria of wealth, success, popularity or de facto power.

MPP4-284 PLATO'S REPUBLIC IS AN IDEAL, NOT A PRACTICAL BLUEPRINT

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 1933, p.39.

Finally, it is only fair to add that Plato understands that his Utopia does not quite fall within the practicable realm. He admits that he has described an ideal difficult of attainment; he answers that there is nevertheless a value in painting these pictures of our desire; man's significance is that he can image a better world, and will some part of it at least into reality; man is an animal that makes Utopias.

MPP4-285 PLATO UPHOLDS THE ONLY VALID FORM OF EQUALITY--EQUAL HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.160-1.

Plato can now be seen to be abiding by the only acceptable interpretation of the principle of equality. He is providing equal happiness and discriminating between people in respect of roles, rights and material advantages only on relevant criteria.

MPP4-286 PLATO SUPPORTS EQUALITY AS EQUAL HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.144.

At this juncture then we arrive at the conclusion that both the liberal-democrats and Plato are committed to a principle of equality, in the sense of a principle of impartiality, with the broad intention of aiming at equal happiness for all. The suggestion that the principle of equality must necessarily demand an arithmetic distribution of goods and advantages has been rejected.

MPP4-287 PLATO UPHOLDS EQUALITY AS IMPARTIALITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.140-1.

At one point Popper glosses the principle by saying that 'Equalitarianism proper is the demand that the citizens of the state should be treated impartially'. We may say at once that we accept this identification of the principle of equality with the principle of impartiality. It is, in fact, the only interpretation of the principle of equality that seems acceptable. But it should be noted that if this is really what 'equalitarianism proper' demands, then appeal to the principle of equality does not necessarily discredit Plato (although as we shall see it does effectively discredit the liberal democrats), since impartial treatment of people, or an impartial distribution of goods, does not necessarily involve exactly similar treatment or an exactly similar distribution. Consequently pointing out the differences between the treatment of people and the allocation of goods they receive in the Republic, is not in itself sufficient to show that Plato ignores the claims of equality.

MPP4-288 PLATO PRESCRIBES RELATIVE EQUALITY OF WEALTH

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.67.

In this second-best city, as Plato recognises it to be (875), the rulers are 'servants of the law' (715d). But in an ideal city it would not be so. The ideals of the Republic remain in another respect too; although in both works great inequality of power is prescribed, the distribution of wealth, though not actually inverted as in the Republic so that the rulers are poorer, remains moderately egalitarian; and it does not depend on one's income-group whether one becomes a ruler, but only on one's merit as judged by the existing rulers. The philosopher-king ideal survives (711).

MPP4-289 PLATO UPHOLD EQUALITY FOR WOMEN

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.28.

In Plato's view there are no valid reasons why a woman per se should be discriminated against in respect of a social role; if men are chosen to rule on the criteria of intelligence and moral integrity, then it is quite illogical to say that a woman ought not to be chosen if she has the same qualities. Therefore the state will aim to classify women by the same criteria, aptitude and ability, and to educate them alongside men.

MPP4-290 PLATO'S CLASS DISTINCTIONS FAVOR WORKERS

W.K.C. Guthrie, THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS, 1950, p.111-2.

To avoid misunderstanding, certain points in this organization should be emphasized. The lowest class in Plato's state is sometimes spoken of by modern writers as the 'masses', and certainly in point of numbers it will be by far the largest. But it differs remarkably from the proletariat of which the Marxist speaks, being in fact the only class permitted to hold private wealth. One of the worst evils of political life, in Plato's opinion, was the material greed of politicians. It was an evil certainly not absent from the debased democracy of his day. His aim therefore was the complete divorce of political from economic power. By this means he hoped to get a class of statesmen whose sole ambition was to govern well. Those who were more interested in getting rich were welcome to do --by leaving the ranks of government and confining their activities to trade. The rulers live a literally Spartan existence, for their system of common messes and common ownership of the necessities of life is modelled closely on Sparta itself.

MPP4-291 PLATO OVERCOMES RESENTMENT BY SEPARATING WEALTH AND POWER

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.26.

Book 3 ends with an account of the austere conditions under which the rulers and auxiliaries will live (415 ff). They will live in communal dwellings, without private property and without money, their food being provided for them by the other citizens. The object of these strictures is clear: on the rulers hang the harmony and health of the state; if they are at variance with each other, or tempted by goods desired by the majority of citizens, should they succumb to temptation, the harmony of the state is ended. What Plato fears is that, if the rulers 'acquire private property in land, houses or money, they will become farmers and businessmen instead of Guardians, and harsh tyrants instead of partners in their dealings with their fellow citizens, with whom they will live on terms of mutual hatred and suspicion' (417 B). His rulers and ruled can be real partners because their needs are different; Plato has preserved harmony by divorcing what all might regard as an advantage (wealth) from authority; consequently, provided that the ruling is equitable, nobody need resent being excluded from it.

MPP4-292 EQUALITY DOESN'T REQUIRE TREATING EVERYONE ALIKE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.140.

What does the principle of equality involve? What does it mean to say that all men are equal or that all men ought to be treated equally? We tread well-trodden ground here, and there can be few who regard the statement that all men are equal as a straightforward descriptive truth; all men are not equal without qualification: some are shorter, some are more beautiful, some are more clever, some are more generous, etc. Likewise, few will interpret the demand that all men should be treated equally as meaning that in all respects the same things should be done for and to each individual. Most egalitarians would accept Plato's contention that it is acceptable, and therefore not to be seen as a heinous contravention of the equality principle, to give a larger amount of meat to a full-grown man than to a new-born baby.

MPP4-293 PLATO DOESN'T UPHOLD INVIDIOUS CLASS DISTINCTIONS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.150.

There is therefore absolutely no evidence to support the contention that the Republic is a class society in which advantages or anything else are distributed by reference to the criteria of birth or family connection; nor is wealth anywhere referred to as a criterion for distribution. The fundamental criterion is aptitude, which involves capability and interest, and such things as material possessions are distributed to the largest group rather than the rulers precisely on the assumption that they will need and want them, and not on the grounds that they are born to working class parents.

MPP4-294 PLATO'S REPUBLIC ISN'T A CLASS SOCIETY
Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.145.

On the face of it the charge that the Republic is a class society in this sense is adequately denied by Plato himself, since he explicitly argues that justice itself demands the adoption of the principle 'that each man should perform that one role in society for which his nature is best adapted'; thus aptitude, and not birth, is the criterion to be employed. Nor is there any obscurity, in theory, about the meaning of 'aptitude'.

MPP4-295 PLATO WOULDN'T DENY EDUCATION TO THE WORKING CLASS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.21.

But Popper goes altogether too far in dismissing the caution of Shorey that 'we cannot infer, as hasty critics have done, from 421 A', where Plato says that cobblers who are badly brought up are less dangerous to the state than Guardians who are badly brought up, 'that he would not educate the masses at all', and in claiming that 'As in Sparta the ruling class alone received education'. That would only be true on the assumption that *paideia*, or education, is properly defined only in terms of the full educational programme laid down for the Guardians. Plato's refusal to 'clothe the farmers in robes of state', which is a metaphorical way of saying 'give the farmers the upbringing and way of life designed for the Guardians', does indeed indicate that the farmers will not receive precisely the same *paideia*, but equally it implies that they will receive their own distinctive *paideia*.

MPP4-296 PLATO WOULD ALLOW CHILDREN TO MOVE BETWEEN CLASSES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.147.

We may conclude with Levinson that 'it is Plato's serious purpose to fit each individual's capacity to the social function he is to perform. This being the case, it would be impossible for Plato to fix permanently the status of any child on the basis of his pedigree'.

MPP4-297 GOOD GOVERNING IS AN EXPERTISE; THUS, IT REQUIRES ELITE RULE

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.418-19.

It was to correct the problem of rule by the incompetent that Plato, in his Republic, set forth a plan whereby those who ruled would be guaranteed to do so wisely and well. Rulers of states, he believed, must be experts in their field, for they require highly specialized knowledge to handle efficiently the complex problems confronting them daily. It is absurd, he thought, for lawyers and physicians to be required to go through an intensive course of training for their professions while politicians, on whose wisdom the entire citizenry depends, have no special training at all.

MPP4-298 RULE SHOULD BE BY THE BEST QUALIFIED
Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.25.

Sections 412 and 413 are arguably the most important in the Republic. 'Those who govern must be the best', that is to say, 'the most regardful of the state', and that, in turn, means 'the most intelligent and capable in respect of watching over and caring for the interests of the whole state'. The *polis*, here translated 'state', means the community or body of citizens. Consequently it is the common interest of their fellow citizens that the rulers are to watch over, and this will be best done by those who love their fellow citizens (412 B). And the rulers must not be amenable to irrational persuasion or influence, nor must they be careless or fearful.

MPP4-299 GIVEN THAT A RULING CLASS IS INEVITABLE, THEY SHOULD BE PROPERLY EDUCATED
R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.73-4.

First, as has often been pointed out by recent writers, we are unlikely to be able to escape being ruled by a ruling class of some kind; 'the iron law of oligarchy' is fairly well established by a study of history. If there are going in any case to be relatively few people who have the power of government and exercise its functions, even in a democracy, then Plato is surely entirely right in holding that it will be best if they receive, before they attain this position of power, an education which will enable them to exercise it wisely.

MPP4-300 PLATO WAS RIGHT THAT THE WISE SHOULD RULE

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 1933, p.38.

And now that these unpleasant necessities are candidly written down, it remains to do willing homage to the power and profundity of Plato's conception. Essentially he is right -- is he not? -- what this world needs is to be ruled by its wisest men. It is our business to adapt his thought to our own times and limitations. Today we must take democracy for granted: we cannot limit the suffrage as Plato proposed; but we can put restrictions on the holding of office, and in this way secure that mixture of democracy and aristocracy which Plato seems to have in mind.

MPP4-301 IF VALUES ARE OBJECTIVE, AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL RULE IS JUSTIFIED

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.69.

If it is once agreed that only some, not all, people are qualified to pronounce on questions of value, then the Platonic authoritarian argument is well under way. And it seems that this argument requires only two premisses: that values are objective, and that people differ about them. It looks as if the second premise is obviously true, and as if, therefore, anybody who wishes to avoid the authoritarian conclusion will have to reject the first. Unless, that is, we take the pessimistic view that nobody knows the objective answers, though these do exist. Short of divine guidance, there would then be no hope of getting our politics right; but although in the Meno Plato rather playfully attributed to divine guidance such successes as had been achieved hitherto, he hoped for something more reliable.

MPP4-302 PLATO'S GUARDIANS AREN'T RULERS BECAUSE THEY SHARE THE INTERESTS OF THE OVERALL COMMUNITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.29.

Section 462 begins another important passage. Plato restates his creed: 'Nothing is worse for a state than disunity, nothing better than cohesion or unity'. Cohesion is the result of an identity of interest; a unified society prevents the occurrence of conflicting interests. In the Republic, therefore, the rulers will not be masters (because 'master' implies a distinctive interest from that of the 'mastered'), but fellow-citizens, defenders and protectors. i.e., though the function of the individual may vary, the ultimate interest is the same. The familiar loyalties and solidarity of the family, and the happiness they inspire, are transferred to the larger community.

MPP4-303 FOR PLATO, RULERS SHOULDN'T BE BOUND BY LAW

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.66-7.

In an ideal state with ideal rulers Plato thinks, the rulers ought not themselves to be bound by the laws, but should be able to alter them ad hoc to fit individual cases, just as a doctor fits his treatment to the condition of each patient. Any attempt to lay down laws by which the rulers themselves were to be bound would lead to an inability to suit measures to particular cases and to a ban on all innovation however beneficial. Provided that the ruler possesses the art of ruling, he should be free to adapt the laws to his knowledge of the Good.

MPP4-304 VOTING QUALIFICATIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.151-2.

There is no point in pressing this argument further, at this juncture, since a lot must depend upon the overall nature of a given society. We shall end this section simply by asking what the justification is, in a democracy, for not allowing sixteen-year-olds to vote, if it is admitted that the question of whether a vote is more or less informed does not arise? For it is simply not true that people under sixteen are incapable of voting, if there are no criteria for sound political judgment. If it be said that there should be some criteria, then formally Plato's discrimination between those fit to make political decisions and those unfit, has been shown to be acceptable.

MPP4-305 PLATO PROPERLY STRESSES APTITUDE IN CHOOSING SOCIAL ROLES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.185.

Plato offers us the eminently rational criterion of aptitude, by which is meant both interest in doing X and the ability to do X, for allotting individuals to roles. The slight obscurity, already noted, in his view of the relative weight to be attached to hereditary and environmental factors in the formation of aptitude is not of critical importance to us. In view of the conflicting claims made by psychologists about the degree to which intelligence is an innate factor and the extent to which it is determined by heredity, we must in any case proceed by hypothesis.

MPP4-306 PLATO'S REPUBLIC IS JUST BECAUSE IT ALLOCATES ROLES ACCORDING TO ABILITY AND SEEKS OVERALL HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.27.

What then is just about the community? Or where do we see justice? The answer is (433) that this community is just because it is built on rationally defensible principles; it is just because its measure of social arrangement is appropriateness. In other words Plato claims (not proves) that a community constituted on the principle of relating a man's activity to his needs is a just one, but it is important to remember, since he does not explicitly state it here, that all along, in constructing what he is now calling a just state, Plato has taken for granted the aim of the happiness of the whole community. In short, in saying that 'Dikaion is in some sense the doing of what is peculiarly one's own' (*to ta hautou prattein*), Plato is saying: the just principle of distribution of social roles is distribution according to aptitude and ability. But he says this in the light of his commitment to a principle of happiness.

MPP4-307 ASSIGNING ROLES UNDERMINES HIERARCHIES OF WORTH

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.155-6.

But there are no grounds whatsoever for regarding one job as intrinsically inferior to another. It is the doctrine of equal opportunity applied to roles and wealth that produces the idea of a hierarchy of worth. By divorcing wealth from roles, by promoting respect in all citizens for all roles that contribute to the efficient functioning of society, and by ensuring that people take on roles to which they are suited, Plato both dissolves the need to worry about who is a manager and who is not, and also puts an effective end to the disdain which liberal-democrats seem to evince for nonintellectual manual workers..

MPP4-308 PLATONIC GOVERNMENT IS PRACTICAL

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 1933, p.35.

The Jesuits who for a time ruled Paraguay were semi-Platonic guardians, a clerical oligarchy empowered by the possession of knowledge and skill in the midst of a barbarian population. And for a time the Communist Party which ruled Russia after the revolution of November, 1917, took a form strangely reminiscent of the Republic. They were a small minority, held together almost by religious conviction, wielding the weapons of orthodoxy and excommunication, as sternly devoted to their cause as any saint to his, and living a frugal existence while ruling half the soil of Europe. Such examples indicate that within limits and with modifications, Plato's plan is practicable; and indeed he himself had derived it largely from actual practice as seen on his travels. He had been impressed by the Egyptian theocracy: here was a great and ancient civilization ruled by a small priestly class; and compared with the bickering and tyranny and incompetence of the Athenian Ecclesia Plato felt that the Egyptian government represented a much higher form of state.

MPP4-309 THE MIDDLE AGES DISPLAYED A PLATONIC SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 1933, p.34.

And now what shall we say of this whole Utopia? Is it feasible? And if not, has it any practicable features which we could turn to contemporary use? Has it ever in any place or measure been realized? At least the last question must be answered in Plato's favor. For a thousand years Europe was ruled by an order of guardians considerably like that which was visioned by our philosopher. During the Middle Ages it was customary to classify the population of Christendom into laboratores (workers), bellatores (soldiers), and oratores (clergy). The last group, though small in number, monopolized the instruments and opportunities of culture, and ruled with almost unlimited sway half of the most powerful continent on the globe. The clergy, like Plato's guardians, were placed in authority not by the suffrages of the people, but by their talent as shown in ecclesiastical studies and administration, by their disposition to a life of meditation and simplicity, and (perhaps it should be added) by the influence of their relatives with the powers of state and church.

MPP4-310 PLATO'S COMMUNISM EXTENDS ONLY TO THE GUARDIANS

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 1933, p.36.

To all these criticisms one can reply very simply, that they destroy a straw man. Plato explicitly exempts the majority from his communistic plan; he recognizes clearly enough that only a few are capable of the material self-denial which he proposes for his ruling class; only the guardians will call every guardian brother or sister; only the guardians will be without gold or goods. The vast majority will retain all respectable institutions -- property, money, luxury, competition, and whatever privacy they may desire. They will have marriage as monogamic as they can bear and all the morals derived from it and from the family; the fathers shall keep their wives and the mothers shall keep their children *ad libitum* and *nausean*.

MPP4-311 DEMOCRATIC STATES ARE OVERLY LED BY DESIRE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.36.

The democratic man and the democratic state, because reason, or the rule of what ought to be, is not in control, are motivated and enslaved by any desires they happen to have, regardless of whether they be necessary in the sense of ultimately beneficial or not. Plato's real attack, then, is directed against the notion that a man's desire per se has any relevance to deciding what ought to be done. Only reason can decide whether a specific desire is worth championing.

MPP4-312 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY DOESN'T SECURE EQUALITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.159.

Secondly, as we have seen, the liberal-democrats do not in practice ensure the equal rights and equal political power that they demand. Thirdly, they cannot claim to be able to distribute an equal amount of advantage to all citizens, whether we understand this to mean an arithmetically equal amount of specific advantages or overall advantage, or an amount that produces an equal end situation in specific instances or overall. Fourthly, because of the unequal distribution of generally desired advantages, they are unable to provide equal happiness for all. An open society cannot subserve the principle of equality in any meaningful sense, because the demands of equality are such that, to ensure that they are continually met, it is necessary for there to be continual control and adjustment of the forces that produce in equality. This the liberal-democrat cannot bring himself to advocate because to do so would be to subordinate the principle of freedom to some other principle.

MPP4-313 PLATO'S CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRACY APPLIES EQUALLY TO MODERN REGIMES

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, CLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1989, p.109.

Plato rejects democracy because he believes in an objective human good; and his reasons apply no less to modern than to Greek democratic regimes, despite the great differences between a Greek democracy and every modern state. Some defenders of democracy agree that if some people could know about everyone's objective interests, then their views would, as Plato says, have to be authoritative. If there is no prospect of such knowledge, Plato's case against democracy fails. Hence these defenders of democracy deny the possibility of knowledge about objective interests. If we deny objective interests, we seem to have equally good reason to reject objective moral and political values in general. And in fact some defenders of liberty and democracy argue that since (1) there are no objective values, and (2) all values are just expressions of taste and preference, it follows that (3) we should tolerate and respect other people's values. This argument is open to grave objections. Once we accept (1) and (2), it follows that (3) is itself simply an expression of taste and preference. If so, why should we accept (3) rather than concluding that (4) if we feel like tolerating other people, we ought to, and if we feel like coercing them, we ought to? If we accept (4), then we admit that we have no argument against those who happen to prefer less liberal policies. A similar criticism will show what is wrong with a defence of democracy that relies on rejection of objective values.

MPP4-314 HAVING GOOD LEADERS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.151.

But what is more disturbing is that those who demand that government officers ought to be elected by popular vote are committed to saying that it does not matter if rulers are unintelligent, immoral or amoral, motivated by personal loyalties or interests and unconcerned about the happiness of the whole community. In other words by altering the method whereby the ruler is elected, we effectively alter our view of the nature of ruling. In short, the demand that all citizens should have a vote of equal validity involves acceptance of the view that it is relatively unimportant to lay down qualifications for ruling. The non-democrat would argue, on the other hand, that ruling ought to be a qualified activity and that consequently the right to vote ought to be restricted to those who have some understanding of the qualifications involved.

MPP4-315 PLATO'S PRINCIPLES ARE COMPATIBLE WITH REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.175.

Plato's principles are, I stress, compatible with the notion of a representative democracy such as our own. To say as much is merely to repeat the point that the rule of the philosopher-kings, as outlined in the *Republic*, embodies merely the formal claim that some are more fit to rule than others, because they are more concerned for the general welfare and less for private profit or honour than others, because they are more adept at appreciating and serving the demands of morality than others, and because they are more proficient at seeing how the moral ends of a community may truly be served than others. But, while holding this view, one might consistently argue that, in practice, to determine who are philosopher-kings is extremely difficult and that there is an enormous risk involved in entrusting absolute power to any limited clique, particularly if that clique is effectively self-perpetuating. Therefore, one might reasonably conclude, the aim of promoting happiness might in practice be better served by some form of representative democracy.

MPP4-316 PLATO WOULDN'T REJECT DEMOCRACY UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.109.

His criticisms do not imply that he ever wanted or planned to overthrow the Athenian democracy. Even if in the right conditions, the rule of philosophers is preferable, still democracy might be the best in imperfect conditions and for imperfect people. If there are no philosopher-rulers available, or if most people are unwilling to accept the rule of philosophers, it might be better to accept a democracy than to overthrow it. Plato does not commit himself to the view that a less democratic regime is always preferable to a more democratic. Though he is a severe critic of democracy, he is not necessarily a supporter of oligarchy.

MPP4-317 THE AIM OF EDUCATION IS SOCIABLE AND HAPPY CITIZENS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.179.

The aim of education is to produce sociable and happy citizens. Education is (by which we mean, of course, that in our view the neutral sociological use of the term education is correctly used as a normative term only when the following conditions are met) the development of virtuous character in the sense of a character that exhibits socially desirable attitudes and behavioural tendencies, the precise nature of which is to be decided by appeal to the principle of happiness in the light of actual circumstances.

MPP4-318 EDUCATION SHOULD BE JUDGED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS PROMOTION OF HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.176.

We cannot take seriously the suggestion that a community might have some fundamental aim, such as the provision of happiness for all, and not intend that education within the community should contribute to that end. Since political aims, political methods and political practice on the one hand, and educational aims, methods and practice on the other, are both judged and valued by reference to ethical values, a state or community that exhibits or enshrines certain values is bound to value educational activity that enshrines these same values and to seek to see that they are appreciated and observed.

MPP4-319 PLATO'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY IS HIS GREATEST PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.80.

This brings us to what, I am sure, Plato himself thought of as his most important practical contribution: his educational theory. He believed firmly that there could be a body of knowledge or understanding whose attainment and handing down would make possible the orderly solution of political problems such as had brought Athens and all Greece into chaos. In this he taught the world a valuable lesson. If we could fully understand the problems, which involves understanding first of all the words in terms of which they are posed, and then (even harder) understanding the situations and the people that generate them, we should be on a way to their solution. This, at any rate, is a more hopeful line than attributing them to human wickedness which can never be eradicated. Even the wicked can be coped with if we understand what makes them do what they do. Socrates did not think he had attained this understanding, and even Plato was not all that optimistic; but he saw it as the only way out of the troubles of Greece, and founded an institution, the Academy, which he thought would help towards attaining it.

MPP4-320 MORAL INDOCTRINATION IS ACCEPTABLE
Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.183.

It has been conceded that the inculcation of belief is this proposition, with the express intention that it shall remain, and in the knowledge that we shall not necessarily be encouraging all children ultimately to examine the arguments behind the injunction, constitutes, on most definitions, indoctrination; but it has been argued that indoctrination, on such definitions, is justifiable. Some individuals will later be encouraged to probe the arguments that lie behind the proposition, that is to say some individuals will later specialise in the field of moral philosophy, just as others will specialise in the field of geology, and probe the arguments that lie behind certain geological propositions. But the individuals who undertake the specific task of probing the field of moral philosophy will be, in practice, a limited number: the aim of promoting enmeshment will prevent us from encouraging those whose lack of interest or whose lack of ability in the matter would lead merely to a loss of faith in the proposition, rather than a reasoned rejection of it, to undertake the task. Some individuals, probably many, will imbibe the proposition's contents at an early age and be allowed to continue in adult life in unquestioning acceptance of the proposition's truth.

MPP4-321 ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDOCTRINATION FAIL

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.114.

We can therefore dispense with the view of such men as Green, who regards the holding of a belief without evidence as the hallmark of indoctrination, not because this view is 'false', but because on this view virtually everybody could be said to be indoctrinated and in a great many cases it would be impossible for this to be otherwise. One has neither the time, nor the means nor the ability to furnish oneself with the evidence necessary to establish all one's beliefs. And if this must, at least in some cases, be so, it is pointless to insist that it ought not to be so. It is also difficult to see how, on this view, one could insist that people ought not to indoctrinate, since, once again, it is often impossible to avoid fostering beliefs in others without providing evidence.

MPP4-322 UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, BRAINWASHING COULD BE LEGITIMATE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.115.

It is not difficult to imagine the brainwashing switch being under the control of an evil and insane Professor Moriarty, and to throw up one's hands in horror at the thought of all that this might involve. But it is also possible to construct emotively more attractive examples: for instance, if it were possible at the throw of a switch to persuade a Hitler, who is about to exterminate a segment of mankind on what we regard as wholly absurd grounds, but who has shown himself impervious to rational argument, to change his mind, would it be wrong to throw the switch? Can one differentiate between the legitimacy of such brainwashing and the legitimacy of fighting against a Hitler on the strength of one's beliefs, or would a man who felt that we had no right on the strength of our beliefs to tamper with Hitler's beliefs be obliged, if he is to be consistent, to oppose also the idea of fighting on the strength of our beliefs?

MPP4-323 EVEN LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ACCEPT SOME LEVEL OF INDOCTRINATION

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.114-5.

Furthermore the liberal-democrats, with whom we are still primarily concerned, certainly do not dispute that in the case of young children who are not capable of understanding the evidence, we are obliged, to some extent at least, to foster the holding of beliefs without evidence. If children are to be dissuaded from indulging in murder, as they are on liberal-democratic terms since murder certainly falls within the obscure rubric that demands a restriction of activity that interferes with the freedom of others, then, in most instances, we shall be obliged to inculcate the belief that it is wrong before we can hope to provide the child with 'evidence' that it can grasp. We are concerned to discover whether there are things that we ought not to do when we are educating people. Green's analysis of 'indoctrination' draws attention to an inevitable feature of virtually everybody's life at some stage.

MPP4-324 THE OPEN SOCIETY ALSO INDOCTRINATES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.117.

The difference between the open and closed societies in this respect is therefore not one of kind. The closed society tends to ensure that all non-rational techniques point in the same direction and foster beliefs that are compatible with the ethos of society. But if this constitutes indoctrination the open society also indoctrinates, for a battery of influences, which we may summarise as social pressure, is brought to bear upon the child to persuade him both of the desirability of our way of life in general, and the worthiness of our values, notably freedom, and the limits of our tolerance in particular. The open society differs from the closed society in this respect only in as much as it tends to enforce belief in a smaller number of propositions, because it is committed to a small number of fixed beliefs.

MPP4-325 SOME USE OF NON-RATIONAL INFLUENCES IS UNAVOIDABLE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.117.

None of this amounts to saying that it is particularly desirable that one should make extensive use of non-rational techniques in the upbringing of children. But it does amount to saying that where rational argument will not convince, as may be the case with young children or with the potential suicide overlooking the top of the Post Office Tower, the use of non-rational techniques of persuasion may be justified. The onus is on those who would argue that persuading a young child that it ought not to kick the girl next door, by means of exhibiting parental displeasure, is unacceptable, because it is a non-rational technique, to prove their point. And it is difficult to see how they can do this in view of the fact that, if the child is not susceptible to rational argument, it is to be presumed that his belief in the desirability of kicking the girl is itself the product of non-rational influence; indeed for the parent to refrain from expressing displeasure is itself a further non-rational influence on the child.

MPP4-326 OPPOSITION TO INDOCTRINATION IS JUST A LIBERAL DOGMA

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.118.

Now certainly the Nazis inculcated (by non-rational means) beliefs which cannot be proved to be true, and which formed part of a system, most notably the belief that the Aryans were born to rule the world; likewise the Catholics teach that only Catholics shall enjoy God's grace in the fullness of time as a lynch pin to a whole system of ideas that has obvious repercussions on life. But Wilson's belief that it is wrong to brainwash people to believe in communism is itself merely part of the liberal-democratic ideology: a system of ideas based on the unsubstantiated lynch-pin that 'Freedom is a necessary condition for social and individual progress, for the expansion and development of a personality or a society'.

MPP4-327 THE LIBERAL THEORY OF VALUE JUSTIFIES INDOCTRINATION

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.121.

If the truth of ultimate moral propositions cannot be known, then one's adherence to certain specific propositions is ultimately a matter of taste or guesswork. Since the individual's taste and the direction of his guesses are the product of non-rational influences, such as examples he witnesses, the conduct of people he admires, the pressure of peer-groups, the fear of disapproval, the experiences of his childhood, or a search for affection, rather than rational proof, it would be absurd to regard inculcating adherence to norms as objectionable. In theory the view would lead to the conclusion that since such beliefs should not be inculcated by non-rational means, and since that is the only way they can arise, nobody ought to have any moral beliefs. In fact, of course, since one cannot bring children up in a vacuum, it would lead to beliefs being formed by chance and the random pressures of society, which would be worse from a utilitarian point of view, and no better from the point of view of those who object to the inducement of belief in propositions that are not known to be true or false.

MPP4-328 EVERY STATE INDOCTRINATES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.179.

Every state, assuming that it is in control of itself, imposes its own values on its children both indirectly (in the way it organises distribution, in the way its teachers behave, etc.), and directly (in the things we say, the behaviour we punish, etc.), with more or less success. The fact that a state seems to impose little, because its value code allows of contradictory evaluations, because it leaves much of education to private influence, and because its teachers have considerable freedom, shows only that one of its values is freedom, which, naturally enough, is enshrined in or imposed on the society, whether its members like it or not.

MPP4-329 SINCE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC THEORY IS GROUNDLESS, INDOCTRINATION AND CENSORSHIP SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.199.

Once the framework of liberal-democratic theory is jolted all the concepts that derive their favourable connotations from it have to seek to defend themselves as best they may. It becomes once again an open question whether indoctrination, defined in any of the proposed ways, is necessarily undesirable, whether censorship differs in any significant way from any other form of positive manipulation or control, and whether one must want even the least interested and least adept mind to attempt to reason out for itself problems that are perhaps insoluble.

MPP4-330 CLAIMS OF HAPPINESS CAN OVERRIDE TRUTH CONSIDERATIONS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.127-8.

Those, such as Plato, who wish to indoctrinate, wish to do so for a reason. We therefore finally need to consider what reasons may actually justify indoctrination. Let us suppose that 'p' be something which is demonstrably false, for instance that the taking of drugs involves certain death within a month. But suppose also that the truth is that one in ten drug takers do die, two in ten become incapacitated, and yet no amount of repeating these true and dire warnings seems to discourage people from taking the risk, and thus bringing misery to their friends and relatives (and perhaps themselves), and confusion and stultification to the national economy and hence way of life of the community. In those unlikely circumstances the Platonist would argue that it was justifiable, assuming it was possible, to set about convincing everybody that the original (false) proposition was true in such a way that nothing would shake the belief, so that, even if presented with a case of someone who had taken drugs for some months before and was still alive, people would simply refuse to believe that he had taken drugs. And, of course, in so arguing the Platonist makes it clear that the claims of happiness override other considerations, in this case a premium on truth and objection to indoctrination.

MPP4-331 ACTIONS AREN'T GOOD OR BAD IN THEMSELVES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.17.

In Plato's view, 'actions vary according to the manner of their performance'. No act such as telling the truth, returning what has been entrusted to one, 'drinking, singing and talking', is in itself good. 'These actions are not in themselves either good or bad, but they turn out in this way or that, according as they are well or ill done'.

MPP4-332 PLATONISM REJECTS LIBERAL EDUCATION BECAUSE IT DOESN'T PRODUCE HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.193-4.

If we want people to examine and arrive at their own moral beliefs, then it goes without saying that we shall require them to be familiar with that, and in fact other, forms of knowledge. But the Platonist does not want this. He wants to ensure happiness. Beneath that ultimate objective he will approve of initiation into various forms of knowledge precisely and only in so far as awareness of various forms of knowledge on the part of a given individual contributes to happiness. The provision of a liberal-education for all could only be justified as the best education if it could be established that the active pursuit of all forms of knowledge by all individuals was more important than the happiness of those same individuals.

MPP4-333 SELF-DEVELOPMENT IS A MYTH

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.135.

The notion of 'self-development' is logically odd-man-out in this list, since the notion of development presupposes that we focus on the (at least relatively) undeveloped, which is to say the young child. But it is inconceivable that the young child should literally develop itself in a complex social milieu. The mere fact of putting a child in school, whatever the nature of the school, is a deliberate control of influences on the individual, and since the child develops in response to non-rational influences, we are developing him along some lines rather than others. One does not interfere with a child's development any less, because, for instance, one places him in a school where there is a minimum of regulation and authority. One merely influences him in a different way. One does not leave him to form his own attitudes and values, one merely abdicates a certain degree of responsibility for the formation of those attitudes to chance. But development in accordance with random influences is not self-development.

MPP4-334 NOT QUESTIONING SOME BELIEFS ENHANCES SOCIAL STABILITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.188.

But this is not the same as saying that we ought to encourage all people to enquire into and satisfy for themselves the rational foundations of all beliefs that they have. Some beliefs, such as moral beliefs, will be better left unquestioned by those people whose abilities are limited in this field to the extent that they will merely become confused by attempting to question them or (more disastrous from the point of view of the harmony of the whole community), that they will actually come out with different beliefs that are in fact not rationally justifiable, but for the adoption of which they will agitate: they will then be unenmeshed with the society as it is and the overall stability of the state will be under pressure.

MPP4-335 SOME VALUES SHOULDN'T BE QUESTIONED

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.102-3.

It seems odd to regard the individual who was brought up to believe that killing was wrong, and who accepts this view, without feeling moved to seriously examine it, and who resolutely refrains from killing, as less 'virtuous' than the individual who thought about the matter, and then accepted it: still more odd to call the individual who thinks, and then decides to kill, as more virtuous. Are we to imagine that the unreflective are necessarily less virtuous than the professional philosopher? And is a stupid man, who in his own peculiar way goes through a process of enquiry, however pathetic, before he acts, therefore virtuous?

MPP4-336 PRESUMPTION IS AGAINST CHALLENGING ALL ASSUMPTIONS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.188.

But if one takes rationality to be equivalent to autonomy, so that the aim of promoting rationality may be identified with the aim of promoting the active process of reasoning and 'awakening of self-criticism and critical thought', and argues that this is what education necessarily involves, then one is doing no more than arguing that children ought to be brought to question and challenge all assumptions with which they might come into contact. Such a view requires a substantiation, which we have argued is lacking, and would need to show either that the claims of equal happiness are not overriding, or that the argument suggesting that in practice the policy involved in such a view leads to a lack of enmeshment is empirically false.

MPP4-337 RADICAL QUESTIONING SHOULDN'T BEGIN TOO EARLY IN LIFE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.194-5.

However confident one may be, however convincing one may be, one appreciates the liberal-democratic point that the search for truth never ends. Therefore we do not want to suppress all further enquiry. We welcome critical thought directed to examining the rationale behind our way of life. But questioning the status and validity of value judgments is not a secondary school option.

MPP4-338 NOT EVERYONE SHOULD SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE VALUES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.126-7.

We reject, then, the suggestion that all men might be brought to make a meaningful contribution to the search for the truth about ultimate values, in the absence of empirical evidence for this view, and that all men can do so equally as things are, in view of the clear empirical evidence against this view. And in any case we reject the suggestion that the truth is more likely to be found if more people are searching for it. Consequently, despite our own commitment to truth and rationality (understood as consistency, impartiality, etc.), we reject the claim that we are therefore committed to enlisting all in the search for rational justification of ultimate principles. We see no good grounds for agreeing that all men ought to examine the justification of their beliefs, and therefore we deny the claim that it must be wrong to bring up children with beliefs that they continue to hold staunchly without examining them for themselves, and return a negative answer to the second of the two questions we asked above.

MPP4-339 CENSORSHIP IS ACCEPTABLE TO PROMOTE HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.129.

The question of how we should influence our children is answered by finding a method that works and which is not morally repugnant. Happiness being the supreme moral principle, methods that involve cruelty are objectionable, for instance. But such methods as example and censored material that reinforces example are, in so far as they are efficacious, entirely acceptable.

MPP4-340 CENSORSHIP IS NEEDED FOR EARLY MORAL TRAINING

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.184.

The imbibement of the moral and conventional norms, the acquisition of a sense of brotherhood and an attitude of tolerance, the adherence to such notions as impartiality, dependability and honesty, will, of course, be achieved symbolically at this stage. One does not, for instance, try to reason with the child that there are no relevant criteria for discriminating between people in respect of happiness, because such reasoning would be meaningless to the child. Instead one fosters the attitude of impartiality by example; and to this end material in books, on television, etc. should be censored, not only with the negative purpose of deleting the undesirable, but with the positive purpose of promoting the desirable, until such time, if ever, as evidence is forthcoming to discredit the assumption that books, films, etc. have a direct effect on the developing mind.

MPP4-341 CENSORSHIP IS JUSTIFIED TO LIMIT ANTI-SOCIAL MODELS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.112.

Selfish behaviour harms the community; Plato does not want individuals to grow up as selfish people, and he therefore restricts those who would continually hold before the community examples of selfishness that are to be regarded as commendable. Censorship, considered as a restriction on certain types of speech or writing, namely those that promote enthusiasm for anti-social behaviour, seems no different in principle to restriction on other forms of other-regarding activity. If it is legitimate to restrict actions that harm the community, there seems to be no reason why one should not also restrict speech or writing that either harms the community directly or causes action that is harmful.

MPP4-342 CENSORSHIP ISN'T BAD IN ITSELF

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.110-1.

The nub of this issue then is quite simply whether it is justifiable to censor examples of undesirable behaviour in literature (or, in modern terms, in the mass media), on the assumption that they inspire similar behaviour in the audience. And, of course, the question of what behaviour is undesirable must be kept quite distinct from the question of whether censorship can in principle be justified. It follows from what has been said above that it is insufficient to condemn censorship merely on the grounds that it is censorship or that censorship by definition involves a restriction of freedom.

MPP4-343 PLATO'S USE OF CENSORSHIP IS LEGITIMATE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.110.

The censorship in the Republic is of a specific nature. Plato is not censoring on aesthetic criteria. His admiration for Homer as a great poet is explicitly acknowledged. Censorship is designed to prevent the promotion of undesirable behavioural characteristics and attitudes through example. 'We admit that there are men and women who are mad and bad, but we cannot have them represented in poetry or drama', 'for we soon reap the fruits of literature in life'. And likewise musical modes which promote undesirable behaviour must be censored. There is no obvious reason to agree that Plato's assumption 'that we tend to become like characters in the books which we admire, will hardly do'. Plato's view is *prima facie* as tenable as Aristotle's contrary view that literature works cathartically and rids us of the urge to behave as we see the heroes of literature behave. In fact it seems at least questionable to argue that the mass media are merely following slavishly behind the enormous increase in figures for violent crime, abortion and illegitimacy, in their portrayal of violence and sexual permissiveness. If people are not suggestible to the influence of fictional characters, it is difficult, for instance, to see how much of advertising has any effect. However, the empirical assumptions cannot be properly tested here: we must work on the hypothesis that people are influenced in their development by the values embodied in literature that they admire.

MPP4-344 FREEDOM IS SUBORDINATE TO HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.100-1.

Consequently, for the sake of a just and happy community, Plato offers us the 'closed society' and advocates 'indoctrination' and censorship. The intention of the laws and the social organisation is 'that the citizens should be as happy as possible, and as friendly as possible to one another'. And, in so far as it is empirically sound to suggest that, so long as mankind is what it is, 'there is no cessation of trouble' if each individual is left free to develop as he may and to do as he wishes, Plato would feel no qualms about the restricted tribal nature of the Republic. It is in no sense, for him, a weakness, blot or necessary evil in his state, that the claims of freedom are subordinated to the claims of justice and happiness. Freedom is good where freedom leads to good results, bad where consequences are bad. Good results are defined in terms of the happiness they promote. The claims of freedom are subordinate to the claims of happiness.

MPP4-345 FREEDOM ISN'T A NATURAL RIGHT

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.102.

Nor does one accept the argument that freedom is a natural right, in the sense of a right derived from man's essential nature as a decision-making creature, nor yet from man's behaviour in a state of nature. Both these lines of argument involve the naturalistic fallacy: it does not follow from the fact that man is able to make decisions and act upon them, nor from the fact that long ago he may have acted entirely on his own decisions, that he ought to.

MPP4-346 FREEDOM DOESN'T PRODUCE A GOOD SOCIETY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.100.

We should not promote individual freedom for its own sake at the expense of justice and happiness, but rather we should promote happiness and justice leaving as much freedom to the individual as is in practice compatible with ensuring these aims. It is not that the Athenians have free speech that worries Plato, but that they think that having freedom is the measure of a good society.

MPP4-347 FREEDOM DOESN'T NECESSARILY PRODUCE HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.98.

Emotionally this may sound attractive, but it is questionable whether much of it is entirely consistent with utilitarianism. The appeal for the accomplishment of great things resounds finely, but one would like to know what 'a great thing' is, and whether it is necessary for the maximization of happiness. I do not know what sort of things Mill regards as great, but, if happiness is to be our test, there is surely no reason to suppose that any of the things one might regard as great achievements, artistic or scientific, have made the world better. I question whether, for example, as a result of the Mona Lisa, the Ring, the motor car and penicillin, people are necessarily any happier today than they were in fifth-century Greece; this is because happiness is not dependent on any necessary conditions, as we have seen. Consequently whatever attractions 'great achievements' may have for some of us, however much you or I need the motor car or the National Gallery for our happiness, there is no necessary need for these things for a happy community.

MPP4-348 RESTRICTIONS ARE JUSTIFIED BY BENEFICIAL CONSEQUENCES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.97.

Nor should we forget that neither Plato nor any other philosopher that one would wish to take seriously is arguing that the mere maximisation of restriction is in itself desirable. The claim is not that, if a particular kind of society be posited as an end, and, if it can reliably be arrived at and maintained equally well, either with or without restrictions, then it is preferable that it be achieved with restriction. It is rather that, within a community, restriction is justified by the beneficial consequences for that community, and it is being suggested that the existence of specific restrictions is not in itself psychologically unpleasant, though at the time of imposition it may seem so.

MPP4-349 PEOPLE PREFER TO LIVE WITH RESTRICTIONS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.97.

The restriction on our freedom to kill, for instance, or our freedom to walk naked in the streets are not, for most of us, the lesser of two evils; we do not calculate the advantages of the restrictions and conclude that the world is happier for them; we simply do not want to kill or walk naked, and, therefore, it does not occur to us to resent the restriction. The point of this observation is that, from a utilitarian point of view, it is important that those restrictions that are considered necessary, should be accepted without resentment by those on whom they are imposed. But there also seems to be considerable evidence, that many people psychologically prefer restrictions, which they see as guiding lines that provide a secure structure for them, as well as that they do not resent restrictions with which they are familiar.

MPP4-350 THE EMPHASIS ON FREEDOM PRODUCES INEQUALITY AND UNHAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.2.

Plato knew what he was doing and he did it openly: he was challenging the philosophy of men such as Popper and Crossman. And he did this because he believed that the open society was doomed to promote inequality, unhappiness and injustice. He also knew why the open society chose to pay such a price: because it clung in an inconsistent manner to an ill-defined ideal of freedom. The Republic is the great challenge to 'our civilisation'. And that challenge is not met by revealing the fact that it is a challenge.

MPP4-351 ARGUMENTS FOR THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY FAIL

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.127.

Attempts to validate a limited principle of autonomy (i.e. the claim that all people ought to think out the substantiation of all their beliefs) by reference to rationality and truth do not lead to this conclusion. And all other liberal-democratic arguments for a general principle of autonomy, in so far as they succeed in convincing us that autonomy can be desirable, are dependent for their force on some other principle, most notably the principle of happiness. We therefore conclude that freedom of thought, like other freedoms, may legitimately be restricted.

MPP4-352 IF FREEDOM ISN'T ABSOLUTE, NEITHER IS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.112.

If it is accepted that the principle of freedom is not an ultimate principle, but that freedom of action may be restricted for some other end, it is difficult to see why freedom of expression should not be curbed for the same end. If a man may legitimately be restrained from performing an action which 'harms' others, then presumably he may be restrained from the act of speaking or writing, in so far as that 'harms' others.

MPP4-353 ORIGINALITY ISN'T NECESSARILY GOOD

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.103.

Nor can 'originality' and 'initiative' be regarded as self-evidently desirable. It may or may not be true, as Popper would imply, that original discoveries, or original behaviour patterns and ideas, cannot be brought to birth in a society unless it eschews all social control and destroys the concept of faith (by which is meant the notion of steadfast commitment to an opinion in the absence of rational arguments to establish the validity of that opinion); but an original idea is not necessarily a good one. If originality is in itself good, then we are faced with the proposition that an individual is better than his neighbour in so far as he finds a novel way of being different to him. Since one presumes that Popper does not advocate this view (he certainly produces no argument for it), one must conclude that he values originality, like Mill, because he believes that a society that encourages originality will in fact be likely to produce worthwhile original ideas; but in this case, since we are distinguishing between worthwhile and unworthwhile original ideas, the criteria for judging something worthwhile cannot involve the originality. Therefore freedom cannot be commended simply on the grounds that it leads to originality.

MPP4-354 MILL EXAGGERATES THE VALUE OF GENIUS AND THE VALUE OF FREEDOM FOR GENIUS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.98.

Mill's own highly individual personality seems to have led him to believe that we ought to have persons of genius in a society, and therefore 'ought to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom'. By 'genius', Mill seems to mean primarily 'artistic genius', and it is obviously, at best, highly debatable whether such genius contributes enough to maximise happiness against the losses incurred in other respects by the preservation of a soil fit for it to grow in; there is also the empirical question of whether it is true that genius needs an atmosphere of freedom. To argue that it does presumably involves the claim that if there's any genius in the world today, it is not to be found in the work of Shostakovich and Rostropovich. Perhaps it also implies that the work of Homer, Michelangelo and Mozart is not the work of genius, since these artists worked within the framework of relatively closed societies, even turning out their accomplishments to commission.

MPP4-355 TOLERANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE ON THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.99.

A society or its executive must assume infallibility on those issues which it regards as fundamental to its way of life. 'The claims of tolerance cannot persuade us that, though the right course is to interfere, we ought not to interfere because the right course might be wrong'. Thus, incitement to overthrow the constitution is treated as reprehensible even in the most open society, although to the anarchist the truth appears in a different guise. The utilitarian, in such an open society, knowing that attempts to incite revolution will be opposed, must decide whether he thinks that allowing subversive opinions to grow, and then be thwarted by force, contributes more or less to the happiness of the community than checking their birth in the first place.

MPP4-356 POVERTY AND MISERY INEVITABLY RESULT FROM OPEN, COMPETITIVE SOCIETY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.74.

Nor can one simply drop the competitive element in the open society, for the function of competition is to provide motivation where direction or compulsion is lacking; a free society without competition is either a society of angels or a stagnant pool. In addition, the open society intends that the individual will enmesh with a situation in which his conscience is his guide; he cannot at the same time be expected to enmesh with a rule-bound society such as even the liberal-democratic ideal state apparently is. 'Poverty', said Plato, 'is the increase of a man's desire and not the diminution of his property'. Poverty is the inevitable result of a competitive society, and since wealth is generally the object on which all hearts are set, the result of poverty is misery.

MPP4-357 THE OPEN SOCIETY INEVITABLY BREEDS UNHAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.74.

Can it be shown that there is any necessary reason why all men should not be happy in an open society? The answer is, obviously, yes. Because although any specific individual may adapt to cope with the responsibility of freedom, the only way in which all may cope is if all achieve enmeshment with the phenomenon of change itself, which, quite apart from its inherent unlikelihood, would mean the end of the notion of society, for it involves the rejection of any stable mores, rules, patterns, customs and habits. The situation is this: the ideal of the open society is that every individual shall develop autonomously, that is to say without any external guidance or influence; it follows that ideally no attempt is made to suit the individual to his role in life, taking role to mean anything from the job he will perform to the status in terms of wealth, nature of employment, and power that he will acquire. Rather the intention is that he will find the role that fits the nature that has developed in him. Unfortunately since a competitive society needs to promulgate enthusiasm for certain ends, the individual's autonomy is in practice subject to considerable pressures; but since a competitive society also needs to maintain a hierarchy of success the net result is that many people inevitably do not find the role to which they aspire; they therefore find themselves in situations to which they do not aspire, to which therefore they are not fully suited and with which they do not enmesh. 'Someone can win only if someone else loses'.

MPP4-358 EXCESSIVE FREEDOM LEADS TO TYRANNY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.36-7.

Plato fears that the natural soil of the embryonic tyrant is a democracy that is excessive in its liberty (562 C). Once 'freedom' is exalted to the status of an ideal and a good in itself, the people 'will abuse their leaders as oligarchs and reject them, unless they are very lax and promote a policy of non-interference', 'the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable, and respect for discipline and law crumbles into nothing'. Ultimately, via intermediary stages, 'from an extreme of liberty' there will be 'a reaction to an extreme subjection'. The tyrant arises as the champion of some faction who claims that he will restore the state to its pristine order.

MPP4-359 PLATO UPHOLDS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, 1955, p.284.

There are certain implications of Plato's conception of justice that are worth noting. Plato appears to hold that a certain amount of freedom is required for the individual, for justice is 'the power that makes each member of a state do his own work' and the rulers are to see that 'no one may appropriate what belongs to others or be deprived of what is his own'. This surely means freedom from interference. Again, a certain amount of equality among individuals is implied in the recognition that every member of the community has a function to perform.

MPP4-360 PLATO'S STATE NEED NOT IN PRACTICE RESTRICT FREEDOM MORE THAN OTHER STATES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.108.

There is a tendency to assume that there must be more restrictions on the activity of citizens of the Republic than on the citizens of most other states. This does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that Plato adheres ruthlessly to the idea that the principle of happiness must override the principle of freedom. And indeed in looking for examples of specific restrictions, we find that few are actually mentioned.

MPP4-361 ACTING ON HABIT ISN'T INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREEDOM

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.98.

Clearly Mill believes that a society is better off, if people do the right thing because they understand what they are doing. But if the principle of utility is really to be 'the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions' his belief may well be incorrect. If people do the right thing (i.e. that which most effectively contributes to the general happiness) it makes no difference whether they do it by habit, or on sound and deliberate calculation, unless it can be shown that people are unhappy when they act on habit.

MPP4-362 PLATO ISN'T OPPOSED TO FREEDOM PER SE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION, 1975, p.95.

However Plato is not concerned to stigmatise 'freedom' as evil, he is not arguing that the less freedom granted to the individual in any circumstances the better. Indeed he expressly denies that this is so: 'Freedom and subordination are both utterly destructive, when given excessive weight, but most beneficial in reasonable measure'. This remark does not help us to decide what a 'reasonable measure' might be, it does not tell us how we are to measure, but it makes it quite clear that Plato's formal position is the same as that occupied by any theorist who believes in government and law: there are circumstances in which it is justifiable to place restrictions on the activity of individuals within a society.

MPP4-363 PLATO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FREEDOM IS IDENTICAL TO MILL'S

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.95-6.

Formally Plato's attitude to freedom is identical with that of John Stuart Mill. And the utilitarian view of freedom, as expounded by Mill, is very straightforward. He expressly states that he regards any liberties that he would defend as derived from the principle of utility. His specific proposals are, naturally enough, geared to the utilitarian touchstone that 'mankind' should be 'the greater gainers' in terms of happiness. Compulsion is quite legitimate where, as with barbarians and children, it is the most efficacious means to the end, and the only reason he offers for objecting to compulsion as a means, in the case of men of maturity and civilised habits, is that he regards self-development as contributory towards men's happiness in the long term.

MPP4-364 LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ALSO SACRIFICE FREEDOM TO HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.106.

But the final point to be made is that as far as one can judge from their cryptic remarks on the subject, when it comes down to specific examples, the liberal-democrats justify certain restrictions by reference to a principle of happiness. For instance, Popper talks of 'the protection of that freedom which does not harm other citizens' as being the 'fundamental purpose of the state', and he admits the propriety of restricting that freedom which does 'harm other citizens'. The particular wording of this formula may give the impression that freedom is of crucial importance, but what the formula actually involves is that there is something more important than freedom, namely whatever is involved in 'the prevention of harm to others'.

MPP4-365 PLATO DOESN'T CALL FOR REJECTION OF THE WORLD

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.115.

This desire to reproduce the character of the Forms is a motive of Plato's philosopher-rulers; their knowledge of the Forms and of their own immortality makes them more, not less, concerned with the world. Plato may fairly be called other-worldly, in so far as he is concerned with more than the physical world and what we do in it. But he is not other-worldly to the extent of renouncing concern for this world; he retains a lively concern to understand the physical world and to change human lives and human societies. On this last point his position contrasts sharply with the conclusions that Plotinus later claims to derive from Platonic premisses. The Republic does not advise rejection of the world; on the contrary, it explains why the just pursuit of moral and political aims is worth while.

MPP4-366 PLATO WASN'T OTHER-WORLDLY

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.115.

On these points Plato is the reverse of other-worldly. His claims about the inadequacy of the senses do not imply that the senses are worthless. The cosmological claims of the *Timaeus* could be confirmed only by detailed empirical study, to confirm or undermine Plato's suggestion that natural processes show a goal directed order. In fact Plato's suggestion stimulates Aristotle to undertake the necessary empirical research; and while there is no evidence to suggest that Plato actually encouraged such research, there is equally little reason to suppose that he discouraged it, or that his philosophical views must have made him hostile to it. It is equally unfair, and for similar reasons, to suppose that Plato's dualism about body and soul implies an other-worldly attitude to ethics. The immortal soul has a body committed to its charge; and when it is aware of the Forms, it will want to reproduce their order in itself, in its life in the body, and in other people. Since the world already partly embodies the Forms, the immortal soul is encouraged to try to reproduce them more fully in the world.

MPP4-367 PLATO IS CONCERNED WITH THE GOOD OF INDIVIDUALS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.50.

Holism is the term used by Popper to castigate Plato's preoccupation with the whole. And the suggestion (it is never made very explicit) is that Plato, because he is concerned about the whole state, therefore has no feeling for the individuals within it. But this seems a most perverse interpretation of the Republic. What is the state, i.e. the whole, except the sum total of the individuals in it? To say this is not to endorse some mystic doctrine of the destiny of a nation without regard to its actual members, it is simply to say that, when one talks about what is good for England, one means what is good for the English people.

MPP4-368 ALL POLITICS MUST SUBORDINATE SOME INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.50.

A proposal that is regarded as in the interests of the English people will not necessarily be in the interests of every single individual. But to suggest that, when advancing proposals of a political nature, one should not so generalise, would immediately bring an end to all political proposals. In proposing any legislation we are likely to distress certain people, but we persevere nonetheless, if we believe that on balance it will alleviate distress for the country as a whole. And that is all Plato means: the welfare of the community as a whole is to be put before the welfare of any individual or group, should the two conflict.

MPP4-369 PLATO'S REPUBLIC WOULDN'T BE TYRANNICAL

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, *THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY*, 1933, p.37.

Other objections are economic rather than psychological. Plato's republic, it is argued, denounces the division of every city into two cities, and then offers us a city divided into three. The answer is that the division in the first case is by economic conflict; in Plato's state the guardian and auxiliary classes are specifically excluded from participation in this competition for gold and goods. But then the guardians would have power without responsibility; and would not this lead to tyranny? Not at all; they have political power and direction, but no economic power or wealth; the economic class, if dissatisfied with the guardians' mode of rule, could hold up the food supply, as Parliaments control executives by holding up the budget.

MPP4-370 PLATO WOULD HAVE HATED NAZISM

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.4.

Thus the suggestion that Plato today would approve of fascism, and admire Hitler's success in propagating National Socialism as an example of the ruler's use of a noble lie, is nothing short of facile. Whether Plato would approve of National Socialism, and the use of censorship and propaganda to perpetuate it, must depend upon the doctrine of National Socialism: the suggestion that he would believe that the Aryan race was superior and that the Jewish race deserved extermination, is entirely without foundation, and, in so far as it seems to involve discrimination between peoples on no recognisably relevant criteria, it would in fact be anathema to Plato, whose Republic is formally founded on the principle of discrimination in accord with relevant criteria only.

MPP4-371 PLATO SCORNS TYRANNY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.36.

Though one would hardly realise it from the attacks of Toynbee, Popper, Russell and Crossman, Plato reserves his most strenuous scorn for the 'tyrant', thus making it clear beyond all doubt that he is no worshipper of absolute authority per se (or anything else per se, as I have tried to stress).

MPP4-372 PLATO'S SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY WAS PRAGMATIC

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.20-1.

The state therefore needs a defence, which in terms of Plato's historical position will have to be an army. The army will also be responsible for internal defence and protection of citizens, hence their title of Guardians. If the Guardians are going to offer a satisfactory defence of the country's boundaries and effectively keep law and order within the state, then, on the principle of specialization, they need to be professionals. This argument does not show either that Plato wants soldiers (he did not have them in 'the real city'), nor that he wants a military caste such as Sparta enjoyed in his time. In referring to the job (*ergon*) of the Guardians as the 'greatest' ('megiston: 374 E) of those available for citizens, he is making no value judgment about the inherent superior worthiness of those who are Guardians, qua human beings; it is greater than the job of, say, the cobbler, both in that it requires longer training and in that the effects of its being done relatively well or ill are a great deal more far reaching: without external and internal defence the state is bound to fall flat. Because the job is therefore important, and because the Guardians 'must be gentle to their fellow citizens and dangerous only to their enemies' (375 G), their training will be particularly important and take considerable time.

MPP4-373 PLATO'S POLITICS DON'T REST ON HIS APPEALS TO MYTH

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.68.

A modern liberal will certainly find these suggested institutions extremely repellent. Let us then ask how he might seek to undermine Plato's argument. He might, first of all, attack the more picturesque features of the Platonic metaphysics. He might dismiss as mythological the view that there is a celestial world of eternally existing Ideas, visible to the eye of the mind provided that it has been suitably schooled. The claim that only those with this superior mental vision are competent to guide others by education and firm government might thus be defeated. Unfortunately matters are not so easy for the liberal. We can show this by restating the Platonic authoritarian argument without the mythology.

MPP4-374 PLATO'S ANATOMY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS BASED ON COMMON EXPERIENCE

W.K.C. Guthrie, *THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS*, 1950, p.114-5.

If Plato based the tripartite character of the individual on the existence of three classes in the state, his argument would of course be hopelessly circular. But that is not what the Republic suggests. He bases it on observation, plus the premise of his own that two contradictory impulses, existing contemporaneously in the mind, cannot proceed from the same source. Such contradictory impulses, he says, are a matter of common experience. A man is desperately thirsty, but suspects that the only available water is infected. There is something in him urging him to drink, and something else urging him to refrain. Here are two warring elements, which he calls desire and reason respectively. But there must be a third. When faced with a conflict between reason and desire, some fall and some resist. It is possible (though that astonishing man Socrates did not know it) to say '*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*'. The reason needs as it were an executive arm to enforce its decisions, and this is provided by the third element, the *thymos*, that element of will-power which Socrates so strangely left out of account.

MPP4-375 POPPER ADMITS HE ISN'T QUALIFIED TO JUDGE PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.4.

We come now to the third and greatest wave that has to be faced if any clear understanding of Plato is to be arrived at: the work of K. R. Popper: *The Open Society and its Enemies*. One of the most extraordinary features of Popper's criticism of Plato is that he more or less admits that he is not a philosopher and does not want to be one; he is rather a social technician. And yet he has considerable admiration for Plato as a sociologist; it is Plato's philosophy which he dislikes.

MPP4-376 RUSSELL'S CRITIQUE OF PLATO IS SIMPLISTIC

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.3.

Likewise when he comments that Plato's definition of justice 'makes it possible to have inequalities of power and privilege without injustice', a number of important questions are raised: ought people to have equal power? What is equal power? Could everybody have equal power? Alas, the questions are not answered. Even in this earlier work, Russell is prone to dismiss by means of emotive phraseology ('in spite of all the fine talk, skill in war and enough to eat is all that will be achieved'), but this technique becomes almost the only manner of argument by the time that 'Philosophy and politics' was written. In the *History of Western Philosophy* all the complexities of the Republic had perforce been summarised in ten pages; now they are summarised in two words: 'totalitarian tract'. It is taken for granted that the term is pejorative, and Russell then attempts to identify Plato's totalitarianism, if such it be, with that of Hitler and Lenin, who are referred to as disciples of Plato who provided 'a practical exegesis' of his 'reactionary tendencies'. The very lack of distinction between Hitler and Lenin, even if one happens to dislike both, is philosophically disturbing.

MPP4-377 A PLURALITY OF PRINCIPLES MEANS THAT THERE ARE NO GOOD GROUNDS FOR CHOICE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.9.

The problem for the liberal-democrats is surely this: if we accept their assumption about a plurality of ultimate principles of equal weight, as many contemporary philosophers, who do not necessarily see eye to eye on all matters with the liberal-democrats or with each other, do, it follows that we cannot make a reasoned choice between a wide variety of educational (or social or any other) proposals; for, of the widely different, but seriously intended, educational programmes that have been put forward, there are few which could not be defended by appeal to one or other of the plurality of ultimate principles. If one cannot in general decide on the relative importance to be attached to principles, how can one ever decide in particular cases between the claims of two ultimate principles? And if one cannot decide, how can one criticise others who do in general attach more importance to one principle than another?

MPP4-378 LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY IS INCOHERENTLY PLURALISTIC

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.8.

It is not only the quality of liberal-democratic criticism of Plato, however, that causes one a certain amount of dismay. There is also the fact that liberal-democratic philosophy itself -- the alternative viewpoint that we are asked to admire in preference to Platonism -- is at best obscure and at worst incoherent. *Prima facie* at least it seems that the lynch-pin of liberal-democratic theory is a belief in a plurality of ultimate moral principles, amongst which are a principle of equality, a principle of freedom and a principle of happiness. These ultimate principles are articles of faith. It cannot be shown that they ought to be adopted. One cannot demonstrate, for example, the truth of the claim that all men ought to be free or that all men are equally entitled to happiness. Furthermore, implicit in the belief that these various principles are ultimate is the claim that they are of equal weight.

MPP4-379 PLATO'S IDEALS ULTIMATELY ENLIGHTENED POLITICS

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.81.

Plato did not see his political proposals realised, nor perhaps did he expect to. His only excursion into politics, in Sicily, was a disaster. But a change did come over men's minds as a result of his thought. Greek political morality did not improve, it is true; nor was the Roman much better. But though the practice of politics remained as dirty as before, it is fair to claim that, gradually, through the work of Plato and his successors, the Stoics, Christians and others, ideals of a new and better sort came in the end to be current.

MPP4-380 PLATO'S PROMOTION OF THE GOOD OUTWEIGHS HIS POLITICAL SINS

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.81.

The rhetoric of present-day politics is still mostly nothing but rhetoric; but rhetoric does influence people (even its authors), and cause things to happen which otherwise would not. Our political rhetoric is permeated now by ideals which were simply non-existent in the rhetoric of Plato's day. This can be seen by comparing almost any political speech nowadays with almost any speech reported from the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Politicians do not always do what they commend in their speeches; but sometimes they do, and that has made a difference to the world. Part of this difference we owe to Plato. In the end he made many people see that personal or even national ambition and success are not the most important things in life, and that the good of other people is a worthier aim. For this we can forgive him for being also the father of political paternalism and absolutism.

MPP4-381 PLATO IDENTIFIES GOODNESS WITH RATIONALITY

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.31.

In point of fact Plato is very loath to tell us what the idea of goodness is, but it is clear that he identifies it with rationality; and he tries to explain it by analogy (507). Goodness is to the realm of the intelligible what the sun is to the realm of the visible. The sun causes the visible world to be seen, and it can be seen itself; in the same way, goodness is what causes the intelligible to be understood by the intellect; it both gives meaning to and is the meaning of the universe, and the intellect can also grasp the notion of goodness. That is to say, without the light of comprehension spread by recognition of the ultimate reality, our understanding of justice, beauty, etc. is nebulous (508/9). In prosaic terms: moral discussion is worthless with those who do not understand the problems inherent in the peculiar status of moral principles, and yet an understanding of moral truth is necessary to give meaning to life.

MPP4-382 KNOWLEDGE IS DISTINCT FROM OPINION

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.30.

Knowledge and opinion are to be distinguished (477); the former has as its object what is, what has absolute existence. Opinion, on the other hand, is appropriate neither to something that is, nor yet to that which is not, but to something in between. Now beautiful things sometimes seem ugly from a different point of view (479); we cannot say this symphony is beautiful, because to another man, or at another time, it may not be beautiful. This symphony neither is, nor is not, beautiful; its beauty is therefore a fitting object for opinion or belief (*doxa*); you opine that it is beautiful, I opine that it is not. We neither of us 'know'. Thus the man who comprehends the beauty of a beautiful statue is possessed of a belief or an opinion. If he desires to be a man of knowledge he must go beyond the particulars, for only the Idea can be known. What Plato means by a philosopher is thus very simple: a man who is capable of a high degree of conceptual thought and who is not wedded exclusively to empirical information about the actual world.

MPP4-383 HAPPINESS INVOLVES RATIONAL CONTROL OF CONFLICTING DESIRES

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.28.

Sections 435-445, on the three-part soul, amount to the formal statement that a just man will be one who acts on rational principle and not on whim; he is characterized, not as the sort of man who does X and Y, but as the sort of man who uses his rationality by way of justification and not his immediate inclinations. The inclinations or desires are not supposed to be quashed or obliterated, merely controlled by the demands of rationality. Plato's ultimate claim that the just man is the happy man thus becomes explicable. Happiness, for Plato, necessarily involves the absence of unfulfilled and conflicting desires, as well as the control of certain desires at certain times which will lead to trouble.

MPP4-384 TRUE FREEDOM IS RULE BY REASON

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.37.

But a state under a 'tyrant, is really enslaved in an evil sense, for it is enslaved to an evil man and his evil principles, just as the tyrannical individual is enslaved to some consuming passion; this is liable in the long run to be unpleasant in fact, and is evil in principle, because it is irrational. No man is really free of every kind of restriction, but the rational man may be emotively described as the most free, because he is ruled only by reason.

MPP4-385 THE RULE OF REASON PRODUCES JUSTICE AND HAPPINESS

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.37.

Plato's position is clear: a man may be motivated predominantly by love of honour, love of material wealth, or love of the immediate gratification of immediate desires whatever they happen to be; or he can be motivated by reason over and above these separate impulses; this last motivation, when embodied in an individual, Plato calls justice and this, he argues, is the surest guarantee of happiness.

MPP4-386 FOR SOCRATES, JUSTICE NEVER CONFLICTS WITH SELF-INTEREST

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.80-1.

Crito agrees; but Socrates does not explain why we should assume that the just and moral life ('living finely and living justly') is the same as the happy life achieving the agent's own interests ('living well'). He claims, very surprisingly, that the virtuous person can suffer no harm at all; however badly everything else may seem to go, he never suffers any loss of happiness and welfare. Socrates is right to say we cannot consistently maintain these beliefs:

1. Justice is a virtue.
2. A virtue must always benefit its possessor.
3. Justice sometimes harms its possessor.

Socrates assumes that we must retain the first two claims and reject the third. But why is this the right resolution of the conflict? If we accept this resolution, what actions will be just, and can justice impose the other-regarding obligations commonly associated with it? We readily assume that the obligations of justice require us, for instance, to keep agreements with other people, to respect their rights, and to consider their interests, in cases where we seem to gain some benefit by cheating or exploiting them. Socrates claims that we are wrong to suspect a conflict between self-interest and obligation in such cases. His own adhesion to justice is clear in the *Apology* and *Crito*; if he is to justify himself, he must show that his just action is actually in his own interest. But he does not present arguments to justify his confidence and resolve our doubts. We might expect him, for instance, to remove some doubts in some people by appealing to the rewards that the virtuous person can expect in an after-life -- a familiar device for proving the convergence of morality and self-interest. Such an appeal, however, requires belief in the immortality of the soul. In the *Apology* Socrates conspicuously forgoes any appeal to immortality; he never suggests that belief in immortality and in post-mortem rewards and punishments is necessary to justify acceptance of justice.

MPP4-387 PLATO'S NATURALISM IS HIS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO MORAL THOUGHT

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.278.

Plato's great contributions to ethical thought are his recognition that goodness consists in the natural and proper functioning of our human nature and his view of society as the normal background of the moral life.

MPP4-388 SOCRATES ACCEPTED ETHICAL EGOISM

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.80.

Socrates accepts an egoist assumption about reasons and motives -- that my own welfare is the ultimate aim of all my action. He identifies my welfare with my happiness (eudaimonia; 'happiness' is a conventional, though not completely satisfactory, rendering; nothing more determinate than a general notion of welfare is intended). Our question, then, is not 'Should I pursue my own happiness or some other end?', but 'Given that I want my happiness, how am I to get it?' Socrates believes in the unity of the virtues, since he believes that they are all to be identified with knowledge of good and evil. The egoist assumption implies that the relevant good and evil must be good and evil for the agent; hence all the virtues must ultimately be ways to promote the agent's own interest. In the *Crito* he applies this general egoist assumption about virtue to justice. He claims that the moral obligations imposed by justice cannot conflict with his own self-interest: Do we still agree or not, that what we should value most highly is not merely living, but living well? . . . And do we still agree that living well, living finely, and living justly are the same thing?

MPP4-389 PLEASURE CAN BE HARMFUL, SO IT CAN'T BE EQUATED WITH THE GOOD

W.K.C. Guthrie, *THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS*, 1950, p.103.

An unreflecting pursuit of pleasure may only lead to future misery. But from this -- which everyone admits -- it follows that some actions pleasant in themselves may cause great harm to a man, even if we still restrict the meaning of harm to that which is painful. This could not happen if pleasure were identical with the good, i.e. were itself the ultimate goal of life. It cannot itself be the end, though it may often conduce to it. We need another word to equate with 'the good' and explain it. Socrates himself suggests a word which means the useful, or beneficial. The good must be something which always benefits, never harms. If we define it thus, then acts which in themselves give pleasure can be referred to the question of ultimate benefit as to a higher standard, while still maintaining the attitude of pure self-interest.

MPP4-390 PLATO'S FORMS ARE A VALUABLE MYTH

John McDowell, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.161.

But Plato's Forms are a myth, they are not a consolation, a mere avoidance of vertigo; vision of them is portrayed as too difficult an attainment for that to be so. The remoteness of the Form of the Good is a metaphorical version of the thesis that value is not in the world, utterly distinct from the dreary literal version which has obsessed recent moral philosophy. The point of the metaphor is the colossal difficulty of attaining a capacity to cope clear-sightedly with the ethical reality which is part of our world. Unlike other philosophical responses to uncodifiability, this one may actually work towards moral improvement; negatively, by inducing humility, and positively, by an inspiring effect akin to that of a religious conversion.

MPP4-391 THE THEORY OF THE FORMS IS A METAPHOR TO INDICATE THE OBJECTIVITY OF JUSTICE

Robin Barrow, Lecturer in Philosophy of Education, University of Leicester, *PLATO, UTILITARIANISM AND EDUCATION*, 1975, p.42.

The theory of Forms is essentially no more than a poet's way of asserting his commitment to an absolutist view of ethics rather than a relativist one. What is fundamentally being conveyed, and what is important, is the view that, for example, justice is not a chameleon concept that derives its content from the habits or attitudes of a specific society at a specific time, but that it is a concept with a determinate content and absolute validity. Some things simply are just and others not, and their justness or lack of it is determined by fixed criteria, regardless of what anybody may happen to think at any particular time. The idea or form of Justice is more real than specific instances of justice, because specific instances are variable in the light of circumstances.

MPP4-392 PLATO CORRECTLY INSISTS ON THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS

Mortimer Adler, Institute for Philosophical Research, *SIX GREAT IDEAS*, 1981, p.9.

Plato was right, not wrong, in holding that ideas are objects that the human mind can think about. He was right in insisting on their objectivity. This, understood in the simplest manner possible, amounts to saying that you and I can engage in conversation about one and the same idea because it is an object that you and I are thinking about, just as you and I can engage in conversation about one and the same overcoat when you help me put it on and ask me whether it is warm enough. When you and I discuss truth or justice, the idea of truth or justice is before our minds, or present to our minds, just as much as the overcoat that you help me on with is handled by both of us at the same time.

MPP4-393 SOCRATIC QUESTIONING HAS SIGNIFICANT MORAL CONSEQUENCES

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.78.

Socrates' argument extends beyond piety to morality in general for it extends beyond divine authority to other claims to moral authority. If someone says that what is right is what the laws require, we can ask the question Socrates asks Euthyphro. Those who maintain this view make morality an arbitrary creature of law, and free law from moral criticism. Protagoras' conventionalist view, treating morality and justice as a matter of convention, also makes them immune to rational criticism. Against him Socrates implies that in fact we apply some further standard in judging whether a norm or convention is just or not and that this standard makes conventional norms open to rational criticism. These implications of the discussion with Euthyphro should assure us that Socrates' questions have significant moral consequences. They force us to see that a consistent reply to his questions may be quite implausible. We have seen that if consistency were all that mattered, the interlocutor could easily avoid defeat by rejecting one of Socrates' crucial assumptions. But when we count the cost of rejection, we can see why we have good reason to agree with Socrates.

MPP4-394 THE SEARCH FOR DEFINITIONS AIDS IN SELF-UNDERSTANDING

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, CLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1989, p.74.

Socrates thinks he does not know the definition of any of the virtues; and he convinces his interlocutors that they do not know either. But he assumes that both he and his interlocutors make true judgements. We might learn the answer to an arithmetical problem even if we cannot work it out for ourselves; but when we can work it out ourselves, we know that this is the right answer, and do not simply get the answer right. This is the knowledge that Socrates thinks he lacks and wants to find. He lacks the explicit justification that will show the truth of his beliefs in disputed cases. Socrates is concerned with an urgent and important dispute about moral beliefs; and if he can answer the questions he asks, he will resolve some of the disputed issues. Moreover, the search for a definition quite reasonably forces the interlocutor to examine his life; he has to decide if he really understands the principles he acts on, and whether his life really conforms to the principles that he finds he accepts on reflexion.

MPP4-395 THE SEARCH FOR PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITIONS ISN'T JUST VERBAL

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, CLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1989, p.74.

In seeking a definition Socrates is not asking what the word 'bravery' means, and the disputes that concern him are not merely verbal. Thucydides' Corcyreans might agree that 'bravery' means (say) 'fearless resolution in a worthy cause'; but they do not agree about the sort of action that this virtue requires. They need a clearer grasp of the standard they apply in regarding actions as brave. Socrates is right to look for a standard to explain and correct judgements about bravery.

MPP4-396 PLATONIC DIALECTIC CHECKS UNSUPPORTED INTUITIONS

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT, 1982, p.78.

Whenever anybody, whether in science or mathematics or moral philosophy, makes some statement on the basis of mere intuition, hoping that we will share the intuition and therefore agree with it, he should be disciplined by means of the Socratic-Platonic demand that he 'give an account' of what he has said. Even now too many philosophical frauds are unwilling to face the auditors in this way.

MPP4-397 SOCRATIC INTERROGATION AIDS IN CONSTRUCTIVE REFLECTION

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, CLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1989, p.79.

Socrates, Laches, and Nicias eventually agree that the genuinely brave person's fearlessness must rest on his knowledge of good and evil as a whole; but this very same knowledge of good and evil is also necessary and sufficient for each of the other virtues; hence bravery turns out to be indistinguishable from virtue as a whole. This conclusion makes some practical difference. For the discussion began by asking about the sort of training suitable for developing bravery; but now we find there is no point in trying to make someone brave without teaching him the rest of virtue as well. We can perhaps make someone fearless and resolute, but if he is also cruel and thoughtless, he has not acquired genuine bravery. The dialogue reaches no explicit result; it ends in puzzlement, designed to provoke reflexion. But reflexion suggests an answer to Thucydides' Corcyrean partisans. They assume that one virtue can conflict with another, and especially that bravery can conflict with justice. In reply Socrates suggests that deeper reflexion about the unity of morality will shake our belief in this conflict. His belief in the 'unity of the virtues' appears to be a harsh paradox. But he thinks we will find, on reflexion, that we really believed it all along; Socratic interrogation is an aid to constructive reflexion.

MPP4-398 SKEPTICISM AND DOGMATISM BOTH EXPRESS A MISUNDERSTANDING OF SOCRATIC METHOD

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, CLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1989, p.114.

A picture of Plato would be incomplete if it did not show how someone might find support in the dialogues for both scepticism and other-worldly dogmatism. Still, neither of these is a fair view of Plato; and the errors in both views result from misunderstanding of his Socratic method. The Socratic cross examination is Plato's method for self-examination and the reform of common-sense beliefs, not for their wholesale abandonment. He denies that the rational conclusion to draw from Socratic examination is scepticism. Nor does he believe, as Plotinus believes under Plato's inspiration, that other-worldly mysticism is the only alternative to scepticism. Though many of Plato's conclusions are paradoxical, he argues both from and to the beliefs of Socrates' interlocutors. If we focus on the Socratic and dialectical character of Plato's arguments, we can see what is wrong or over-simplified in some apparently plausible objections to him.

MPP4-399 SOCRATIC QUESTIONING ISN'T INTENDED TO PRODUCE SKEPTICISM

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.75.

Socrates seeks to amend and improve an interlocutor's beliefs, not to destroy them. Some interlocutors feel their firm convictions being undermined. He is compared with a jellyfish that numbs the victims it stings, and with Daedalus, who could make statues move as Socrates makes beliefs move and wander away. Such a reaction might lead to scepticism. But Laches' confusion does not result in scepticism. Though cross-examination reveals inconsistencies in his beliefs, reflexion shows him how to improve them. Confused and sceptical reactions reflect only part of the truth about Socrates. He deserves to be taken seriously when he claims to be searching for the truth.

MPP4-400 PLATO CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED TOTALITARIANISM

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.56.

Plato's determination to uphold a paternalistic and totalitarian politics is clearly independent of any particular version of the theory of Forms; for long after he has abandoned the version which in the Republic helps to sustain such a politics, he is prepared to advocate the political views which it sustained.

MPP4-401 PLATO'S TOTALITARIANISM DERIVES FROM HIS MORAL ABSOLUTISM

R.J. Hollingdale, *WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION*, 1979, p.84.

This doctrine may be called Plato's absolutism. He believes that there is one Good, which is the same for all men, that goodness is something not dependent on opinion or desire, but is, like mathematical truth, objective. That which is good is good absolutely, and remains good whether or not anyone knows it is good. From this moral absolutism follows his political authoritarianism, or as we should now say, totalitarianism.

MPP4-402 PLATO'S VIEW OF THE GOOD LED TO HIS AUTHORITARIANISM

R.M. Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.64.

Given Plato's views about knowledge of the Good, and about the role of education in making possible a good life, it is easy to see how he came by his highly authoritarian political doctrines. We can become good men and lead a good life by one of two means. Either we acquire right opinions about the best way to live, or we acquire knowledge. Both, as he says in the Meno (98), will serve the limited purpose of living a good life; but right opinion can never be reliably imparted, and will never be secure against corrupting influences, unless somebody -- either a man himself or those who teach and subsequently rule him -- has not merely right opinion but knowledge: knowledge of the Ideas, which are the explanations of why things are as they are, and are also, because of the dependence of the other Ideas on the Good, explanations of how it is best that they should be. The possessors of this knowledge are the only people who can determine what kind of life is good, and thus the only people who can provide the education (even the primary education which imparts only right opinion) and the governance which are the necessary conditions of the good life.

MPP4-403 PLATO'S DEFINITION OF JUSTICE PARALLELS TOTALITARIAN USAGE

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.119.

These class prerogatives, he claimed, are necessary for upholding the stability of the state. They constitute therefore the essence of justice. Ultimately, this claim is based upon the argument that justice is useful to the might, health, and stability of the state; an argument which is only too similar to the modern totalitarian definition: right is whatever is useful to the might of my nation, or my class, or my party.

MPP4-404 PLATO'S STATIST MORALITY IS TOTALITARIAN

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.107.

We see here that Plato recognizes only one ultimate standard, the interest of the state. Everything that furthers it is good and virtuous and just; everything that threatens it is bad and wicked and unjust. Actions that serve it are moral; actions that endanger it, immoral. In other words, Plato's moral code is strictly utilitarian; it is a code of collectivist or political utilitarianism. The criterion of morality is the interest of the state. Morality is nothing but political hygiene. This is the collectivist, the tribal, the totalitarian theory of morality: 'Good is what is in the interest of my group; or my tribe; or my state.' It is easy to see what this morality implied for international relations: that the state itself can never be wrong in any of its actions, as long as it is strong; that the state has the right, not only to do violence to its citizens, should that lead to an increase of strength, but also to attack other states, provided it does so without weakening itself. (This inference, the explicit recognition of the amorality of the state, and consequently the defence of moral nihilism in international relations, was drawn by Hegel.)

MPP4-405 PLATO'S POLITICAL PROGRAM WAS TOTALITARIAN

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.87.

In spite of such arguments I believe that Plato's political programme, far from being morally superior to totalitarianism, is fundamentally identical with it. I believe that the objections against this view are based upon an ancient and deep-rooted prejudice in favour of idealizing Plato.

MPP4-406 PLATO'S CONCEPT OF JUSTICE WAS TOTALITARIAN

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.89.

What did Plato mean by 'justice'? I assert that in the Republic he used the term 'just' as a synonym for 'that which is in the interest of the best state'. And what is in the interest of this best state? To arrest all change, by the maintenance of a rigid class division and class rule. If I am right in this interpretation, then we should have to say that Plato's demand for justice leaves his political programme at the level of totalitarianism; and we should have to conclude that we must guard against the danger of being impressed by mere words.

MPP4-407 PLATO ATTEMPTS TO REESTABLISH TRIBALISM

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.119.

Summing up, we can say that Plato's theory of Justice presented in the Republic and later works, is a conscious attempt to get the better of the equalitarian, individualistic, and protectionist tendencies of his time, and to re-establish the claims of tribalism by developing a totalitarian moral theory.

MPP4-408 PLATO'S TOTALITARIAN MORALITY OVERRIDES EVEN PHILOSOPHY

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.138.

The contrast between the Platonic and the Socratic creed is even greater than I have shown so far. Plato, I have said, followed Socrates in his definition of the philosopher. 'Whom do you call true philosophers? -- Those who love truth', we read in the Republic. But he himself is not quite truthful when he makes this statement. He does not really believe in it, for he bluntly declares in other places that it is one of the royal privileges of the sovereign to make full use of lies and deceit: 'It is the business of the rulers of the city, if it is anybody's, to tell lies, deceiving both its enemies and its own citizens for the benefit of the city; and no one else must touch this privilege.' 'For the benefit of the city', says Plato. Again we find that the appeal to the principle of collective utility is the ultimate ethical consideration. Totalitarian morality overrules everything, even the definition, the Idea, of the philosopher. It need hardly be mentioned that, by the same principle of political expediency, the ruled are to be forced to tell the truth. 'If the ruler catches anyone else in a lie . . . then he will punish him for introducing a practice which injures and endangers the city. . .' Only in this slightly unexpected sense are the Platonic rulers -- the philosopher kings -- lovers of truth.

MPP4-409 PLATO'S REPUBLIC WOULD BE TOTALLY MILITARIZED

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.103.

Like other totalitarian militarists and admirers of Sparta, Plato urges that the all-important requirements of military discipline must be paramount, even in peace, and that they must determine the whole life of all citizens; for not only the full citizens (who are all soldiers) and the children, but also the very beasts must spend their whole life in a state of permanent and total mobilizations. 'The greatest principle of all', he writes, 'is that nobody, whether male or female, should ever be without a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative, neither out of zeal, nor even playfully. But in war and in the midst of peace -- to his leader he shall direct his eye, and follow him faithfully. And even in the smallest matters he should stand under leadership. For example, he should get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals...only if he has been told to do so...In a word, he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to dream of acting independently, and to become utterly incapable of it. In this way the life of all will be spent in total community. There is no law, nor will there ever be one, which is superior to this, or better and more effective in ensuring salvation and victory in war. And in times of peace, and from the earliest childhood on should it be fostered -- this habit of ruling others, and of being ruled by others. And every trace of anarchy should be utterly eradicated from all the life of all the men, and even of the wild beasts which are subject to men.'

MPP4-410 PLATO HELPED TO UNDERMINE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.110.

Plato's attitude to democracy began a tradition of philosophical hostility or indifference (to which Aristotle is only a partial exception). Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle profited from Athenian democracy; they might have found it hard to interest people in philosophical discussion if Athenians had not already grown used to hearing and evaluating purportedly rational arguments on moral and political questions. Their hostile attitude seems to betray failure to appreciate all the effects of democracy. Greek democracy declined; eventually, though not immediately, the argumentative habits favourable to philosophy declined also. Rhetoric and public speaking turned from argument and (moderately) rational persuasion, to flattery, panegyric, and display. Still later, philosophy lost its argumentative character also. It would be too simple to see a straightforward relation of cause and effect in this sequence, and wrong to put all the blame on Plato. But it is not unfair to suppose that the philosophers and their pupils, and especially Plato, bear some responsibility.

MPP4-411 DEMOCRACY IS JUSTIFIED BY THE VALUES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.110.

We need not choose between the self-defeating defence of democracy and Plato's anti-democratic outlook. His argument assumes that democratic participation in government has only instrumental value, determined by its efficiency in promoting interests that are quite distinct from it. Against Plato, however, we might value control over what happens to us, and shared responsibility for it, even at some cost in efficiency. Each of us values himself as an agent who to some extent plans his life; and each of us shows respect for others as agents of the same sort, in so far as we decide collectively about our lives. We need not claim that the values of responsibility and control always justify an enormous cost in efficiency. To cast doubt on Plato's argument, we need claim only that there is a potential conflict between efficiency and these other values, and that Plato overlooks the conflict, because he has not attended to the other values.

MPP4-412 PLATO INVERTS ORDINARY CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.90.

It will be seen that Plato's concept of justice is fundamentally different from our ordinary view as analysed above. Plato calls class privilege 'just', while we usually mean by justice rather the absence of such privilege. But the difference goes further than that. We mean by justice some kind of equality in the treatment of individuals, while Plato considers justice not as a relationship between individuals, but as a property of the whole state, based upon a relationship between its classes. The state is just if it is healthy, strong, united -- stable.

MPP4-413 PLATO UNDERMINES JUSTICE BY STRESSING BIRTH AND CITIZENSHIP

Paul A. Vander Waerdt, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *THE SOCRATIC MOVEMENT*, 1994, p.309.

This brings us to a second way in which Zeno may seek to improve upon the way of life of Plato's best regime. Zeno appears to hold that Plato radically misconstrues the conditions necessary for the realization of natural justice. This regime, after all, originates in an act of injustice: when the city of pigs is transformed by the introduction of unnecessary desires into the feverish city, one of its first acts is the conquest of its neighbors' land in order to provide for excess production (373d-e). Moreover, it does not distinguish friends from enemies strictly on the basis of virtue, but on the purely arbitrary ground of birth and citizenship. Socrates holds that there is a natural difference in the treatment due to barbarians as distinguished from fellow Greeks: the former are "enemies by nature," while the latter are "by nature friends"; accordingly, Socrates objects to the enslavement of the latter but not of the former.

MPP4-414 PLATO'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS UNDERMINES HIS ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE

Paul A. Vander Waerdt, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *THE SOCRATIC MOVEMENT*, 1994, p.306.

For Zeno, on the other hand, natural justice requires the eradication of all merely conventional boundaries (Plut. *De virt. Alex.* 329a-b; cf. Cic. *Rep.* 3.33). To sanction different treatment merely on the basis of ethnic origin would seem flagrantly to violate natural law. Here again Zeno's view represents an attempt to improve upon the Platonic Socrates' by construing the requirements of his teaching on justice strictly. More particularly, Zeno seeks to avoid an apparent contradiction in it: while the citizens of Plato's best regime are required to treat each according to his due, such that one's position within the regime is determined by the quality of one's soul (those with golden souls become philosopher-guardians, and so forth), foreigners are excluded from any share in this regime by mere accident of birth, irrespective of their natural character and attainments. Thus, solely for conventional reasons, they cannot share in the way of life that Plato holds to accord with nature. Zeno's best regime, to the contrary, is a community whose citizenship is determined solely by rationality; only the virtuous may belong to it, and the sole basis for ties of kinship, friendship, and so forth is virtue (D.L. 7.122-24). In enjoining that we not be divided by the differing principles of justice of conventional communities, Zeno appears once again to aim to disarm a difficulty that appears to threaten the internal consistency of the Platonic account of natural justice.

MPP4-415 PLATO HATED INDIVIDUALISM AND FREEDOM

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.103-4.

Never was a man more in earnest in his hostility towards the individual. And this hatred is deeply rooted in the fundamental dualism of Plato's philosophy; he hated the individual and his freedom just as he hated the varying particular experiences, the variety of the changing world of sensible things. In the field of politics, the individual is to Plato the Evil One himself.

MPP4-416 PLATO SUPPRESSES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.143.

But I believe that wherever Plato considers religious matters in their relation to politics, his political opportunism sweeps all other feelings aside. Thus Plato demands, in the Laws, the severest punishment even for honest and honourable people if their opinions concerning the gods deviate from those held by the state. Their souls are to be treated by a Nocturnal Council of inquisitors, and if they do not recant or if they repeat the offense, the charge of impiety means death. Has he forgotten that Socrates had fallen a victim to that very charge?

MPP4-417 PLATO TOTALLY SUBORDINATES THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE STATE

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.106.

To sum up. Because of his radical collectivism, Plato is not even interested in those problems which men usually call the problems of justice, that is to say, in the impartial weighing of the contesting claims of individuals. Nor is he interested in adjusting the individual's claims to those of the state. For the individual is altogether inferior. 'I legislate with a view to what is best for the whole state', says Plato, '... for I justly place the interests of the individual on an inferior level of value.' He is concerned solely with the collective whole as such, and justice, to him, is nothing but the health, unity; and stability of the collective body.

MPP4-418 PLATO'S SUBORDINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS SHOCKING TO CONTEMPORARY SENSIBILITIES

W.K.C. Guthrie, *THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS*, 1950, p.85. Among the ruling classes in Plato's Republic the individual is to be subordinated to the common weal with what appears to our eyes an excessive relentlessness. The taking away from these, the most valuable citizens of the state, of property and family life, the communal supervision of their children, the distribution of duties and privileges according to an almost inexorable system of class-distinctions -- all this seems shocking to our eyes.

MPP4-419 PLATO'S REPUBLIC IS OVERLY STATIC

Will Durant, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, *THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY*, 1933, p.38.

What Plato lacks above all, perhaps, is the Heracleitean sense of flux and change; he is too anxious to have the moving picture of this world become a fixed and still tableau. He loves order exclusively, like any timid philosopher; he has been frightened by the democratic turbulence of Athens into an extreme neglect of individual values; he arranges men in classes like an entomologist classifying flies; and he is not averse to using priestly humbug to secure his ends. His state is static; it might easily become an old-fogey society, ruled by inflexible octogenarians hostile to invention and jealous of change. It is mere science without art; it exalts order, so dear to the scientific mind, and quite neglects that liberty which is the soul of art; it worships the name of beauty, but exiles the artist who alone can make beauty or point it out. It is a Sparta or a Prussia, not an ideal state.

MPP4-420 PLATO RESORTS TO PROPAGANDA TO STOP ALL POLITICAL CHANGE

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.139-40.

What kind of lies has Plato in mind when he exhorts his rulers to use strong medicine? Crossman rightly emphasizes that Plato means 'propaganda, the technique of controlling the behaviour of . . . the bulk of the ruled majority'. Certainly, Plato had these first in his mind; but when Crossman suggests that the propaganda lies were only intended for the consumption of the ruled, while the rulers should be a fully enlightened intelligentsia, then I cannot agree. I think, rather, that Plato's complete break with anything resembling Socrates' intellectualism is nowhere more obvious than in the place where he twice expresses his hope that even the rulers themselves, at least after a few generations, might be induced to believe his greatest propaganda lie; I mean his racialism, his Myth of Blood and Soil, known as the Myth of the Metals in Man and of the Earthborn. Here we see that Plato's utilitarian and totalitarian principles overrule everything, even the ruler's privilege of knowing, and of demanding to be told, the truth. The motive of Plato's wish that the rulers themselves should believe in the propaganda lie is his hope of increasing its wholesome effect, i.e. of strengthening the rule of the master race, and ultimately, of arresting all political change.

MPP4-421 PLATO'S REPUBLIC WOULD BE INTELLECTUALLY STERILE

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.115.

When we ask: what will Plato's Republic achieve? The answer is rather humdrum. It will achieve success in wars against roughly equal populations, and it will secure a livelihood for a certain small number of people. It will almost certainly produce no art or science, because of its rigidity; in this respect, as in others, it will be like Sparta. In spite of all the fine talk, skill in war and enough to eat is all that will be achieved. Plato had lived through famine and defeat in Athens; perhaps, subconsciously, he thought the avoidance of these evils the best that statesmanship could accomplish.

MPP4-422 PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF WISDOM IS REMOTE FROM REALITY

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.106-7.

"Wisdom," in the sense supposed, would not be any kind of specialized skill, such as is possessed by the shoemaker or the physician or the military tactician. It must be something more generalized than this, since its possession is supposed to make a man capable of governing wisely. I think Plato would have said that it consists in knowledge of the good, and would have supplemented this definition with the Socratic doctrine that no man sins wittingly, from which it follows that whoever knows what is good does what is right. To us, such a view seems remote from reality. We should more naturally say that there are divergent interests, and that the statesman should arrive at the best available compromise. The members of a class or a nation may have a common interest, but it will usually conflict with the interests of other classes or other nations. There are, no doubt, some interests of mankind as a whole, but they do not suffice to determine political action. Perhaps they will do so at some future date, but certainly not so long as there are many sovereign States. And even then the most difficult part of the pursuit of the general interest would consist in arriving at compromises among mutually hostile special interests.

MPP4-423 PLATO'S POLITICS LED HIM TO A DEBASED CONCEPT OF WISDOM

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.146.

Wisdom, as we have seen, does not mean to Plato the Socratic insight into one's own limitations; nor does it mean what most of us would expect, a warm interest in, and a helpful understanding of, humanity and human affairs. Plato's wise men, highly preoccupied with the problems of a superior world, 'have no time to look down at the affairs of men . . .; they look upon, and hold fast to, the ordered and the measured'. It is the right kind of learning that makes a man wise: 'Philosophic natures are lovers of that kind of learning which reveals to them a reality that exists for ever and is not harassed by generation and degeneration.' It does not seem that Plato's treatment of wisdom can carry us beyond the ideal of arresting change.

MPP4-424 RULE BY THE WISE IS IMPRACTICAL

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.107.

But even if we suppose that there is such a thing as "wisdom," is there any form of constitution which will give the government to the wise? It is clear that majorities, like general councils, may err, and in fact have erred. Aristocracies are not always wise; kings are often foolish; Popes, in spite of infallibility, have committed grievous errors. Would anybody advocate entrusting the government to university graduates, or even to doctors of divinity? Or to men who, having been born poor, have made great fortunes? It is clear that no legally definable selection of citizens is likely to be wiser, in practice, than the whole body. It might be suggested that men could be given political wisdom by a suitable training. But the question would arise: what is a suitable training? And this would turn out to be a party question. The problem of finding a collection of "wise" men and leaving the government to them is thus an insoluble one. That is the ultimate reason for democracy.

MPP4-425 PLATO EXAGGERATES THE USEFULNESS OF EXPERTISE IN GOVERNMENT

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.422.

The role of experts in government has often been questioned. Experts are useful as efficient means to agreed-upon ends. But what equips the experts to determine as well the ends which the State will serve? Since citizens' lives are being affected, shouldn't they be permitted to determine their own ends, rather than have them determined by the rulers? Plato does grant the populace a large measure of freedom, but simply because the rulers in their infinite wisdom permit it; the citizens do not possess freedom by right. If the rulers decide to censor literature, for example, it's for the good of the people and they have no cause to complain.

MPP4-426 EVEN THE UNWISE HAVE A LEGITIMATE STAKE IN PUBLIC DECISIONS

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, *HUMAN CONDUCT*, 1982, p.422.

It is because it is their lives that are affected that they (the people) should have a voice in the rulership. They may not express that voice wisely (though they may learn); nevertheless, said John Stuart Mill, even a mediocre government in which the people have a voice is preferable to a wise government in which they have none: "That a handful of human beings should weigh everybody in the balance, and give more to one and less to another at their sole pleasure and judgment, would not be borne unless from persons believed to be more than men, and backed by supernatural terrors."

MPP4-427 PLATO DOESN'T SUFFICIENTLY ALLOW FOR FALLIBILITY OF RULERS

R.M. Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.74.

Secondly, we must make more allowance than perhaps Plato does for human fallibility. Even if we grant him that there is a skill of ruling which could in theory equip its possessor to make all the right decisions, it may be a skill which no human being will ever attain, and perhaps a skill by the exercise of which he will be corrupted. Plato is in fact fairly pessimistic about this, as can be seen by reading between the lines of the *Republic*, and by looking at the much less ambitious demands made of his rulers in the *Laws*. But Plato does not recognise, as he should, that if rulers are fallible their claim to absolute power is less strong. As Sir Karl Popper rightly insisted, it may be more important to have institutional means of limiting the harm that unwise rulers can do, and removing them without violence if they fail to secure the good of their subjects.

MPP4-428 PLATO'S PHILOSOPHER KING IS A DEBASED HUMAN BEING

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.156.

What a monument of human smallness is this idea of the philosopher king. What a contrast between it and the simplicity and humaneness of Socrates, who warned the statesman against the danger of being dazzled by his own power, excellence, and wisdom, and who tried to teach him what matters most -- that we are all frail human beings. What a decline from this world of irony and reason and truthfulness down to Plato's kingdom of the sage whose magical powers raise him high above ordinary men; although not quite high enough to forgo the use of lies, or to neglect the sorry trade of every shaman -- the selling of spells, of breeding spells, in exchange for power over his fellow-men.

MPP4-429 PLATO'S POLITICS RESEMBLE THE INQUISITION

R.M. Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.80-1.

Plato here took a short cut. If absolute power could come into the hands of good and wise men, would not that do the trick? We have seen how much of good sense can be extracted from this bold suggestion. It is not wholly devoid of merit, but simply ignores the difficulty (indeed the practical impossibility) of finding suitable incumbents, and the further difficulty of reconciling absolute power, however wise its possessor, with the attainment of ends which nearly everybody (and who shall say they are wrong?) will include in their requirements for the good life, above all liberty. When Plato, impressed with the practical difficulties, goes on in the *Laws* to subject human and fallible rulers to a rigid code, he only makes matters worse. In its final form the Platonic proposal shares many features with the Holy Inquisition.

MPP4-430 PLATO HAD AN UNDULY ESTHETIC IDEA OF POLITICS

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.165.

Politics, to Plato, is the Royal Art. It is an art -- not in a metaphorical sense in which we may speak about the art of handling men, or the art of getting things done, but in a more literal sense of the word. It is an art of composition, like music, painting, or architecture. The Platonic politician composes cities, for beauty's sake. But here I must protest. I do not believe that human lives may be made the means for satisfying an artist's desire for self-expression. We must demand, rather, that every man should be given, if he wishes, the right to model his life himself, as far as this does not interfere too much with others. Much as I may sympathize with the aesthetic impulse, I suggest that the artist might seek expression in another material. Politics, I demand, must uphold equalitarian and individualistic principles; dreams of beauty have to submit to the necessity of helping men in distress, and men who suffer injustice; and to the necessity of constructing institutions to serve such purposes.

MPP4-431 POLITICAL ESTHETICISM IS FUTILE AND DESTRUCTIVE

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.166-7.

This is the way in which the artist-politician must proceed. This is what canvas-cleaning means. He must eradicate the existing institutions and traditions. He must purify, purge, expel, banish, and kill. ('Liquidate' is the terrible modern term for it.) Plato's statement is indeed a true description of the uncompromising attitude of all forms of out-and-out radicalism -- of the estheticist's refusal to compromise. The view that society should be beautiful like a work of art leads only too easily to violent measures. But all this radicalism and violence is both unrealistic and futile. (This has been shown by the example of Russia's development. After the economic breakdown to which the canvas-cleaning of the so-called 'war communism' had led, Lenin introduced his 'New Economic Policy', in fact a kind of piecemeal engineering, though without the conscious formulation of its principles or of a technology. He started by restoring most of the features of the picture which had been eradicated with so much human suffering. Money, markets, differentiation of income, and private property -- for a time even private enterprise in production -- were reintroduced, and only after this basis was re-established began a new period of reform.

MPP4-432 IN SACRIFICING THE HAPPINESS OF THE GUARDIANS, PLATO DESTROYS THE HAPPINESS OF HIS WHOLE CITY

Paul A. Vander Waerdt, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *THE SOCRATIC MOVEMENT*, 1994, p.304.

Now Zeno's central objection to the Platonic paradox of the rule of the philosopher-kings cannot very well be its impossibility, given that his own polity has the same feature. But he may well have aimed to resolve the problem to which Aristotle draws attention in his criticism in *Politics* 2: that in attempting to make the city as a whole happy Socrates destroys the happiness of the guardian class; that the city as a whole; cannot be happy unless all or at least some of its parts are happy; and that if the guardians are not happy, no one else will be, certainly not the artisans or multitude (1264b15-23; cf. 1329a22-24). In other words, in sacrificing the happiness of his philosophers to the necessity of ruling, Plato founds a regime none of whose citizens are happy.

MPP4-433 PLATO DOESN'T REALLY SEEK INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.169.

True happiness, Plato insists, is achieved only by justice, i.e. by keeping one's place. The ruler must find happiness in ruling, the warrior in warring; and, we may infer, the slave in slaving. Apart from that, Plato says frequently that what he is aiming at is neither the happiness of individuals nor that of any particular class in the state, but only the happiness of the whole, and this, he argues, is nothing but the outcome of that rule of justice which I have shown to be totalitarian in character. That only this justice can lead to any true happiness is one of the main theses of the Republic.

MPP4-434 PLATO BETRAYED SOCRATES' LEGACY

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.194-5.

Socrates had only one worthy successor, his old friend Antisthenes, the last of the Great Generation. Plato, his most gifted disciple, was soon to prove the least faithful. He betrayed Socrates, just as his uncles had done. These, besides betraying Socrates, had also tried to implicate him in their terrorist acts, but they did not succeed, since he resisted. Plato tried to implicate Socrates in his grandiose attempt to construct the theory of the arrested society; and he had no difficulty in succeeding, for Socrates was dead. I know of course that this judgement will seem outrageous, harsh, even to those who are critical of Plato. But if we look upon the *Apology* and the *Crito* as Socrates' last will, and if we compare these testaments of his old age with Plato's testament, the *Laws*, then it is difficult to judge otherwise. Socrates had been condemned, but his death was not intended by the initiators of the trial. Plato's *Laws* remedy this lack of intention. Here he elaborates coolly and carefully the theory of inquisition. Free thought, criticism of political institutions, teaching new ideas to the young, attempts to introduce new religious practices or even opinions, are all pronounced capital crimes. In Plato's state, Socrates might have never been given the opportunity of defending himself publicly; and he certainly would have been handed over to the secret Nocturnal Council for the purpose of 'attending' to his diseased soul, and finally for punishing it.

MPP4-435 ACCORDING TO BENTHAM, PLATO AND SOCRATES SIMPLY PLAYED WITH WORDS

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.116.

Hostility to these claims of philosophy to be a distinct discipline results in Bentham's (1748-1832) verdict on Socrates and Plato: While Xenophon was writing history, and Euclid giving instruction in geometry, Socrates and Plato were talking nonsense under presence of teaching morality and wisdom. This morality of theirs consisted in words. This wisdom of theirs, in so far as it had a meaning, consisted in denying the existence of matters made known to every body by experience [and] in asserting the existence of a variety of matters the non existence of which was made known to everybody by experience. Exactly in proportion as they and their notions thus differed from the general mass of mankind, exactly in that same proportion were they below the level of it. If we see no point in the Socratic method, we see no point in Platonic philosophy, and we must agree with Bentham.

MPP4-436 GENERAL MORAL DEFINITIONS AREN'T NECESSARY

Terence Irwin, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell, *CLASSICAL THOUGHT*, 1989, p.73.

We may be surprised that Socrates chooses to cross-examine a person's life and moral outlook simply by asking him to define a virtue; this seems too abstract and theoretical a question to show that our ordinary morality is 'upside down'. Acting morally and learning to be a good person do not seem to require knowledge of definitions. If we want to teach sewing or carpentry, we must be able to recognize the sorts of competence to be expected from the expert; but can we not recognize these without a general definition? Surely the same is true for moral training and learning; should we not just imitate recognizably admirable people? Nor do we seem to need Socrates' 'standard' to make true judgements. Surely we can often grasp and use a word properly without a general definition. Words for colours, for example, are hard to define, but even so we can tell blue things apart from red.

MPP4-437 PLATO FAILS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE SUBSTANTIAL AND THE VERBAL

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.49.

What is fairly clear, moreover, is that he failed, as many moderns still fail, to make a further distinction. This is the distinction between on the one hand substantial opinions about questions of morality or even of fact, and on the other questions about what rightness, etc. are (whether these latter are thought of as questions about language or about the nature of things). It is perhaps the greatest fault in Plato's way of putting the questions he was asking, as demands for accounts of the being of things, that it can make us confuse substantial questions with verbal ones. To revert to a previous example, there is a substantial question about mud, namely how it is, as a matter of fact, composed (a question that is answered by putting it into a centrifuge; earth and water will be the result). There is also a question, 'What is mud?', which, as we have seen, could be taken either for a question about the Idea of Mud or for one about the word 'mud'. On neither interpretation is it about the thing mud in the down-to-earth sense of what gets on one's boots or what goes into the centrifuge. But it is easy to take the question about the Idea for a more substantial question than it really is, and Plato probably did so.

MPP4-438 PLATO FALSELY SEPARATES REASON AND DESIRE

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.47.

Given Plato's psychology, only bad arguments were available to him. For the complete divorce of reason and desire in the soul entails that the contrast has to be between reason on the one hand and senseless and uncontrolled appetite on the other. These are the only alternatives available, given the Platonic psychology; but in fact they are not, of course, the only or even the most important alternatives.

MPP4-439 KNOWLEDGE ISN'T SUFFICIENT FOR VIRTUE

R.M Hare, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, "Plato," in *FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT*, 1982, p.25.

A related difficulty is presented in the first book of the *Republic* (332-3). If good living is a skill or art, what is it the skill to do? There seems no way of specifying the skill as 'the skill to do x' without making it also the skill to do the opposite of x. Another difficulty is this: if one has skill in or knowledge of wrestling, then one is a good wrestler. But is knowledge of goodness (that which, as Plato thought, would enable one to teach it) sufficient to make one a good man? As it has been put, is knowledge sufficient for virtue? Socrates seems to have thought so; but few people have believed him.

MPP4-440 PLATO'S DISTINCTION OF REASON AND APPETITE IS INCOHERENT

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.37-8.

Plato's picture of the parts of the soul is not in fact coherent. Sometimes he speaks as though the rational part of the soul had one set of desires and the appetitive part another; at other times, as if the appetites were the desires, and reason essentially a check and restraint upon them. He speaks as though the desire to drink was a nonrational craving, the apprehension of danger from drinking an insight of reason. But in fact we do not first have desires and then afterwards reason about them; we learn -- and we use our reason in learning -- to desire certain things (Plato does not distinguish the biologically determined appetite from the conscious human desire), and the desire to quench one's thirst is as rational as the desire not to be injured by poison in the water. It is just not true that only our restraint upon ourselves derives from reflection; it is often upon reflection that we decide that we need to drink. An irrational fear of being poisoned might be checked by a reasonable desire to quench one's thirst, just as much as vice versa -- an irrational desire to quench one's thirst might be inhibited by a rational fear of poison. What makes a desire reasonable or unreasonable is its relation to our other purposes and choices, possible as well as actual. A man may behave unreasonably by not allowing his desires play, and desire may on occasion correct an agent's would-be rational assessments. But these facts Plato, and a long tradition which is to follow him, rule out of court in order to maintain that rigid division between reason and the appetites in which reason is always to be in the right.

MPP4-441 PLATO LINKS REASON AND DOMINATION

Greta Gaard, Department of Women's Studies, University of Minnesota, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Spring 1996, p.95. Plumwood finds in the philosophy of Plato "the origins of the fatal flaw, the marriage of reason and domination": it is not merely a masculine identity which underlies the Platonic conception of reason, but a "master identity." Plumwood's naming of "the master model" describes an identity defined through the exclusion and domination "not only of the feminine but also of the slave (which usually combines race, class and gentler oppression) of the animal, and of the natural" (p.72). Her explanation of the relation between reason and the master identity, as discussed in Plato's *Timaeus*, is crisp and convincing: "Primal nature (chaos) is conceived as initially fallen and disordered; *logos* undertakes to do for this disorderly other that he finds in nature the same task that he undertakes for slaves, free-living animals, female forces and other 'disorderly' elements; *logos* orders and rules the world of nature, conceived as chaotic and disorderly, in a relation of domination conceived as the imposition of a rational order".

MPP4-442 PLATO OVERLY MATHEMATIZES ETHICS

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 1963, p.282.

Plato's mistake was to fail to distinguish between one type of inquiry and another. The exact definitions and rigorous proofs of the mathematician are out of place in practical affairs. We do not expect demonstration from an orator any more than we allow a mathematician to support his propositions by rhetoric. We must deal with men and things as we find them. We must ask what is the right condition, the appropriate activity for human beings; and we must answer these questions in human terms, just as we must understand the oak tree or the jellyfish as such, and not as an attempt and a manifest failure to be something it was never meant to be.

MPP4-443 PLATONIC SELF-CONTROL ISN'T SUFFICIENT FOR GOODNESS

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, 1955, p.278.

The strongest objection to Plato's theory is undoubtedly one mentioned by Professor Stace, that it would be possible for a man to control his appetites perfectly and yet be entirely selfish; while for many people selfishness is the most outstanding form of evil.

MPP4-444 PLATO FALSELY ASSUMES THAT MORALITY NECESSARILY PAYS

John Hospers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, HUMAN CONDUCT, 1982, p.29.

Certain contemporary moralists have contended that Plato was simply sidetracked on this issue: [The Republic's] main argument is an elaborate attempt, continued to the end of the book, to show in detail that if we look below the surface and consider what just actions really consist in and also the nature of the soul, and to a minor degree, the nature of the world in which we have to act, it will become obvious, in spite of appearances to the contrary, that it is by acting justly that we shall really gain or become happy. Plato's opponents, the Sophists, held that being moral doesn't always pay and that when it doesn't pay we have no reason to be moral. Plato argued against them that being moral always pays. But, says Prichard, what he should have questioned is the entire notion of the relation between moral activity and a payoff: an act may be moral and not pay, and it may pay and not be moral. The important issue is not whether an action pays but whether it is right; and if it is, one then has the only good reason for doing it, whether it pays or not.

MPP4-445 PLATO'S INDEPENDENT REALM OF IDEAS IS A MYTH

Mortimer Adler, Institute for Philosophical Research, SIX GREAT IDEAS, 1981, p.8-9.

The world of changing physical things is thus for Plato a mere shadow of the much more real world of ideas. When we pass from the realm of sense experience to the realm of thought, we ascend to a higher reality, for we have turned from things that have no enduring existence to enduring and unchanging (Plato would say "eternal") objects of thought -- ideas. For those of us who cannot shuck off our commitment to common sense, Plato goes too far in attributing reality to ideas, and much too far in exalting their reality over the reality of sensible phenomena -- the reality of the ever-changing world we experience through our senses. We do not hesitate to reject Plato's theory of ideas, and declare him wrong in attributing reality to ideas as well as to physical things, and a superior reality at that. For us commonsense fellows, it is the world of ideas that is comparatively shadowy as compared with the tangible, visible, audible world of things that press on us from all sides.

MPP4-446 THE FORM OF THE GOOD IS USELESS FOR MAKING MORAL CHOICES

Renford Bambrough, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, 1963, p.281-2.

Aristotle is fundamentally opposed to this approach. The Form of the Good is useless in the making of moral choices because moral action is concerned with concrete particular circumstances. The identification of virtue with knowledge, and the consequential paradox that men's crimes and sins are the result of ignorance and are therefore involuntary, is dismissed by Aristotle as contrary to received opinion and common experience.

MPP4-447 PLATONIC EDUCATION DOESN'T PROMOTE VIRTUE

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.281.

At the same time there is no doubt that relatively simple-minded people are often more virtuous than the wise, and specialists in logical and mathematical reason, who have had the kind of education which Plato recommended, do not appear to show any conspicuous ability in keeping their appetites under control. What the Greeks did not realize in the place that they gave to knowledge is the fact that for most men the intuitive guidance given by conscience which has been unconsciously trained in the society of good men is sufficient knowledge for virtuous living.

MPP4-448 PLATO'S VIEW OF JUSTICE ENTRENCHES CLASS RULE

Karl Popper, Professor of Philosophy, University of London, *THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME ONE: THE SPELL OF PLATO*, 1966, p.90.

This conclusion is reaffirmed and summed up a little later: 'The city is just . . . if each of its three classes attends to its own work.' But this statement means that Plato identifies justice with the principle of class rule and of class privilege. For the principle that every class should attend to its own business means, briefly and bluntly, that the state is just if the ruler rules, if the worker works, and if the slave slaves.

MPP4-449 THERE'S NO REASON TO BELIEVE IN PLATO'S UNIVERSAL JUSTICE

W.K.C. Guthrie, *THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS*, 1950, p.86-7.

It was inevitable that the single-minded zeal of Socrates, who as Aristotle said, concerned himself exclusively with questions of conduct and not at all with the nature of things as a whole, should arouse questions and criticism in the lively and sceptical intellects of contemporary Greece. The question is this. Your exhortation, Socrates, involves a large assumption, the assumption that such a thing as justice or virtue does exist apart from the acts in which it is manifested. But does absolute justice or virtue in fact exist? The truth is that a number of people have acted in different times and circumstances in a way which we call just. But none of these separate actions is claimed to be identical with the perfect justice whose definition is being sought. They are all thought to be only very imperfect approximations to it. Yet after all, what can be said to exist except the individual just acts? And if your universal justice does not exist, what is to be gained by pursuing such a will-o'-the-wisp?

MPP4-450 PLATO'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE GREATER HAPPINESS OF THE JUST LIFE FAIL

Alasdair MacIntyre, Professor of Philosophy, Duke, *A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS*, 1966, p.46-7.

Plato has three arguments to show that the just life is happier than the unjust one. The first is that the unjust man sets no curb upon his desires, and so his desires are without limit. But, being limitless, his desires can never be satisfied, and so he will always be discontented. The second argument is that only the philosopher is in a position to contrast the pleasures of reason with those of limitless appetite and sensuality, for he alone knows both sides. Finally, it is argued that the pleasures of intellect are genuine, while what the man of appetite takes to be pleasure is often merely a cessation of pain or discomfort (as eating relieves hunger) and at best far less real (in terms of the notion of the real as the unchanging and immaterial) than what the intellect delights in. These are bad arguments. The third depends for part of what it seeks to prove upon the arguments about the Forms, and it in any case ignores -- with Plato's characteristic and utterly deplorable puritanism -- the many genuine bodily pleasures; the second is simply false -- even in Plato's terms the philosopher is no more acquainted with the pleasures of limitless desire than the sensualist is with the delights of rational control; while the first argument fallaciously infers from the premise that the sensualist will always have appetites which have not yet been satisfied the conclusion that he will always be and feel unsatisfied and dissatisfied.

MPP4-451 PLATO FAILS TO SUCCESSFULLY REFUTE THRASYMACHUS

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.116-7.

This point of view, in a crude form, is put forth in the first book of the Republic by Thrasymachus, who, like almost all the characters in Plato's dialogues, was a real person. He was a Sophist from Chalcedon, and a famous teacher of rhetoric; he appeared in the first comedy of Aristophanes, 427 B.C. After Socrates has, for some time, been amiably discussing justice with an old man named Cephalus, and with Plato's elder brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Thrasymachus, who has been listening with growing impatience, breaks in with a vehement protest against such childish nonsense. He proclaims emphatically that "justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger." This point of view is refuted by Socrates with quibbles; it is never fairly faced. It raises the fundamental question in ethics and politics, namely: Is there any standard of "good" and "bad," except what the man using these words desires? If there is not, many of the consequences drawn by Thrasymachus seem unescapable.

MPP4-452 RESPECT FOR PLATO IS MISGUIDED

Bertrand Russell, Professor of Philosophy, Cambridge, *A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*, 1945, p.105.

He was a pupil of Socrates, for whom he had a profound affection and respect; and Socrates was put to death by the democracy. It is not, therefore, surprising that he should turn to Sparta for an adumbration of his ideal common wealth. Plato possessed the art to dress up illiberal suggestions in such a way that they deceived future ages, which admired the Republic without ever becoming aware of what was involved in its proposals. It has always been correct to praise Plato, but not to understand him. This is the common fate of great men. My object is the opposite. I wish to understand him, but to treat him with as little reverence as if he were a contemporary English or American advocate of totalitarianism.

MPP4-453 VIRTUE ETHICS CALL FOR THE CULTIVATION OF MORAL CHARACTER

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.119-20.

Virtue ethics says that it is important not only to do the right thing but also to have the requisite dispositions, motivations, and emotions in being good and doing right. It is important that normally we are not even tempted to steal, lie, or cheat and that normally we enjoy doing good because we are good. Virtue ethics is not only about action but about emotions, character, and moral habit. As Richard Taylor puts it, it is an ethics of aspiration rather than an ethics of duty. It calls us to aspire to be an ideal person.

MPP4-454 VIRTUE ETHICS SEEK TO PROMOTE EXCELLENCE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.115.

For traditional duty-based ethics, the question is, What should I do? For aretaic ethics the question is, What sort of person should I become? Aretaic ethics seeks to produce excellent people, who both act well out of spontaneous goodness and serve as examples who inspire others. It seeks to create people like Moses, Socrates, Jesus, St. Francis, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa, who stand out as "jewels who shine in their own light." There is a teleological aspect in aretaic ethics, but it is different from the kind usually found in utilitarianism, which asks what sort of action will maximize happiness or utility. The aretaic concept of teleology focuses, rather, on the goal of life: living well and achieving excellence.

MPP4-455 VIRTUE ETHICS ARE DISTINCT FROM CONSEQUENTIALIST OR DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.115.

Whereas most ethical theories have been either duty- or action-oriented (deontic from the Greek word for "obligation") -- either deontological or teleological -- there is a third tradition that goes back to Plato and, especially, Aristotle, and that receives support in the writings of the Epicureans, Stoics, and members of the early Christian church, as well as in some sections of the New Testament. I refer to the virtue-based systems, sometimes called aretaic ethics (from the Greek word *arete*, which we translate 'excellence' or 'virtue'). Rather than seeing the heart of ethics as based in actions or duties, virtue ethics centers in the heart of the agent -- in the character and dispositions of people. Whereas action or deontic ethics emphasizes doing, virtue or agent ethics emphasizes being, being a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or nonactions.

MPP4-456 KANT'S SYSTEM IS THE ANTITHESIS OF VIRTUE ETHICS

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.118.

Virtue ethicists often cite Kant's theory as a paradigm of an antivirtue ethics. They point out that an examination of Kant's extreme action-centered approach reveals the need for a virtue alternative. For Kant, natural goodness is morally irrelevant; the fact that you actually want to help someone (because you like them or just like doing good deeds) is of no moral importance. In fact, because of the emphasis put on the good will (doing duty for duty's sake), it would seem that Kant's logic would force him to conclude that you are actually moral in proportion to the amount of temptation that you have to resist in performing your duty: For little temptation you receive little moral credit; if you experience great temptation, you receive great moral credit for overcoming it.

MPP4-457 VIRTUE ETHICS REPLACES THE NOTION OF OBLIGATION

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.2-3.

How, then, is a virtue ethicist to carve out his or her own niche? It must be by providing an account of ultimate moral reasons which not only is neither utilitarian nor Kantian, but makes essential reference to the rationality of virtue itself. Thus, for example, the real reason why I should not lie to you is not that it is against the moral law, nor that it is likely not to maximize well-being, but because it is dishonest. The notions of virtue, then, are more basic than the notions at the heart of utilitarian and Kantian theory. They may even replace some of these notions, including perhaps 'obligation' itself. The virtue ethicist at least does not need such language. Certainly, it is characteristic of modern virtue ethics that it puts primary emphasis on aretaic or virtue-centred concepts rather than deontic or obligation-centred concepts.

MPP4-458 VIRTUE ETHICS REJECTS COMPLETE CONSEQUENTIALISM

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.4.

What also argues in favour of virtue ethics, however, is the fact that, unlike moral philosophers 'since Sidgwick', Plato and Aristotle appear to consider certain actions out of bounds independently of considerations of consequences. Given the 'corruption' of the opposite view, this should encourage us (once we have done our homework in philosophical psychology) to pursue an ethics more like Plato's or Aristotle's and in particular, then, an ethics with a distinctly virtue-ethical commitment to making virtuous character or character traits central to ethical concern.

MPP4-459 A CATALOG OF THE VIRTUES

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.120.

The virtues are excellences of character -- trained behavioral dispositions that result in habitual acts. Traditionally, they may be divided into two types: moral and nonmoral virtues, the criterion of difference being either intuitive or tied to moral principles.

1. Moral virtues: honesty, benevolence, nonmalevolence, fairness, kindness, conscientiousness, gratitude, and so forth
2. Nonmoral virtues: courage, optimism, rationality, self-control, patience, endurance, industry, musical talent, cleanliness, wit, and so forth

MPP4-460 MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINCT FROM INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.121.

After positioning ethics as a part of politics, Aristotle explains that the moral virtues are different from the intellectual ones. Whereas the intellectual virtues may be taught directly, the moral ones must be lived in order to be learned. By living well we acquire the right habits; these habits are in fact the virtues. The virtues are to be sought as the best guarantee to the happy life. But again, happiness requires that one be lucky enough to live in a flourishing state. The morally virtuous life consists in acquiring dispositions to act and feel in the right degree between the two extremes of excess and deficiency. "We can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity and generally any kind of pleasure and pain either too much or too little, and in either case not properly. But to experience all this at the right time, toward the right objects, towards the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner -- that is the median and the best course, the course that is a mark of virtue." Courage is the mean between cowardice and foolhardiness. Liberality is the mean between stinginess and unrestrained giving.

MPP4-461 VIRTUE IS LEARNED BY IMITATION

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.121-2.

Most of us learn by watching others and imitating them; this is a hallmark of virtue ethics. Rules cut up moral reality in fragmented and unnatural ways, but lives exhibit appropriate attitudes and dispositions in wholistic fashion. The life of a Socrates, a Jesus, a Gandhi, or a Mother Teresa shows us what ideals there are and inspires us to become ideal types. We have in the exemplar living proof and a picture of the moral life to which we may aspire by imitation. The lesson of the exemplar is, "If this person can overcome temptation and live a deeply moral life, so can I."

MPP4-462 ARISTOTLE IS THE MAIN SOURCE OF VIRTUE ETHICS

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.2.

In speaking of human flourishing, Anscombe was referring back to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, of the fourth century BC, who has been the main source of inspiration for modern virtue ethicists. Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, argued that the best life for a human being -- eudaimonia -- consists in the exercise of the virtues (or the 'excellences'). Indeed his is perhaps one of the most radical virtue ethics ever, since he can be understood to be saying that there is nothing worth having in life except the exercise of the virtues. This is the view which was taken up and developed by the Stoics.

MPP4-463 ARISTOTLE OFFERS THE MOST USEFUL ACCOUNT OF THE VIRTUES

Philippa Foot, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.163.

In spite of this modern work, it perhaps is best when considering the virtues and vices to go back to Aristotle and Aquinas. I myself have found Plato less helpful, because the individual virtues and vices are not so clearly or consistently distinguished in his work. It is certain, in any case, that the most systematic account is found in Aristotle, and in the blending of Aristotelian and Christian philosophy found in St. Thomas.

MPP4-464 ARISTOTLE'S OBJECTIVISM ENHANCES OUR MORAL SENSITIVITY

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.11.

One of the links between art and morality drawn out by Murdoch owes as much to Aristotle as it does to Plato, and this is the idea of moral sensitivity. For Murdoch, the self is a source of falsity and deception, and moving beyond it is to make contact with the world as it is. 'The authority of morals', she says, 'is the authority of truth, that is of reality.' And coming to understand reality is a matter not just of abstract intellect, but of looking and seeing. This view of moral perception has its roots in Aristotle's account of the practical wisdom (*phronesis*) of the virtuous man, who sees matters as they are and responds appropriately. The Good, Murdoch believes, brings unity into a world of chaos, and that is partly through the understanding we can have of the relationships between and hierarchy in the virtues. But this understanding has to be complemented by an awareness of the richness and complexity of detail in everyday situations, an awareness itself grounded in love of the Good.

MPP4-465 FOR ARISTOTLE, THE VIRTUES ENABLE PEOPLE TO LIVE WELL IN COMMUNITIES

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.120-1.

In Aristotle's classic work on the virtues, written more than three centuries before Christ, the virtues are simply those characteristics that enable individuals to live well in communities. In order to achieve a state of well-being (eudaimonia, often translated as 'happiness'), proper social institutions are necessary. Thus the moral person cannot really exist apart from a flourishing political setting that enables him or her to develop the requisite virtues for the good life. For this reason ethics is considered a branch of politics.

MPP4-466 RULE-BOUND ETHICS INHERENTLY FAIL

John McDowell, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.148.

As Aristotle consistently says, the best generalizations about how one should behave hold only for the most part." If one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong -- and not necessarily because one had changed one's mind; rather, one's mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula.

MPP4-467 DEONTIC ETHICS NEGLECT THE LINK BETWEEN VIRTUES AND ACTIONS

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.129.

The moral rules require people to perform (or omit) certain actions, and these can be performed by people who either lack or possess the virtues. There are two problems with the first thesis of the standard deontic view from the virtue ethicist's perspective. First of all, it neglects the close causal link between virtue and action. Doing right without the requisite disposition is like a person who has never played baseball before hitting a home run against a leading major league pitcher: He may have had luck this time, but he shouldn't count on it again. Likewise, without the virtues we shouldn't expect right conduct, even though we may occasionally be surprised both by the right act of the nonvirtuous and the wrong act of the virtuous. Because of the close causal connection, it is statistically improbable that the good will do wrong and the bad or indifferent will do right.

MPP4-468 RULE-GOVERNED AND ACTION-CENTERED ETHICS FAIL

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.115-6.

Virtue ethics has reemerged as a major ethical theory largely due to a dissatisfaction with rule-governed or action-centered ethical systems. Since 1958 such philosophers as Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Mayo, Edmund Pincoffs, and Richard Taylor have become disenchanted with the promises of the mainstream of the modern ethical tradition and have argued for a return to a virtue-based theory. Specifically, four criticisms have been lodged against rule-governed ethics: (1) they lack a motivational component, (2) they are founded on a theological-legal model that is no longer appropriate, (3) they ignore the spiritual dimension of morality, and (4) they overemphasize the principle of autonomy and neglect the communal context of morality.

MPP4-469 ACTION-BASED ETHICS NEGLECT SPIRITUAL QUALITIES

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.118.

Action-based ethics reduce all moral judgments to judgments about actions ("deontic judgments") and neglect the spiritual qualities of gratitude, self-respect, sympathy, having one's emotions in proper order, and aspiring to become a certain kind of person.

MPP4-470 RULE-BASED ETHICS ARE OVERLY NEGATIVE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.116.

Critics claim that action-based ethics are uninspiring, even boring -- and largely negative. They fail to motivate or inspire to action. Ethics becomes a sort of mental plumbing, or a moral casuistry, or a set of hairsplitting distinctions, that somehow loses track of the purpose of morality altogether. But what good are such rules without the dynamo of character that propels the rules to action? This uninspiring feature is illustrated by the largely negative character of deontological systems. Most of the commandments and rules in such systems are inherently negative: 'Thou shalt not ___!' As John Stuart Mill complained about the so-called "Christian morality" of the Victorian Age: Christian morality (so-called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of the Good; in its precepts "Thou shalt not" predominates unduly over "Thou shalt. Whatever exists of magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognized, is that of obedience.

MPP4-471 DEONTOLOGICAL AND CONTRACTUAL ETHICS ARE TOO MINIMALIST

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.116-7.

There is something unsatisfactory about a morality that is so disproportionately defined in terms of "Thou shalt not's," stressing innocence rather than an "energetic Pursuit of the Good." Deontological and contractual systems (such as Hobbes's) focus on an egoistic, minimal morality, the basic principles of which seem to be more preventive than positive. The only sure principle is a reciprocal duty to do no harm. This sort of theory places a very low value on morality, judging it primarily as a necessary evil. The aretaist rejects this judgement, seeing morality as an intrinsically worthwhile activity.

MPP4-472 RULE-BASED ETHICS ARE TOO DEPENDENT ON RELIGION

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.117.

Moral language in traditional schemes usually has a structure that resembles law. Typically, the notions of right and wrong occur within the structure of a legal context in which there is a clear authority. Traditional, natural-law ethics used this model with integrity, for it considered moral principles to be analogous to law and God to be the analogue to the sovereign. Now, however, ethics has been detached from its theological moorings -- it has become an autonomous activity -- leaving the legal model without an analogue, so that it has become an incoherent metaphor. The virtue ethicist rejects this model. Rather than spend time on moral hairsplitting and puzzle-solving, ethics should help us develop admirable characters that will generate the kinds of insights needed for the exigencies of life.

MPP4-473 ACTION-BASED ETHICS NEGLECT COMMUNITY

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.119.

Action-Based Ethics Overemphasize Autonomy and Neglect the Communal Context of Ethics. This criticism, set forth by Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue* (1981), claims that rule-governed ethics is a symptom of the Enlightenment, which exaggerated the principle of autonomy -- the ability of each person to arrive at a moral code by reason alone. In fact, all moral codes are rooted in practices that are themselves rooted in traditions or forms of life. We do not make moral decisions as rational atoms in a vacuum, and it is sheer ideological blindness that allows this distorted perception. MacIntyre does not want to embrace relativism. His point is that we can discover better ways of living, but they will probably be founded on an account of what the good life is and what a good community is. It is in communities that such virtues as loyalty, natural affection, spontaneous sympathy, and shared concerns arise and sustain the group. It is out of this primary loyalty (to family and friends and community) that the proper dispositions arise and flow out to the rest of humanity. Hence, moral psychology is more important than traditional ethics has usually recognized. Seeing how people actually learn to be moral and how they are inspired to act morally is vital to moral theory itself, and this, it seems, has everything to do with the virtues.

MPP4-474 THE LEGALISM OF RULE-BASED ETHICS UNDERMINES MORALITY

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.117.

In this regard, the legalistic bent of modern moral theory has the effect of undermining the spirit of morality: "Morality was made for man, not man for morality." Rules often get in the way of kindness and spontaneous generosity.

MPP4-475 ACTION FROM DUTY, NOT VIRTUE, IS MORALLY PERVERSE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.118-9.

To virtue ethicists this is preposterous. Taken to its logical conclusion, the homicidal maniac who always just barely succeeds in resisting his perpetual temptation to kill is actually the most glorious saint, surpassing the "natural saint" who just does good because of a good character. True goodness is spontaneously, cheerfully, and enjoyably to do what is good. As Aristotle said, We may even go so far as to state that the man who does not enjoy performing noble actions is not a good man at all. Nobody would call a man just who does not enjoy acting justly, nor generous who does not enjoy generous actions, and so on. It is not the hounded neurotic who barely manages to control himself before each passing temptation, but the natural saint -- the one who does good out of habit and from the inner resources of good character -- who is the morally superior person.

MPP4-476 THE VIRTUES ARE ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD LIFE

Philippa Foot, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.164.

First of all it seems clear that virtues are, in some general way, beneficial. Human beings do not get on well without them. Nobody can get on well if he lacks courage, and does not have some measure of temperance and wisdom, while communities where Justice and charity are lacking are apt to be wretched places to live, as Russia was under the Stalinist terror, or Sicily under the Mafia.

MPP4-477 THE VIRTUES, NOT RULES, GIVE THE ONLY RELIABLE ANSWER TO HOW TO LIVE

John McDowell, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.161-2.

If the question 'How should one live?' could be given a direct answer in universal terms, the concept of virtue would have only a secondary place in moral philosophy. But the thesis of uncodifiability excludes a head-on approach to the question whose urgency gives ethics its interest. Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way. And there is no dislodging, from the central position they occupy in the ethical reflection of Plato and Aristotle, questions about the nature and (hardly discussed in this paper) the acquisition of virtue. It is sometimes complained that Aristotle does not attempt to outline a decision procedure for questions about how to behave. But we have good reason to be suspicious of the assumption that there must be something to be found along the route he does not follow. And there is plenty for us to do in the area of philosophy of mind where his different approach locates ethics.

MPP4-478 VIRTUE ETHICS CAN PROVIDE A NON-CIRCULAR GUIDE TO ACTION

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.21.

Rosalind Hursthouse's 'Virtue Theory and Abortion' addresses some of the criticisms of (traditional) virtue ethics raised by Loudon and Schneewind. She argues that virtue ethics can focus on particular actions and evaluate them as right and wrong, can formulate moral rules to guide action, and can help us to resolve practical or applied moral issues such as whether (in some particular case) abortion is or was morally permissible. She also shows how it is possible for a virtue theory to claim that right actions are actions a virtuous person would perform in the relevant circumstances, without falling into circularity. It is possible, because the concept of a virtuous person can be unpacked in terms of the notion of particular virtues, and these latter, in turn, can be understood as traits human beings need in order to live well, to achieve eudaimonia.

MPP4-479 VIRTUE ETHICS AID IN RESOLVING PARTICULAR MORAL PROBLEMS

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.22.

But perhaps the most distinctive accomplishment of Hursthouse's article lies in its discussion of how virtue theory can be practically relevant to a difficult moral issue like abortion. Her view involves claiming that the permissibility or wrongness of abortions will vary with the circumstances and is, to that extent, then, in agreement with act-utilitarianism. But, unlike the latter, this variation, according to Hursthouse, depends on the differing motives and thinking of women who have abortions, rather than on the different (probable) consequences of abortions in different circumstances.

MPP4-480 THE VIRTUES ARE NEEDED TO CORRECT HUMAN NATURE

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.16.

Foot notes the importance of an account of human nature for a theory of the virtues, and she puts forward the interesting hypothesis that the virtues are correctives to certain aspects of human nature as it is. If we were not by nature, for example, more attached to our own interests than to those of others, there would be no need for the virtue of benevolence. This insight of Foot's explains, for example, why the virtue of self-love either does not exist or is spoken of only rarely.

MPP4-481 WE STILL CAN REACH CONSENSUS ON THE VIRTUES

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.20.

This also raises the question whether the charge of anachronism made by both Schneewind and Loudon against virtue ethics is not also an exaggeration. Do we really have no consensus on what counts as a virtue in modern society? Of course, we shall disagree radically about what constitutes certain virtues, such as justice, but that sort of disagreement was as intense within ancient Athens as it is in New York.

MPP4-482 MODELLING IDEAL INDIVIDUALS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN FOLLOWING MORAL RULES

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.120.

Although most virtue systems do not deny that there are principles of action that serve as action-guides (at least as rules of thumb), these entities are not the essence of morality. Likewise, it is sometimes appropriate to reason about what to do, but such reasoning or deliberating should give significant attention to such feelings as sympathy and loyalty, and the like. The primary focus is not on abstract reason but on ideal types of people or on actual ideal people. Discovering the proper moral example and imitating the person or ideal type thus replace casuistic reason as the most significant aspects of the moral life. Eventually, the apprentice-like training in virtue gained by imitating the ideal model results in a virtuous person who spontaneously does what is good.

MPP4-483 THE VIRTUES ARE KEY TO FULFILLING THE FUNCTION OF HUMAN LIFE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.121.

For Aristotle, humanity has an essence or function. Just as the function of a doctor is to cure the sick and restore health, the function of a ruler is to govern society well, and the function of a knife is to cut well, so it is the function of humans to use reason in pursuit of the good life (eudaimonia, happiness or flourishing). The virtues indicate the kind of moral-political characteristics necessary for people to attain happiness.

MPP4-484 THE VIRTUES HAVE INTRINSIC VALUE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.128-9.

The complementarity ethicist still holds to the essential Aristotelian idea that the virtues are excellences that have value in their own right, not merely instrumental to, but constitutive of the good life. The virtues are not wholly derivative, but rather partly intrinsic; their value is at least partially independent of the rightness of the actions to which they are related. And finally, sometimes the rules require not action but the right kind of sentiments or attitudes.

MPP4-485 PROPER DISPOSITIONS CAN BE CULTIVATED

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.129-30.

Kant pointed out that love (in the passional or emotional sense) could not be a moral duty because it could not be commanded, for we have no direct control over our emotions. Even though the moral law may require me to give a part of my income to feed the poor, I don't have to like them; I give my money because it is right to do so. The virtue ethicist rejects this kind of thinking. Although we don't have direct control over our emotions, we do have indirect control over them. We cannot turn our dispositions on and off like water faucets, but we can take steps to inculcate the right dispositions and attitudes. If we recognize the appropriateness of certain emotions in certain situations, we can use meditation, sympathetic imagination, and therapy (and, if one is religious, prayer) in order to obtain those attitudes in the right way. We are responsible for our character; we must not only be good, but we must love the Good. As Aristotle said, "There must first be a disposition to excellence, to love what is fine and loathe what is base."

MPP4-486 THE VIRTUES ARE ENDURING QUALITIES IN HUMAN NATURE

William Lillie, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, Aberdeen, *AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS*, 1955, p.274.

It is easy to fall back into the error of the relativists and hold that what is virtuous is always relative to circumstances. This is not the case. The four cardinal virtues of the Greeks, justice, wisdom, courage, and self-control, may have different applications in modern times from what they had in the days of Pericles, but their essential nature remains the same. The virtuous element in courage is fundamentally the same in the courage of the three hundred defending the pass of Thermopylae against insuperable odds, and in the courage of 'that very gallant gentleman' Captain Oates' walking out to certain death in the Antarctic snows to add one small chance towards the saving of his comrades' lives, although Captain Oates was engaged in an enterprise that the Greek heroes would hardly have understood. Different circumstances, or a different ethos, made the actions in these two cases very different, but the high virtue of courage was the same in both. This is so much the case that the chief value of the analytical study of certain of the virtues which will be made in this chapter is that it confirms the view that there are kinds of conduct that are objectively good and that a reasonable explanation of their goodness is that they conform to a natural law of some sort.

MPP4-487 THE VIRTUES ARE INTRINSIC TO WHAT MAKES LIFE WORTH LIVING

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.130.

The third thesis of the standard deontic view is that the virtues have only derivative and instrumental value. The aretaist rejects this thesis: The virtues have intrinsic value and are not merely derivative but part of what constitutes the good life. The Good is not simply good for others, but it's good for you as well. The virtues are an inextricable part of what makes life worth living -- having the right dispositions and attitudes to the right degree expressed in the right way.

MPP4-488 THERE IS A CONSENSUS THAT VIRTUE HAS BEEN NEGLECTED

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.131.

If nothing else, virtue ethicists have been successful in drawing attention to the importance of the virtues. There is a consensus in moral philosophy that the virtues have been neglected and that it is important to work them into one's moral perspective.

MPP4-489 THE ETHICS OF VIRTUE AND RULES ARE COMPLEMENTARY, NOT EXCLUSIVE

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.216.

My own view (which can only be stated summarily here) is that we need to begin efforts to coordinate irreducible or strong notions of virtue along with irreducible or strong conceptions of the various act notions into our conceptual scheme of morality. This appeal for coordination will not satisfy those theorists who continue to think in the single-element or mononomic tradition (a tradition which contemporary virtue-based theorists have inherited from their duty-based and goal-based ancestors), but I do believe that it will result in a more realistic account of our moral experience. The moral field is not unitary, and the values we employ in making moral judgements sometimes have fundamentally different sources. No single reductive method can offer a realistic means of prioritizing these different values. There exists no single scale by means of which disparate moral considerations can always be measured, added, and balanced. The theoretician's quest for conceptual economy and elegance has been won at too great a price, for the resulting reductionist definitions of the moral concepts are not true to the facts of moral experience. It is important now to see the ethics of virtue and the ethics of rules as adding up, rather than as cancelling each other out.

MPP4-490 DEONTIC ETHICS NEED NOT NEGLECT PROPER MOTIVATION

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.127.

To the charge that it lacks an adequate motivational component (p.116), philosophers like Warnock would insist that we can bring up children to prize the correct principles and embody them in their lives. Moral psychology will help us develop the necessary virtues in such a way as to promote human flourishing. A deontic ethicist can honor the virtues and use them wisely without distorting their role in life. The sophisticated deontic ethicist can even insist that we have a duty to obtain the virtues as the best means to achieve success in carrying out our duties, and that we have a special duty to inculcate in ourself and others the virtue of conscientiousness (the disposition to do one's duty) which will help us achieve all our other duties.

MPP4-491 UTILITARIANISM LEAVES ROOM FOR VIRTUE

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.18-9.

Not all was lost for virtue ethics, however, for the natural lawyers had left some room for virtue in their drawing of a distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. How to make this distinction precise is a perennial problem in moral philosophy, but one plausible way of so doing -- adopted by both Grotius and J. S. Mill -- is in terms of rights. If I have contracted with you to perform a certain task, then you have a right to my performance, and I have a perfect duty correlative to that right. If you are a beggar in the street, however, you have no right to alms from me. Though I do have an imperfect duty to be generous, I have some discretion when and to whom to distribute my goods. And, the natural lawyers argued, in the case of imperfect duties, the spirit in which they are carried out does matter. In this way, then, room was left for talk of virtue.

MPP4-492 KANT LEAVES ROOM FOR VIRTUE

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.19.

Kant, in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, also allowed room for the virtues in his account of morality. Schneewind suggests that Kant's view can be seen as a revival of the natural-law view, again based on the perfect/imperfect duty distinction and again amounting to the splitting of morality into an ethic of rules and an ethic of virtue. Schneewind concludes that this is the best that can be hoped for by the friends of virtue.

MPP4-493 VIRTUE ETHICS LACK A DETAILED CONTEMPORARY ARTICULATION

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.202.

But what about virtue ethics? What are the hallmarks of this approach to normative ethics? One problem confronting anyone who sets out to analyse the new virtue ethics in any detail is that we presently lack fully developed examples of it in the contemporary literature. Most of the work done in this genre has a negative rather than positive thrust -- its primary aim is more to criticize the traditions and research programmes to which it is opposed rather than to state positively and precisely what its own alternative is.

MPP4-494 ETHICS CAN'T DISPENSE WITH THE IDEA OF DUTY

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.202-3.

On the Anscombe model, strong, irreducible duty and obligation notions drop out of the picture, and are to be replaced by vices such as unchasteness and untruthfulness. But are we to take the assertion literally, and actually attempt to do moral theory without any concept of duty whatsoever? On my reading, Anscombe is not really proposing that we entirely dispose of moral oughts. Suppose one follows her advice, and replaces 'morally wrong' with 'untruthful', 'unchaste', etc. Isn't this merely shorthand for saying that agents ought to be truthful and chaste, and that untruthful and unchaste acts are morally wrong because good agents don't perform such acts? The concept of the moral ought, in other words, seems now to be explicated in terms of what the good person would do.

MPP4-495 RULES ARE SUPERIOR TO RELIANCE ON DISPOSITIONS

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG, 1990, p.127.

To the charge that action ethics is based on an improper theological-legal model (p.117), the action-based ethicist responds that we can separate the rational decision-making procedures from the theological ones without violating those procedures. To the charge that this still leaves us with a skewed process of casuistry or hair-splitting, they answer that it is important to come as close as possible to working out a consistent system, for we want to have all the guidance for our actions that is possible. Appropriate modesty will inform us of our limits in this respect, but at least we have rules as guides -- unlike the extreme aretaist, who only has dispositions.

MPP4-496 VIRTUE WASN'T NEGLECTED IN MODERN MORAL THEORY

J.B. Schneewind, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.178.

Another of the friends of virtue, G. H. von Wright, shares Foot's view. 'Virtue is a neglected topic in modern ethics,' he says, and implies that Kant is one of the culprits. The suggestion is that virtue has been neglected ever since the period of moral philosophy that culminated in the theories of Hume and Kant. Such widespread and protracted indifference would indeed have to count as a misfortune for virtue; if it actually occurred a historian of ethics might well be expected to try to explain why. But I doubt very much that it did occur. In this article I shall argue that at least during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the formative period for modern moral philosophy, virtue did not suffer from neglect. Its misfortune was something rather different.

MPP4-497 VIRTUE ETHICS ARE VAGUE AND UNHELPFUL IN PRACTICE

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.206.

Virtue theory is not a problem-oriented or quandary approach to ethics: it speaks of rules and principles of action only in a derivative manner. And its derivative oughts are frequently too vague and unhelpful for persons who have not yet acquired the requisite moral insight and sensitivity. Consequently, we cannot expect it to be of great use in applied ethics and casuistry. The increasing importance of these two subfields of ethics in contemporary society is thus a strike against the move to revive virtue ethics.

MPP4-498 VIRTUE ETHICS OFFER LITTLE INSIGHT INTO PARTICULAR MORAL DILEMMAS

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.205.

A recent reviewer of Foot's *Virtues and Vices*, for instance, notes that 'one must do some shifting to gather her view on the virtues'. 'Surprisingly,' he adds, 'the studies of abortion and euthanasia are not of much use.' And this is odd, when one considers Foot's demonstrated interest in applied ethics in conjunction with her earlier cited prefatory remark that a 'sound moral theory should start from a theory of virtues and vices'. But what can a virtues and vices approach say about specific moral dilemmas?

MPP4-499 VIRTUE ETHICS FAIL TO OFFER PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.205.

It has often been said that for virtue ethics the central question is not 'What ought I to do?' but rather 'What sort of person ought I to be?' However, people have always expected ethical theory to tell them something about what they ought to do, and it seems to me that virtue ethics is structurally unable to say much of anything about this issue. If I'm right, one consequence of this is that a virtue-based ethics will be particularly weak in the areas of casuistry and applied ethics.

MPP4-500 VIRTUE ETHICS CAN'T EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH MORAL DISAGREEMENTS

J.B. Schneewind, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.199-200.

In tackling these problems, classical virtue theory is of little or no use. Aristotle does not tell us what a virtuous agent (*phronimos*) is to do to convince someone who is not virtuous to agree with him, other than to educate him all over again. He does not suggest criteria which anyone and everyone can use to determine who is a virtuous agent and who is not. He does not discuss the situation in which two virtuous agents disagree seriously with one another. And consequently he does not notice what seems to be an implication of his view: that if two allegedly virtuous agents strongly disagree, one of them (at least) must be morally defective.

MPP4-501 VIRTUE ETHICS FOCUS ON STYLE OVER SUBSTANCE

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.213.

In emphasizing Being over Doing, the Inner over the Outer, virtue theorists also lay themselves open to the charge that they are more concerned with style than with substance. For as I argued earlier, virtue theorists are committed to the view that the moral value of certain key character traits is not exhausted by or even dependent on the value of the actions to which they may give rise. When this gulf between character and conduct is asserted, and joined with the claim that it is agents rather than actions which count morally, the conclusion is that it is not the substance of an agent's actions which is the focus of moral appraisal. The implication here seems to be that if you have style, i.e., the style of the virtuous person, as defined in the context of a concrete moral tradition, it doesn't so much matter what the results are. ('It's not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game that counts.')

MPP4-502 VIRTUE ETHICS FAIL IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.215.

The last vice I shall mention has a more socio-historical character. It seems to me that there is a bit of utopianism behind the virtue theorist's complaints about the ethics of rules. Surely, one reason there is more emphasis on rules and regulations in modern society is that things have become more complex. Our moral community (in so far as it makes sense to speak of 'community' in these narcissistic times) contains more ethnic, religious, and class groups than did the moral community which Aristotle theorized about. Unfortunately, each segment of society has not only its own interests but its own set of virtues as well. There is no general agreed upon and significant expression of desirable moral character in such a world. Indeed, our pluralist culture prides itself on and defines itself in terms of its alleged value neutrality and its lack of allegiance to any one moral tradition. This absence of agreement regarding human purposes and moral ideals seems to drive us (partly out of lack of alternatives) to a more legalistic form of morality. To suppose that academic theorists can alter the situation simply by re-emphasizing certain concepts is illusory. Our world lacks the sort of moral cohesiveness and value unity which traditional virtue theorists saw as prerequisites of a viable moral community.

MPP4-503 THERE'S NO GOOD WAY TO DETERMINE WHO IS VIRTUOUS

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.210.

There is also an epistemological issue which becomes troublesome when one focuses on qualities of persons rather than on qualities of acts. Baldly put, the difficulty is that we do not seem to be able to know with any degree of certainty who really is virtuous and who vicious. For how is one to go about establishing an agent's true moral character? The standard strategy is what might be called the 'externalist' one: we try to infer character by observing conduct. While not denying the existence of some connection between character and conduct, I believe that the connection between the two is not nearly as tight as externalists have assumed. The relationship is not a necessary one, but merely contingent. Virtue theorists themselves are committed to this claim, though they have not always realized it. For one central issue behind the 'Being vs. Doing' debate is the virtue theorist's contention that the moral value of Being is not reducible to or dependent on Doing; that the measure of an agent's character is not exhausted by or even dependent on the values of the actions which he may perform. On this view, the most important moral traits are what may be called 'spiritual' rather than 'actional'.

MPP4-504 IT ISN'T HELPFUL TO APPEAL TO THE EXAMPLE OF THE VIRTUOUS

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.206.

Owing to the very nature of the moral virtues, there is thus a very limited amount of advice on moral quandaries that one can reasonably expect from the virtue-oriented approach. We ought, of course, to do what the virtuous person would do, but it is not always easy to fathom what the hypothetical moral exemplar would do were he in our shoes, and sometimes even he will act out of character. Furthermore, if one asks him why he did what he did, or how he knew what to do, the answer -- if one is offered -- might not be very enlightening. One would not necessarily expect him to appeal to any rules or principles which might be of use to others.

MPP4-505 VIRTUE ETHICS ENCOURAGE INTOLERANCE
J.B. Schneewind, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.200.

The Aristotelian theory may have been suited to a society in which there was a recognized class of superior citizens, whose judgement on moral issues would be accepted without question. But the Grotians did not believe they lived in such a world. Moreover, since virtue theory must treat disagreement with the virtuous agent as showing a flaw of character, it discourages parties to a moral dispute from according even *prima-facie* respect to differing points of view. It encourages each, rather, to impugn the character of the other rather than listen to the other's case. And it gives no distinctive guidance about how to analyse a dispute so as to find the common ground from which agreement can be peacefully reached. Natural-law theory tries to do precisely that. It reminds us of the basic needs we share, and the difficulties, inherent in our nature, to overcoming them. It gives us laws showing us what we have to do to solve the problems. And it instructs us to apply those laws either to resolve our disputes in their terms (in a state of nature) or to construct civil laws which will give us more specific instruments for reaching agreements.

MPP4-506 VIRTUE ETHICS FAIL TO ACCOUNT FOR TRAGIC FAILURES

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.206-7.

Another reason for making sure that our ethical theory allows us to talk about features of acts and their results in abstraction from the agent and his conception of what he is doing is that some times even the best person can make the wrong choices. There are cases in which a man's choice is grounded in the best possible information, his motives honourable and his action not at all out of character. And yet his best-laid plans may go sour. Aristotle, in his Poetics, suggests that here lies the source of tragedy: we are confronted with an eminent and respected man, 'whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice (*kakia*) and depravity (*moktheira*) but by some error of judgement (*amartia*)' (1453a8-9). But every human being is morally fallible, for there is a little Oedipus in each of us. So Aristotle's point is that, regardless of character, anyone can fall into the sort of mistake of which tragedies are made. Virtue ethics, however, since its conceptual scheme is rooted in the notion of the good person, is unable to assess correctly the occasional (inevitable) tragic outcomes of human action.

MPP4-507 VIRTUE ETHICS LEAD TO MORAL BACKSLIDING

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.209.

Finally, the focus on good and bad agents rather than on right and wrong actions may lead to a peculiar sort of moral backsliding. Because the emphasis in agent ethics is on long-term, characteristic patterns of behaviour, its advocates run the risk of overlooking occasional lies or acts of selfishness on the ground that such performances are mere temporary aberrations -- acts out of character. Even the just man may on occasion act unjustly, so why haggle over specifics? It is unbecoming to a virtue theorist to engage in such pharisaic calculations. But once he commits himself to the view that assessments of moral worth are not simply a matter of whether we have done the right thing, backsliding may result: 'No matter how many successes some people have, they still feel they "are" fundamentally honest.' At some point, such backsliding is bound to lead to self-deception.

MPP4-508 VIRTUE ETHICS ARE UNDERMINED BY CHANGES IN CHARACTER

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.209.

If skills can become rusty, it seems to me that virtues can too. Unless we stay in practice we run the risk of losing relative proficiency. We probably can't forget them completely (in part because the opportunities for exercising virtues are so pervasive in everyday life), but we can lose a certain sensitivity. People do become morally insensitive, relatively speaking -- missing opportunities they once would have noticed, although perhaps when confronted with a failure they might recognize that they had failed, showing at least that they hadn't literally 'forgotten the difference between right and wrong'. If the moral virtues are acquired habits rather than innate gifts, it is always possible that one can lose relative proficiency in these habits. Also, just as one's interests and skills sometimes change over the course of a life as new perceptions and influences take hold, it seems too that aspects of our moral characters can likewise alter. (Consider religious conversion experiences.) Once we grant the possibility of such changes in moral character, the need for a more 'character-free' way of assessing action becomes evident. Character is not a permanent fixture, but rather plastic. A more reliable yardstick is sometimes needed.

MPP4-509 THERE'S NO SPECIAL COGNITIVE ABILITY ARISING FROM VIRTUE

J.B. Schneewind, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.184.

Grotius rejects yet another important aspect of an ethics of virtue, its attribution of a privileged status to the insight of the virtuous agent. He does not think the laws of nature determine what we are to do down to the last detail. Where the law is indeterminate, however, what operates is not insight but discretion. In such cases we choose freely among permissible acts. Grotius brings this out in direct confrontation with Aristotelianism. Because so many complexities enter into morals, he says, and circumstances always alter cases, it comes about 'that between what should be done and what it is wrong to do there is a mean, that which is permissible; and this is now closer to the former, now to the latter.... This is what Aristotle means when he says: "Often it is hard to decide what choice one should make." The virtuous are simply those who obey the law where it is specific, and stay within the bounds of the permissible where it leaves room for choice. In the Grotian morality of rule and act there is no room for any special cognitive ability arising from virtue.

MPP4-510 VIRTUE ETHICS FAIL TO CLEARLY OUTLAW INTOLERABLE ACTIONS

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.207-8.

A third reason for insisting that our moral theory enable us to assess acts in abstraction from agents is that we need to be able to identify certain types of action which produce harms of such magnitude that they destroy the bonds of community and render (at least temporarily) the achievement of moral goods impossible. In every traditional moral community one encounters prohibitions or 'barriers to action' which mark off clear boundaries in such areas as the taking of innocent life, sexual relations, and the administration of justice according to local laws and customs. Such rules are needed to teach citizens what kinds of actions are to be regarded not simply as bad (a table of vices can handle this) but as intolerable. Theorists must resort to specific lists of offences to emphasize the fact that there are some acts which are absolutely prohibited. We cannot articulate this sense of absolute prohibition by referring merely to characteristic patterns of behaviour.

MPP4-511 VIRTUE ETHICS IGNORE THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF GOOD AGENTS

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.207.

My point is that virtue ethics is in danger of blinding itself to the wrongful conduct in Oedipal acts, simply because it views the Oedipuses of the world as honourable persons and because its focus is on long-term character manifestations rather than discrete acts. To recognise the wrong in Oedipal behavior, a theory with the conceptual tools enabling one to focus on discrete acts is needed.

MPP4-512 VIRTUE ETHICS ALLOW "GOOD" PEOPLE TO COMMIT TERRIBLE ACTS

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, VIRTUE ETHICS, 1997, p.20-1.

Louden has further criticisms of the agent-orientation of virtue ethics. Because of its concentration on long-term assessment of character, it is likely to be blind to the ethical implications of cases, such as those depicted in tragedies, in which a good person performs some morally terrible action. Likewise, it will play down the importance of the consequences of actions, even if these are very bad. And it will be unable to spell out the importance of accepting absolute prohibitions on certain specific acts. This is likely to result in our finding it easier to break such prohibitions, feeling that we are acting 'out of character', and so not to be blamed. Finally, because character can change, we need something more secure on the basis of which to assess action.

MPP4-513 CONSENSUS AGREES VIRTUE ETHICS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.131.

There is also some consensus that a pure virtue ethic cannot stand alone without a strong deontic component; principles of action are important largely in the way deontological and utilitarian accounts have said they were. The question is not whether these accounts were wrong in what they said, but whether they said enough.

MPP4-514 VIRTUE ETHICS ALONE ARE INCOMPLETE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.123.

Even though the formula for pure aretaic ethics sometimes accurately describes how a moral act is generated (that is, we sometimes act spontaneously out of a good heart), it hardly seems to cover all ethical actions; sometimes we do use rules and moral reasons in order to decide on what to do. The question is, Are these rules really irrelevant to the essence of morality? To date no one has worked out a complete pure aretaic account, and so it is difficult to know whether it can be done. Pure aretaic ethics seems to suffer from two major types of problems; one is epistemological and the other is practical.

MPP4-515 VIRTUE ETHICS FAIL TO PROVIDE MORAL GUIDANCE

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.20.

The charge that virtue ethics cannot provide guidance is put in a modern form by Louden, and he links the charge also to the epistemological priority thesis. Moral dilemmas arise over particular courses of action. If what I am to do in any particular case is to be decided by my own virtuous perception, then moral theory can offer little help. But people have always sought such help from philosophy, and act-centred views can deliver it. In the case of abortion, for example, utilitarianism can tell us that it is wrong if it leads to utility's not being maximized, while a Kantian view can tell us that it is permissible if no rights are infringed.

MPP4-516 VIRTUE ETHICS ARE CIRCULAR

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.123.

What habits and emotions are genuine or proper virtues? How do you know which ones? Who is the virtuous person? Suppose you ask me, "What is the right thing to do?" I answer, "Do what the virtuous person would do!" But you counter, "Who is the virtuous person?" To which I reply, "The man who does the right thing." The reasoning is circular. As Frankena has stated, "Virtues without principles are blind." We need something to serve as a criterion for the virtues.

MPP4-517 VIRTUE ETHICS ARE TOO PRONE TO RELATIVISM

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.123.

Related to this epistemological problem is the problem of virtue relativism. What counts as a virtue changes over time and place. Whereas Aristotle valued pride as a special virtue, Christians see it as a master vice. A caveman armed only with a spear and confronted by a herd of mastodons would be thought by his community to have "excessive" fear if he abandoned his fellow tribesmen and fled; contemporary society would make no such judgment. Capitalists view acquisitiveness as a virtue, whereas Marxists see it as a vice.

MPP4-518 THERE IS NO INTRINSIC VALUE IN VIRTUE

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.127.

To the charge that deontic ethics neglects the spiritual dimension of morality (p.118), the action ethicist responds that we can honor the virtues without making them into a religion. It is better to have a virtue (for example, benevolence) than not to have it because having the virtue gives us the best chance of acting rightly. However, there is no intrinsic value in the virtue; what really is important is doing the right act.

MPP4-519 VIRTUE ETHICS DON'T AVOID REDUCTIONISM

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.204.

In other words, conceptual reductionism is at work in virtue ethics too. Just as its utilitarian and deontological competitors begin with primitive concepts of the good state of affairs and the intrinsically right action respectively and then drive secondary concepts out of their starting-points, so virtue ethics, beginning with a root conception of the morally good person, proceeds to introduce a different set of secondary concepts which are defined in terms of their relationship to the primitive element. Though the ordering of primitive and derivatives differs in each case, the overall strategy remains the same. Viewed from this perspective, virtue ethics is not unique at all. It has adopted the traditional mononomic strategy of normative ethics.

MPP4-520 VIRTUE ETHICS GIVE INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO ACTS

Robert Louden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.210.

The virtue theorist is committed to the claim that the primary object of moral evaluation is not the act or its consequences but rather the agent -- specifically, those character traits of the agent which are judged morally relevant. This is not to say that virtue ethics does not ever address the issue of right and wrong actions, but rather that it can only do so in a derivative manner. Sometimes, however, it is clearly acts rather than agents which ought to be the primary focus of moral evaluation.

MPP4-521 IT'S ACTING MORALLY THAT MATTERS, NOT BEING A CERTAIN TYPE OF PERSON

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.18.

Virtue ethics owes much to Aristotle, who was severely criticized by Grotius. His attack concentrated on Aristotle's account of justice as a 'mean' between two vices, but the moral of it applies to all versions of virtue ethics. The motive of the just agent does not matter; what does matter is following the rules of justice, performing certain acts rather than being a certain kind of person. Further, like Grotius, Pufendorf went on to impugn the notion that the virtuous person has any kind of special access to moral truth.

MPP4-522 VIRTUES ARE SECONDARY TO ACTIONS

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.125.

Duty-based ethical theorists who hold to the standard account do not deny the importance of character. But they claim that the nature of the virtues can only be derived from right actions or good consequences. To quote Frankena once more, "... traits without principles are blind." Whenever there is a virtue, there must be some possible action to which the virtue corresponds and from which it derives its virtuosity. For example, the character trait of truthfulness is a virtue because telling the truth, in general, is a moral duty. Likewise, conscientiousness is a virtue because we have a general duty to be morally sensitive.

MPP4-523 TO BE ACCEPTABLE, VIRTUE ETHICS NEEDS AN ADEQUATE POLITICAL THEORY

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.24.

If virtue ethics cannot produce some plausible conception of social justice and of political morality more generally, then its main contemporary rivals, consequentialism and Kantianism, will have a distinct advantage. These approaches clearly can be systematically applied to both individual moral and political questions (contract theory typically does not aspire to cover all questions of individual morality), so, if virtue ethics cannot do the same, and perhaps even has to borrow an acceptable political philosophy from consequentialism or Kantianism, it is bound ultimately to seem inferior to these other approaches.

MPP4-524 VIRTUE ETHICS NEED TO EMBRACE LARGER POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.24.

Clearly, virtue ethics needs to expand its recent moral horizons so as to take in larger questions of political morality. Otherwise, contemporary virtue ethics will fail to meet Schneewind's criticism that virtue ethics, while acceptable in and for the relatively homogeneous and peaceful societies that typified the ancient world, is unsuitable to the more diverse and conflict-ridden conditions of modern and contemporary life, conditions that require political thought and political principles that can help to reduce tensions and allow us to live with one another.

MPP4-525 MACINTYRE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN ETHICAL TRADITION IS PARADOXICAL

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.12-3.

Two related questions, however, do remain. First, if ethical discussion has really broken down, as MacIntyre claims, how can he expect to persuade us of his own views, which do seem to take much from various earlier traditions? Secondly, how are we to decide between competing practices which are worth pursuing? In later chapters of *After Virtue* and in later writing, MacIntyre seeks to answer both of these questions. But it is at least arguable that in so doing he is returning to engage with opponents whom he earlier castigated as shouting incomprehensibly at one another across unbridgeable conceptual voids.

MPP4-526 MACINTYRE'S POSITION IS RELATIVISTIC

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.128.

Finally, to MacIntyre's criticism that morality emerges in communities and cultures (p.119), the action ethicist responds that if this is taken as the whole story, then it implies ethical relativism, in which case the virtues have no objective status either. On the other hand, if he allows that we can discover the good for humanity in the context of an Aristotelian naturalism, then we can derive a core set of principles as well as the right virtues.

MPP4-527 THE COMPLEXITY OF MODERN SOCIETY MAKES ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS OBSOLETE

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.19.

Modern society, constituted as it is by vast populations comprising many subgroups with very different interests and views, is riven by disagreement. This fact was recognized by the natural lawyers, and their stress on rules was an attempt to provide guidance to ensure the survival of society. Aristotle's ethics was developed in the much more confined context of a stable and fairly homogeneous city state. He gives us little help in identifying just who the virtuous person is, and no help at all in dealing with conflict.

MPP4-528 CLASSICAL VIRTUE ETHICS WERE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Professors of Philosophy, Oxford and University of Maryland, *VIRTUE ETHICS*, 1997, p.24.

There is danger for virtue ethics in the attempt to meet this challenge -- not merely because it may be unable to produce a political philosophy, but because the political philosophy it manages to produce may be of the wrong kind. The political ideals associated with virtue ethics in the ancient world were by and large anti- or non-democratic. Neither Plato nor Aristotle, for example, thought democracy an ideal form of government, and it is difficult to see how a plausibly democratic social ideal could be developed, say, out of Aristotle's ethical views.

MPP4-529 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS DON'T APPLY OUTSIDE A SMALL, HOMOGENEOUS COMMUNITY

Robert Loudon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.213.

The reasons for this strange lacuna, I suggest, are two. First, Aristotle is dealing with a small face-to-face community, where the pool of potential *phronimoi* generally come from certain well established families who are well known throughout the *polis*. Within a small face-to-face community of this sort, one would naturally expect to find wide agreement about judgements of character. Second, Aristotle's own methodology is itself designed to fit this sort of moral community. He is not advocating a Platonic ethics of universal categories. Within the context of a *polis* and an ethical theory intended to accompany it, the strategy of pointing to a *phronimos* makes a certain sense. However, to divorce this strategy from its social and economic roots and then to apply it to a very different sort of community -- one where people really do not know each other all that well, and where there is wide disagreement on values -- does not. And this, I fear, is what contemporary virtue ethicists have tried to do.

MPP4-530 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ARE INSUFFICIENTLY ACTION GUIDING

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG, 1990, p.123-4.

One of the perennial criticisms of virtue-based ethical systems is that such theories provide no guidance for resolving an ethical dilemma. In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, precious little is said about what we are supposed to do. One would think that ethics should be, at least to some extent, action-guiding. Aristotle's answer seems to be, Do what a good person would do. But the question arises, Who is the good person, and how shall I recognize him or her? Furthermore, even if we could answer that question without reference to kinds of actions or principles addressed by the nonvirtue-oriented ethicists, it is not always clear what ideal people would do in our situations.

MPP4-531 THE MEAN FAILS AS AN EXPLANATION OF JUSTICE

J.B. Schneewind, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins, VIRTUE ETHICS, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., 1997, p.183.

His criticisms are brief. He points out the implausibility of the doctrine of the mean with respect to virtues such as truthfulness (said to be a mean between boastfulness and dissimulation), but his main fire is reserved for justice. Aristotle himself, says Grotius, could not make the doctrine work when it came to this virtue. For he could not point to a mean in any appropriate passion, or any action coming from the passions, which could plausibly be said to constitute justice. So he resorted to making claims about the things justice is concerned with -- possessions, honours, security -- because only about these would it be reasonable to say that there could be a too much or a too little. And even here, Grotius continues, the doctrine of the mean fails. A single example shows this. It may be a fault not to take what is my own property -- for example, if I need it in order to support my child -- but it is surely not doing an injustice to another to claim less than is mine. Justice consists wholly in 'abstaining from that which is another's'. And Grotius adds that 'it does not matter whether injustice arises from avarice, from lust, from anger, or from ill-advised compassion'. What matters is only whether one is taking what another has a right to. Grotius concedes that some virtues do keep passions under control, but this is not due to the nature of virtue. It is due, rather, to the fact that 'right reason, which virtue everywhere follows' sometimes prescribes moderation. At other times, as in worshipping God, or in hoping for eternal bliss it does not. These cannot be excessive, any more than hatred of sin can be to great.

MPP4-532 THE GOLDEN MEAN IS TOO DIFFICULT TO APPLY

Louis Pojman, Professor of Philosophy, University of Mississippi, *ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG*, 1990, p.124.

Sometimes Aristotle writes as though the right action is that intermediate or "Golden Mean" determine how to apply this. As J. L. Mackie says: As guidance about what is the good life, what precisely one ought to do, or even by what standard one should try to decide what one ought to do, this is too circular to be very helpful. And though Aristotle's account is filled out with detailed descriptions of many of the virtues, moral as well as intellectual, the air of indeterminacy persists. We learn the names of the pairs of contrary vices that contrast with each of the virtues, but very little about where or how to draw the dividing lines, where or how to fix the mean; As Sidgwick says, he "only indicates the whereabouts of virtue." In sum, virtue ethics has a problem of application: It doesn't tell us what to do in those particular instances in which we most need direction.

MPP4-533 PLATO IS THE FATHER OF COLLECTIVISM

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.26.

If we view the West's philosophic development in terms of essentials, three fateful turning points stand out, three major philosophers who, above all others, are responsible for generating the disease of collectivism and transmitting it to the dictators of our century. The three are: Plato -- Kant -- Hegel. (The antidote to them is Aristotle.) Plato is the father of collectivism in the West. He is the first thinker to formulate a systematic view of reality, with a collectivist politics as its culmination.

MPP4-534 PLATO OFFERS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE ABSOLUTE STATE

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.28.

The advocacy of the omnipotent state follows from the above as a matter of course. The function and authority of the state, according to Plato, should be unlimited. The state should indoctrinate the citizens with government-approved ideas in government-run schools, censor all art and literature and philosophy, assign men their vocations as they come of age, regulate their economic -- and in certain cases even their sexual -- activities, etc. The program of government domination of the individual is thoroughly worked out. In Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* one can read the details, which are the first blueprint of the totalitarian ideal.

MPP4-535 PLATO'S IRRATIONALISM LEADS TO DICTATORSHIP

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.45.

It is not an accident that Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and the whole tradition of German nationalism from Luther on, advocated a variety of anti-senses, anti-logic, anti-intellect doctrines. The statism all these figures upheld or fostered is a result; the root lies in their view of knowledge, i.e., of man's mind. The aspiring dictator may not be able to identify in philosophic terms the clash between reason and his particular schemes. But he, too, is aware of it. In some (usually un verbalized) form, he knows that he cannot demand unthinking obedience from men, or gain their consent to the permanent rule of brutality, until he has first persuaded his future subjects to ditch their brains and their independent, self-assertive judgment.

MPP4-536 THE NAZIS DREW ON PLATO'S INSPIRATION

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.29.

Some of those dictators never read or even heard of Plato, but absorbed his kind of ideas indirectly, at home, in church, in the streets, or from the gutter. Some, however, did go back to the source. Plato, notes Walter Kaufmann, was widely read in German schools [under the Nazis], and special editions were prepared for Greek classes in the Gymnasium, gathering together allegedly fascist passages.... Instead of compiling a list of the many similar contributions to the Plato literature, it may suffice to mention that Dr. Hans F. K. Gunther, from whom the Nazis admittedly received their racial theories, also devoted a whole book to Plato.... As to Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler's official ideologist, he "celebrates Plato as 'one who wanted in the end to save his people on a racial basis, through a forcible constitution, dictatorial in every detail.'"

MPP4-537 PLATO IS ONE OF THE INTELLECTUAL BUILDERS OF AUSCHWITZ

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.43-4.

All of these men and movements contributed the notes, the chords, or the screeches that fused into the Horst Wessel song. And they are merely some of the obvious voices in Germany from a chorus sustained across hundreds of years and gradually rising in volume. If the brutes finally rose from the gutters and stamped a swastika across the doctrines of the centuries; if, plucking the naked essence of those doctrines from the atmosphere, they began to preach the worship of the all-powerful, collectivist, militarist state, ruled by a master Fuhrer in the name of a master race; and if, finding an avid following, they proceeded to drench the world in blood -- one need not ask what made it possible. In one respect, Hegel's share of the responsibility has been widely recognized: the similarity between his politics and that of Hitler is hard to escape. But Hegel's politics is not a primary. It is an expression of his fundamental philosophy, which is the culmination of a long historical development. Hegel would not have been possible but for Kant, who would not have been possible but for Plato. These three, more than any others, are the intellectual builders of Auschwitz.

MPP4-538 PLATONISM UNDERMINES INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.27.

Momentous conclusions about man are implicit in this metaphysics (and were later made explicit by a long line of Platonists): since individual men are merely particular instances of the universal "man," they are not ultimately real. What is real about men is only the Form which they share in common and reflect. To common sense, there appear to be many separate, individual men, each independent of the others, each fully real in his own right. To Platonism, this is a deception; all the seemingly individual men are really the same one. Form, in various reflections or manifestations. Thus, all men ultimately comprise one unity, and no earthly man is an autonomous entity -- just as, if a man were reflected in a multifaceted mirror, the many reflections would not be autonomous entities.

MPP4-539 PLATONISM LEADS TO SELF-SACRIFICE

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.27.

What follows in regard to human action, according to Plato, is a life of self-sacrificial service. When men gather in society, says Plato, the unit of reality, and the standard of value, is the "community as a whole." Each man therefore must strive, as far as he can, to wipe out his individuality (his personal desires, ambitions, etc.) and merge himself into the community, becoming one with it and living only to serve its welfare. On this view, the collective is not an aggregate, but an entity. Society (the state) is regarded as a living organism (this is the so-called "organic theory of the state"), and the individual becomes merely a cell of this organism's body, with no more rights or privileges than belong to any such cell.

MPP4-540 ARISTOTLE AND OBJECTIVISM FUNDAMENTALLY AGREE

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.311.

There is no future for the world except through a rebirth of the Aristotelian approach to philosophy. This would require an Aristotelian affirmation of the reality of existence of the sovereignty of reason, of life on earth -- and of the splendor of man. Aristotle and Objectivism agree on fundamentals and, as a result, on this last point, also. Both hold that man can deal with reality, can achieve values, can live non-tragically. Neither believes in man the worm or man the monster, each upholds man the thinker and therefore man the hero. Aristotle calls him "the great-souled man" Ayn Rand calls him Howard Roark, or John Galt.

MPP4-541 OBJECTIVISM REAFFIRMS THE ARISTOTELIAN WORLDVIEW

Chris Matthew Sciabarra, AYN RAND: THE RUSSIAN RADICAL, 1995, p.141.

Rand's affirmation of the identity of existence and consciousness implies that entities which exist are limited, finite, and knowable. The Greeks believed that such limitation was inherently good. In Greek thought, the unlimited was both indefinable and unknowable. By contrast, the Christian metaphysic moved away from the realism of the Aristotelian tradition and elevated the infinite above the finite. Peikoff argues that this sparked a mystical rebellion against identity which culminated in the irrationality of modern philosophy. Objectivism attempts to recapture the profound realism of the Aristotelian worldview.

MPP4-542 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS ARE ULTIMATELY FREEDOM ENHANCING

Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher, *THE AYN RAND LEXICON*, 1986, p.36.

Throughout history the influence of Aristotle's philosophy (particularly of his epistemology) has led in the direction of individual freedom, of man's liberation from the power of the state . . . Aristotle (via John Locke) was the philosophical father of the Constitution of the United States and thus of capitalism . . . it is Plato and Hegel, not Aristotle, who have been the philosophical ancestors of all totalitarian and welfare states, whether Bismarck's, Lenin's or Hitler's.

MPP4-543 ARISTOTLE WAS THE FATHER OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.109.

The father of this new world was a single philosopher: Aristotle. On countless issues Aristotle's views differ from those of the Enlightenment. But, in terms of broad fundamentals, the philosophy of Aristotle is the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The primacy of this world; the lawfulness and intelligibility of nature; the reality of particulars and therefore of individuals; the sovereign power of man's secular reason; the rejection of innate ideas; the nonsupernaturalist affirmation of certainty, objectivity, absolutes; the uplifted view of man and of the human potential; the value placed on intellectual development as a means to self-fulfillment and personal happiness on earth -- the sum of it is Aristotelian, specifically Aristotelian, as against the mysticism of the Platonic tradition and the self-proclaimed bankruptcy of the skeptical tradition. If the key to the Enlightenment is secularism without skepticism, this means: the key is Aristotle. In the deepest philosophic sense, it is Aristotle who laid the foundation of the United States of America. The nation of the Enlightenment is the nation of Aristotelianism.

MPP4-544 ARISTOTLE DEFENDS ETHICAL EGOISM

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.71.

The Greek philosophers did not urge self-sacrifice on men, but self-realization. Socrates, Aristotle, even Plato to some extent, taught that man is a value; that his purpose in life should be the achievement of his own well-being; and that this requires among other conditions the fullest exercise of his intellect. Since reason is the "most authoritative element" in man, writes Aristotle -- the most eloquent exponent of the Greek egoism -- "therefore the man who loves [reason] and gratifies it is most of all a lover of self.... In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self.

MPP4-545 MODERN SCIENCE AND POLITICAL FREEDOM ARE THE RESULT OF ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.31.

The Renaissance represented a rebirth of the Aristotelian spirit. The results of that spirit are written across the next two centuries, which men describe, properly, as the Age of Reason and the Age of Enlightenment. The results include the rise of modern science; the rise of an individualist political philosophy (the work of John Locke and others); the consequent spread of freedom across the civilized world; and the birth of the freest country in history, the United States of America. The great corollary of these results, the product of men who were armed with the knowledge of the scientists and who were free at last to act, was the Industrial Revolution, which turned poverty into abundance and transformed the face of the West. The Aristotelianism released by Aquinas and the Renaissance was sweeping away the dogmas and the shackles of the past. Reason, freedom, and production were replacing faith, force, and poverty. The age-old foundations of statism were being challenged and undercut.

MPP4-546 ARISTOTLE UPHELD THE VALUE OF PERSONAL SELF-FULFILLMENT

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.30.

But for Aristotle, the good life is one of personal self-fulfillment. Man should enjoy the values of this world. Using his mind to the fullest, each man should work to achieve his own happiness here on earth. And in the process he should be conscious of his own value. Pride, writes Aristotle -- a rational pride in oneself and in one's moral character -- is, when it is earned, the "crown of the virtues." A proud man does not negate his own identity. He does not sink selflessly into the community. He is not a promising subject for the Platonic state.

MPP4-547 ARISTOTLE IS THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANTIDOTE TO PLATO'S TOTALITARIANISM

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.29.

If mankind has not perished from such constitutions, if it has not collapsed permanently into the swamp of statism, but has fought its way up through tortured centuries of brief rises and long-drawn-out falls -- like a man fighting paralysis by the power of an inexhaustible vitality -- it is because that power had been provided by a giant whose philosophic system is, on virtually every fundamental issue, the opposite of Plato's. The great spokesman for man and for this earth is Aristotle. Aristotle is the champion of this world, the champion of nature, as against the supernaturalism of Plato. Denying Plato's World of Forms, Aristotle maintains that there is only one reality: the world of particulars in which we live, the world men perceive by means of their physical senses.

MPP4-548 ALL RATIONAL VALUES DERIVE FROM ARISTOTLE

Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher, *THE AYN RAND LEXICON*, 1986, p.34-5.

If we consider the fact that to this day everything that makes us civilized beings, every rational value that we possess -- including the birth of science, the industrial revolution, the creation of the United States, even the structure of our language -- is the result of Aristotle's influence, of the degree to which, explicitly or implicitly, men accepted his epistemological principles, we would have to say: never have so many owed so much to one man.

MPP4-549 ARISTOTLE'S RECOGNITION OF OBJECTIVE REALITY WAS HIS GREATEST ACCOMPLISHMENT

Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher, *THE AYN RAND LEXICON*, 1986, p.34.

Aristotle's philosophy was the intellect's Declaration of Independence. Aristotle, the father of logic, should be given the title of the world's first intellectual, in the purest and noblest sense of that word. No matter what remnants of Platonism did exist in Aristotle's system, his incomparable achievement lay in the fact that he defined the basic principles of a rational view of existence and of man's consciousness: that there is only one reality, the one which man perceives -- that it exists as an objective absolute (which means: independently of the consciousness, the wishes or the feelings of any perceiver) -- that the task of man's consciousness is to perceive, not to create, reality -- that abstractions are man's method of integrating his sensory material -- that man's mind is his only tool of knowledge -- that A is A.

MPP4-550 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY PROGRESSIVE

Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher, *THE AYN RAND LEXICON*, 1986, p.34.

Aristotle may be regarded as the cultural barometer of Western history. Whenever his influence dominated the scene, it paved the way for one of history's brilliant eras; whenever it fell, so did mankind. The Aristotelian revival of the thirteenth century brought men to the Renaissance. The intellectual counter-revolution turned them back toward the cave of his antipode: Plato.

MPP4-551 ARISTOTLE IS THE FOUNTAINHEAD OF WESTERN INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS

Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher, *THE AYN RAND LEXICON*, 1986, p.34.

If there is a philosophical Atlas who carries the whole of Western civilization on his shoulders, it is Aristotle. He has been opposed, misinterpreted, misrepresented, and -- like an axiom -- used by his enemies in the very act of denying him. Whatever intellectual progress men have achieved rests on his achievements.

MPP4-552 ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE IS ESSENTIALLY LIBERTARIAN

Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher, *THE AYN RAND LEXICON*, 1986, p.36.

Throughout history the influence of Aristotle's philosophy (particularly of his epistemology) has led in the direction of individual freedom, of man's liberation from the power of the state...Aristotle (via John Locke) was the philosophical father of the Constitution of the United States and thus of capitalism . . . it is Plato and Hegel, not Aristotle, who have been the philosophical ancestors of all totalitarian and welfare states, whether Bismarck's, Lenin's or Hitler's.

MPP4-553 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS AREN'T CONSISTENTLY ANTI-STATIST

Leonard Peikoff, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, *THE OMINOUS PARALLELS*, 1982, p.30.

Although Aristotle's writings do include a polemic against the more extreme features of Plato's collectivism, Aristotle himself is not a consistent advocate of political individualism. His own politics is a mixture of statist and antistatist elements. But the primary significance of Aristotle, or of any philosopher, does not lie in his politics. It lies in the fundamentals of his system: his metaphysics and epistemology.

MPP4-554 ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE SUPPORT RAWLS

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE*, 1971, p.10-1.

Now this approach may not seem to tally with tradition. I believe, though, that it does. The more specific sense that Aristotle gives to justice, and from which the most familiar formulations derive, is that of refraining from *pleonexia*, that is, from gaining some advantage for oneself by seizing what belongs to another, his property, his reward, his office, and the like, or by denying a person that which is due to him, the fulfillment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the showing of proper respect, and so on. It is evident that this definition is framed to apply to actions, and persons are thought to be just insofar as they have, as one of the permanent elements of their character, a steady and effective desire to act justly. Aristotle's definition clearly presupposes, however, an account of what properly belongs to a person and of what is due to him. Now such entitlements are, I believe, very often derived from social institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they give rise. There is no reason to think that Aristotle would disagree with this, and certainly he has a conception of social justice to account for these claims. The definition I adopt is designed to apply directly to the most important case, the justice of the basic structure. There is no conflict with the traditional notion.

MPP4-555 ACCORDING TO THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE, PEOPLE ENJOY EXERCISING INCREASINGLY COMPLEX CAPACITIES

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE*, 1971, p.426.

Turning now to our present topic, it will be recalled that the Aristotelian Principle runs as follows: other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity. The intuitive idea here is that human beings take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at it, and of two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling on a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations. For example, chess is a more complicated and subtle game than checkers, and algebra is more intricate than elementary arithmetic. Thus the principle says that someone who can do both generally prefers playing chess to playing checkers, and that he would rather study algebra than arithmetic.

MPP4-556 ARISTOTLE AFFIRMED THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.426.

Yet since he does not state such a principle explicitly, and some of it is at best only implied, I have not called it "Aristotle's Principle." Nevertheless, Aristotle certainly affirms two points that the principle conveys: (1) that enjoyment and pleasure are not always by any means the result of returning to a healthy or normal state, or of making up deficiencies; rather many kinds of pleasure and enjoyment arise when we exercise our faculties; and (2) that the exercise of our natural powers is a leading human good. Further, (3) the idea that the more enjoyable activities and the more desirable and enduring pleasures spring from the exercise of greater abilities involving more complex discriminations is not only compatible with Aristotle's conception of the natural order, but something like it usually fits the judgments of value he makes, even when it does not express his reasons.

MPP4-557 THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE EXPLAINS OUR MOTIVES

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.427-8.

The Aristotelian Principle is a principle of motivation. It accounts for many of our major desires, and explains why we prefer to do some things and not others by constantly exerting an influence over the flow of our activity. Moreover, it expresses a psychological law governing changes in the pattern of our desires. Thus the principle implies that as a person's capacities increase over time (brought about by physiological and biological maturation, for example, the development of the nervous system in a young child), and as he trains these capacities and learns how to exercise them, he will in due course come to prefer the more complex activities that he can now engage in which call upon his newly realized abilities. The simpler things he enjoyed before are no longer sufficiently interesting or attractive. If we ask why we are willing to undergo the stresses of practice and learning, the reason may be (if we leave out of account external rewards and penalties) that having had some success at learning things in the past, and experiencing the present enjoyments of the activity, we are led to expect even greater satisfaction once we acquire a greater repertoire of skills. There is also a companion effect to the Aristotelian Principle. As we witness the exercise of well-trained abilities by others, these displays are enjoyed by us and arouse a desire that we should be able to do the same things ourselves. We want to be like those persons who can exercise the abilities that we find latent in our nature.

MPP4-558 THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE JUSTIFIES TRAINING OUR MATURE CAPACITIES

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.428-9.

Now accepting the Aristotelian Principle as a natural fact, it will generally be rational, in view of the other assumptions, to realize and train mature capacities. Maximal or satisfactory plans are almost certainly plans that provide for doing this in significant measure. Not only is there a tendency in this direction postulated by the Aristotelian Principle, but the plain facts of social interdependency and the nature of our interests more narrowly construed incline us in the same way. A rational plan -- constrained as always by the principles of right -- allows a person to flourish, so far as circumstances permit, and to exercise his realized abilities as much as he can. Moreover, his fellow associates are likely to support these activities as promoting the common interest and also to take pleasure in them as displays of human excellence. To the degree, then, that the esteem and admiration of others is desired, the activities favored by the Aristotelian Principle are good for other persons as well.

MPP4-559 SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS MUST ACCOMMODATE THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.429.

Yet if it is a useful theoretical notion, the tendency postulated should be relatively strong and not easily counterbalanced. I believe that this is indeed the case, and that in the design of social institutions a large place has to be made for it, otherwise human beings will find their culture and form of life dull and empty. Their vitality and zest will fail as their life becomes a tiresome routine. And this seems borne out by the fact that the forms of life which absorb men's energies, whether they be religious devotions or purely practical matters or even games and pastimes, tend to develop their intricacies and subtleties almost without end. As social practices and cooperative activities are built up through the imagination of many individuals, they increasingly call forth a more complex array of abilities and new ways of doing things. That this process is carried along by the enjoyment of natural and free activity seems to be verified by the spontaneous play of children and animals which shows all the same features.

MPP4-560 EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY SUPPORT THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.431.

Now it may be objected that there is no reason to suppose that the Aristotelian Principle is true. Like the idealist notion of self-realization, to which it bears a certain resemblance, it may have the ring of a philosopher's principle with little to support it. But it seems to be borne out by many facts of everyday life, and by the behavior of children and some of the higher animals. Moreover, it appears to be susceptible to an evolutionary explanation. Natural selection must have favored creatures of whom this principle is true. Aristotle says that men desire to know. Presumably we have acquired this desire by a natural development, and indeed, if the principle is sound, a desire to engage in more complex and demanding activities of any kind as long as they are within our reach. Human beings enjoy the greater variety of experience, they take pleasure in the novelty and surprises and the occasions for ingenuity and invention that such activities provide. The multiplicity of spontaneous activities is an expression of the delight that we take in imagination and creative fantasy. Thus the Aristotelian Principle characterizes human beings as importantly moved not only by the pressure of bodily needs, but also by the desire to do things enjoyed simply for their own sakes, at least when the urgent and pressing wants are satisfied.

MPP4-561 THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE UNDERLIES OUR CONSIDERED VALUE JUDGMENTS

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.432.

The role of the Aristotelian Principle in the theory of the good is that it states a deep psychological fact which, in conjunction with other general facts and the conception of a rational plan, accounts for our considered judgments of value. The things that are commonly thought of as human goods should turn out to be the ends and activities that have a major place in rational plans. The principle is part of the background that regulates these judgments. Provided that it is true, and leads to conclusions matching our convictions about what is good and bad (in reflective equilibrium), it has a proper place in moral theory.

MPP4-562 THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE IS IMPORTANT TO THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.433.

I mention this fanciful case only to show that the correctness of the definition of a person's good in terms of the rational plan for him does not require the truth of the Aristotelian Principle. The definition is satisfactory, I believe, even if this principle should prove inaccurate, or fail altogether. But by assuming the principle we seem able to account for what things are recognized as good for human beings taking them as they are. Moreover, since this principle ties in with the primary good of self respect, it turns out to have a central position in the moral psychology underlying justice as fairness.

MPP4-563 A WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY UPHOLDS THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.528.

But further, the Aristotelian Principle holds for institutional forms as well as for any other human activity. Seen in this light, a just constitutional order, when adjoined to the smaller social unions of everyday life, provides a framework for these many associations and sets up the most complex and diverse activity of all. In a well-ordered society each person understands the first principles that govern the whole scheme as it is to be carried out over many generations; and all have a settled intention to adhere to these principles in their plan of life. Thus the plan of each person is given, a more ample and rich structure than it would otherwise have; it is adjusted to the plans of others by mutually acceptable principles.

MPP4-564 THE ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLE DEMONSTRATES THE GOOD OF PARTICIPATING IN A WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY

John Rawls, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 1971, p.571.

Another basic consideration is this: it follows from the Aristotelian Principle (and its companion effect) that participating in the life of a well-ordered society is a great good. This conclusion depends upon the meaning of the principles of justice and their precedence in everyone's plans as well as upon the psychological features of our nature. It is the details of the contract view which establish this connection. Because such a society is a social union of social unions, it realizes to a preeminent degree the various forms of human activity; and given the social nature of humankind, the fact that our potentialities and inclinations far surpass what can be expressed in any one life, we depend upon the cooperative endeavors of others not only for the means of well-being but to bring to fruition our latent powers. And with a certain success all around, each enjoys the greater richness and diversity of the collective activity.

MPP4-565 PLATO OFFERED A PRACTICAL MODEL OF JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE, 1990, p.25.

Plato drew a protracted analogy between the just society and the just individual, noting that each depended upon the "harmony" of its parts and insisting that neither was possible without the other. But what Plato meant by justice (*dikaiosyne*) was not at all the abstract rules and policies that so obsess us. Justice was nothing less than "the good life," the way for us all to live well together. Plato's teacher and hero Socrates was the model and not merely a theoretician of the good life.

MPP4-566 SOCRATES PROPERLY EQUATES JUSTICE WITH THE GOOD LIFE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE, 1990, p.87.

We have already insisted that justice won't make much sense to us if it is not part and parcel of what we consider to be the good life. Sainthood is not our aspiration, and justice will not much appeal to us unless Socrates is right about justice being its own reward and inseparable from the good life as such.

MPP4-567 BOTH PLATO AND ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RIGHT EMOTIONS

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.209.

Why shouldn't emotions be central to justice? Why should they be excluded from consideration? Plato and Aristotle, neither of them enemies of reason or defenders of unbridled passion, nevertheless thought that the right emotions were necessary to good character and virtue and, in particular, to that all-important sense of justice.

MPP4-568 PLATO AND ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZED REASON MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH EMOTION

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.36.

Plato and Aristotle, because they recognized that the sense of justice must be wholly integrated with one's sense of the good life, insisted that justice is a product, at least in part, of the passions. One could not possibly be considered a good man, much less a happy man, unless he acted not against his feelings but in harmony with them; This holistic view of the self will be central to the account defended here as well, however opposed it may be to the frequently dualistic and combative accounts of the moral self we find in more modern theories. Plato and Aristotle knew, and I want to insist that the most important element in moral education is not the teaching of moralistic bromides and abstract commandments but the cultivation of the emotions.

MPP4-569 JUSTICE IS INSEPARABLE FROM LIVING WELL

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.76.

Socrates' insistence that being just and serving one's own interests are not distinct projects is his answer to the question, what is justice? Justice is living well and living right, which are indistinguishable. And why should we be just? Because not to be just is to be something less than a complete person or a full citizen, to be inwardly torn and conflicted and less than fully rational, to run a large risk of being miserable and untrue to one's own true nature.

MPP4-570 JUSTICE IS KEY TO THE GOOD LIFE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.76.

What Plato means by justice is living the good life. To be sure, he was not concerned with many of the aspects of justice which very much concern us, such as the question of welfare for the poor and the debate over progressive taxation, and much of what he praises in his ideal society and disparages in democracy should offend us; but his basic idea, namely, that justice is not an abstract or isolated aspect of life but the very essence of living as a citizen in society, should be quite familiar and appealing to us.

MPP4-571 FOR PLATO, JUSTICE IS EQUATED WITH HEALTH AND HAPPINESS

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.75-6.

Plato suggests that, whether we are talking about the individual or society, justice is akin to health and happiness while injustice is like sickness and misery. Injustice is internal discord, which leaves society or the psyche weak and confused, at war with itself. This provides Plato with a solution to his problem, namely, how it is that justice must be considered desirable for its own sake. If justice is nothing less than the integrity and harmony of ourselves and our society, if we are "naturally" motivated to be just, then the denial of this harmony or the misfortune of living in a society that does not or cannot sustain it will inevitably not only make us miserable but also induce a kind of internal turmoil and conflict, even if we manage to do quite well for ourselves as individuals in such circumstances. Living in a just society certainly helps and encourages us to be just persons, not because society makes us just but because it gives us the opportunity to act out our natural impulses. Justice must be in the individual before it can be in society. And what external rewards or enticements does one require in order to pursue health and happiness?

MPP4-572 PLATO OFFERS A FRUITFUL VIEW OF JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.75.

And yet, *The Republic* also offers us a vision of what justice is and must be. Whatever else it may be, justice involves the integrity and fulfillment of the individual and his or her contribution to society rather than, as we tend to think of it, an individual (namely oneself) getting what he or she wants or deserves. But whereas Plato has society wholly determine the role and the status of the individual, we insist that it is the well-being and rights of the individual that determine the nature of society. It is the individual who is the measure and standard of justice, but -- and this is the critical point -- this measure and standard is always embedded in society and unthinkable without it.

MPP4-573 JUSTICE IS A HARMONIOUS ENGAGEMENT IN ONE'S SOCIETY

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.75.

What constitutes justice is a whole-hearted concern and engagement in society, the recognition that the pursuit of personal interests in the absence of a community in which those interests are defined, respected, and realized makes no sense whatsoever. For Plato, the essence of justice is belonging to a well-ordered and harmonious society and being the kind of person who makes possible such a society.

MPP4-574 PLATO HAD AN INVIGORATING IDEA OF PUBLIC SERVICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.74-5.

The guardians, however, are subjected to severe restrictions, including the abolition of personal property and the familiar modes of family privacy. They share wives, and consequently children are raised communally, as new guardians. Whether or not we think such a system sounds fair, it should give us occasion in these days of millionaire senators to rethink what we mean by "public servants."

MPP4-575 FOR PLATO, JUSTICE IS THE HARMONY OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL ELEMENTS

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.74.

But the result of all of these skilled and specialized citizens working together is a maximally unified, efficient, healthy, and happy society (a point made again twenty centuries later by Adam Smith). In other words, the perfect city is the product of thousands of (imperfect) individuals, working together and enjoying the fruits of success appropriate to their roles and expectations. This is justice. So too, the just individual is a person in whom body and soul are in harmony, in whom desire is in accordance with reason so that, in effect, he or she has only desires that are appropriate to his or her place in the just society.

MPP4-576 LIKE ADAM SMITH, PLATO SEES DIVISION OF LABOR AS KEY TO JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.74.

The central feature of Plato's just society -- and it is also the defining feature of modern society in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* -- is the division of labor: Everyone does what he or she can do best. Thus justice turns on the notion of merit; what is essential is what people contribute to the society through their own special skills and talents.

MPP4-577 PLATO DEFENDED EQUALITY FOR WOMEN

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.73.

The Republic is devoted to Socrates' defense of justice as a virtue that is desirable for its own sake and to his formulation of a blueprint for a society ruled by justice and by just men and women. (It should be noted that Plato's inclusion of women as guardians of the republic was a remarkably novel and precocious idea in a society that still considered women chattel.)

MPP4-578 THE REPUBLIC OFFERS A COMPLEX, DIALECTICAL VIEW OF JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.73.

And as for substance, The Republic gives us not just a single analysis of justice but several, all of which Socrates rejects as perverse, confused, or far too limited. Why does he bother? Because it is Socrates' view that the true definition will emerge dialectically ("through conversation") from a consideration of all of the one-sided or wrongheaded answers now in circulation. Or perhaps we can read Plato as trying to tell us that there are many different conceptions of justice, appropriate and limited to different contexts, so that the heart of justice is not in the world but in our judgments. Or perhaps we should realize that the diversity of answers considered by Socrates and his interlocutors demonstrates not the stupidity of Socrates' fellow Athenians but rather the genuine conflict and confusion of various ancient and novel visions of the good life and the way the world works. In The Republic, in contrast to most modern works on justice, there is no theory of justice and no attempt to reduce justice to a few impersonal principles. Justice is nothing less than the very soul of the best individuals and the best communities.

MPP4-579 PLATO PROPERLY SEES JUSTICE AS A PERSONAL VIRTUE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.70.

Our modern way of thinking about this question defends justice by arguing that justice serves our collective interests. This is not Plato's view, but neither is it to be thought that he defends a sense of justice as self-sacrifice. What he suggests -- and what I shall be arguing -- is that a proper conception of justice requires a revised conception of one's self. Justice, according to the social contract conception, is an artifice of society. It is not a matter of personal inclination or virtue so much as it is a system of threats and rewards to which we agree for our mutual advantage. Justice, according to Plato, is first of all a personal virtue.

MPP4-580 PLATO SUCCESSFULLY INDICTS THE SOCIAL CONTRACT VIEW OF JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.71.

Underlying the idea of a social contract to protect us from one another is the uncritical and inadequate notion that we are all basically selfish and competitive. It is as if our selfish desires occur naturally, quite apart from ethics or society, but our sense of justice is not natural at all. Against this, Plato argues that justice cannot be just a social convention but must be found in the nature of the soul of the agent. This means that selfishness cannot be so simply opposed to justice, and justice must be understood in terms of what kind of people we are and should be. Justice does not depend on a contract or on anyone's sense of obligation. Indeed, the ancient Greeks did not even have our overly contractual notion of "obligation." It is simply not true that all of us are basically selfish creatures who need contractual obligations to keep us in line. Indeed, holding simultaneously to the antagonistic concepts of "selfishness" and "obligation" makes any adequate conception of justice impossible.

MPP4-581 PLATO AND ARISTOTLE HAVE AN OVERLY INEQUALITARIAN VIEW OF JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.178.

Plato argued in *The Republic* and Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* that justice and the good life are so inextricably bound together that one cannot live well without being just. But Plato and Aristotle were aristocrats (or, at least, lived with and taught the sons of aristocrats); they took gross inequality to be perfectly natural and not at all unjust. They accepted slavery as a necessary condition of civilized society. So, for them, the compatibility of justice with gross discrepancies between the rich and the very poor, the coexistence of aristocracy and slavery, was not a problem. But we believe -- and we start all of our deliberations about justice with the view -- that "all men [sic] are created equal." It is not fair that some should be so wealthy while others, perhaps only a couple of blocks away, do not even have a roof over their heads or enough to eat.

MPP4-582 THE REPUBLIC IS ALMOST A PARADIGM OF INJUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.75.

We should not be surprised that this image of a harmonious, prosperous, and happy society has inspired political leaders for so many centuries, but many elements of this hierarchical portrait of justice and the ideal society should repel and disgust us as well. What has no place in this portrait of justice, indeed is its enemy, is democracy, and the individual freedoms and choices that democracy both requires and makes possible. The unabashed acceptance of slavery as the economic presupposition of the republic should horrify us, and the idea that each of us is just and will be happy if only we accept without challenging our place in society should revolt us. Of course, *The Republic* is not entirely idealized fiction; it is, quite naturally, a good deal like Athens in the fourth century B.C., reflecting all of the political battles that Athenians had endured in the previous century or so. It is not a utopia, by any means, but an idealization of one strain of political thought that Socrates and Plato found particularly attractive. It is a vision that we, however, would and should find almost a paradigm of injustice.

MPP4-583 THE ANT COLONY EPI TOMIZES PLATONIC JUSTICE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *A PASSION FOR JUSTICE*, 1990, p.138-9.

And yet, we shouldn't forget that justice for Plato lies in the harmonious working together of the various members of society, each of whom knows his or her place. Justice is not reciprocity but undisturbed harmony. Ants certainly recognize one another and display all the earmarks of fellow feeling (greeting one another, total cooperation, joint hostility to strangers). All the ant colony lacks, on Plato's account, would seem to be a few philosophers to properly reflect on their happy situation. But what is missing is not only freedom but reciprocal response, a sense of individual strategy, and a memory of past encounters rather than just a program for mutual recognition. Surely any adequate conception of justice must take full account of the importance of social harmony and efficiency, but harmony and efficiency alone are clearly not enough for justice. As much as some people might admire the efficiency or the savagery of ants, ants make poor candidates for a natural model of justice.

MPP4-584 ARISTOTLE REJECTED THE SEPARATION OF BUSINESS FROM THE REST OF LIFE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.51.

Even today representatives of business offer up such Pyrrhonian arguments as "business is akin to poker and apart from the ethics of everyday life" and "the [only] social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." It is just this schism between business and the rest of life that so infuriated Aristotle, for whom life was supposed to fit together in a coherent whole. The very idea of separating, as we do so readily, the personal from the professional life, the idea that "business is business" (not really a tautology but a throwaway excuse for acting inhumanely), he would have thought to be unthinkable. A person had to think of him- or herself as a member of the community, the polis, and strive to excel, to bring out what was best in ourselves and our shared enterprise.

MPP4-585 BUSINESS ETHICS SHOULD BE BASED ON INDIVIDUAL VIRTUE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.51.

What we need to cultivate is a certain way of thinking about ourselves in and out of the corporate cultural context. The Aristotelian approach to business ethics begins with the idea that it is individual virtue that counts; good corporate and social policy will follow. But it is the good corporation that cultivates individual virtue, and so the Aristotelian chicken presupposes a Platonic republican (not Republican) egg.

MPP4-586 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS AREN'T OVERLY RATIONALISTIC

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.52.

The Aristotelian approach is also to be contrasted with that two hundred-or-so-year-old obsession in ethics that takes everything to be a matter of rational principles, morality in the strict Kantian sense of obedience to the moral law. This is not to say, of course, that Aristotelian ethics dispenses with rationality or, for that matter, principles. But Aristotle is quite clear about the fact that it is cultivation of character that counts, long before we begin to "rationalize" our actions, and the formulation of general principles (in what he famously but confusingly calls his practical syllogism) is not an explicit step in correct and virtuous behavior as such but rather a philosopher's formulation about what it means to act rationally. However obvious the principle, it is its interpretation and application that count in practical matters, and these require experience and judgment, not just rationality. They require sensitivity and a sense of responsibility, not just an ability to reason abstractly.

MPP4-587 HUMANS ARE SOCIALLY CONSTITUTED AND SOCIALLY SITUATED

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.56.

The Aristotelian approach begins with the idea that we are all members of an organized group, with something of a history and established practices governing everything from eating and working to worshipping. To be sure, communities in the contemporary "Western" world are anything but homogeneous or harmonious, but the claim I am making here is more metaphysical than nostalgic, and that is that what we call "the individual" is him- or herself socially constituted and socially situated. The philosophical myth that has grown almost cancerous in many business circles, the neo-Hobbesian view that "it's a jungle out there" and "it's every man [sic] for himself," is the direct denial of the Aristotelean view that we are all first and foremost members of a community and that our self-interest is for the most part identical to the larger interests of the group.

MPP4-588 THE CORPORATION IS ALWAYS PART OF A LARGER COMMUNITY

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.57.

To my business students today, who are all too likely to choose a job on the basis of salary and start-up bonus alone I always say, "To live a decent life, choose the right company." In business ethics the corporation is one's community, but, of course the corporation is itself a part of a larger community--as diverse as that may be--without which it would have no identity, serve no purpose, and sell no products. Quite the contrary of the cynical business "wisdom" that preaches "every man [sic] for himself," the truth is that every business activity, from the small-time hustler to the giant corporation, presupposes and itself incorporates a community, a polis in which the virtues of mutual trust and cooperation are taken for granted (even in their intentional breach).

MPP4-589 VIRTUE AND QUALITY TAKE PRIORITY OVER PROFIT

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.57.

Virtue is doing one's best, excelling, not merely (from top to bottom) "keeping one's nose clean" and "toeing the line." The virtues that constitute business ethics are, above all, the virtues of doing business, and these should not be conceived of as if business ethics were nothing other than the general application of moral principles to one specific context (among others), primarily as an inhibiting force or a set of side constraints, rather than the underlying set of rules and expectations that make the practice of business possible in the first place. The word "quality," though much overused in advertising, defines the bottom line of business competition far better than "profits," which readily follow. The virtues of self-respect and integrity, far from being antagonistic to long-term success, form its very precondition.

MPP4-590 BUSINESS ETHICS ARE SITUATIONAL

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.58.

The Aristotelian approach to business ethics presumes concrete situations and particular people and their place in organizations. There is little point to an ethics that tries to transcend all such particularities and embrace the chairman of the board as well as a middle manager, a secretary, and a factory worker. All ethics is contextual, and one of the problems with all of those grand theories is that they try to transcend context and end up with vacuity.

MPP4-591 BUSINESS VALUES SHOULDN'T BE ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF LIFE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.58.

It more or less follows from what I've said that one of the problems of traditional business thinking is our tendency to isolate our business or professional roles from the rest of our lives a process that Marx, following Friedrich Schiller, described as "alienation." The good life may have many facets, but they are facets and not mere components, much less isolated aspects of a fragmented existence. We hear more and more in managerial circles that a manager's primary and ultimate concern is people. It's gotten trite, but as I watch our more ambitious students and talk with more and more semi-successful but "trapped" middle managers and executives, I become more and more convinced that the tunnel vision of business life encouraged by the too narrow business curriculum and the daily rhetoric of the corporate community is damaging and counterproductive. Good employees are good people, and to pretend that the virtues of business stand isolated from the virtues of the rest of our lives--and this is not for a moment to deny the particularity of either our business roles or our lives--is to set up that familiar tragedy in which a pressured employee violates his or her "personal values" because, from a purely business point of view, he or she "didn't really have any choice."

MPP4-592 GOOD JUDGMENT IS KEY TO ETHICS

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.59.

Against the view that ethics consists primarily of general principles that get applied to particular situations, Aristotle thought that it was "good judgment," or *phronesis*, that was of the greatest importance in ethics. Good judgment (which centered on perception, rather than on the abstract formulation and interpretation of general principles) was the product of a good upbringing, a proper education.

MPP4-593 QUESTIONS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE JUDGMENT, NOT MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF RULES

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.59.

Justice, for example, may sound as if it were a monolithic, hierarchically layered, and almost mechanical process (especially in the writings of some philosophers). As I have argued elsewhere, however, there are a dozen or more different considerations that enter into most deliberations about justice, including not only rights and prior obligations and the public good but questions of merit (which themselves break down into a variety of sometimes conflicting categories) and responsibility and risk. I won't go into this here, but the point is that there is no (nonarbitrary) mechanical decision procedure for resolving most disputes about justice; what is required, in each and every case, is the ability to balance and weigh competing concerns and come to a "fair" conclusion. But what's fair is not the outcome of one or several preordained principles of justice; it is (as they say) a judgment call, always disputable but nevertheless well or badly made.

MPP4-594 THE AMORALITY OF BUSINESS IS A DANGEROUS MYTH

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.60.

What lies at the basis of all such images haunting business ethics is still, I think, the one that Richard De George called the myth of amoral business. It is the view that business transactions take place in a moral and social vacuum in which "anything goes" and only profits are of concern. It is a myth that persists not only among the suspicious public and some socialist-minded philosophers but among many businesspeople themselves, who thus degrade and misunderstand their own world and its significance. A defense of Aristotelian thinking in business thus requires a purging of these vulgar, naive, and sometimes downright disgusting images that pervade all too much talk about business, not only in the arguments of its detractors but in the words of its enthusiastic defenders and promoters. The first task of business ethics is to clear the way through incriminating and dangerous myths and metaphors that obscure rather than clarify the underlying ethos that makes business possible and make any talk of "virtue" sound merely quaint and naively idealistic.

MPP4-595 PROFIT ISN'T THE CENTRAL AIM OF BUSINESS

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.60-1.

To be sure, a business does aim to make a profit, but it does so only by supplying quality goods and services, by providing jobs, and by fitting in with the community. To single out profits rather than productivity or public service as the central aim of business activity is to ask for trouble. And profits as such are not the end or the goal of business activity: profits get distributed and reinvested. Profits are a means of building the business and rewarding employees, executives, and investors. For some people, profits may be a means of "keeping score," but even to those degenerate cases, it is the status and satisfaction of "winning" that is the goal, not the profits as such. It was for good reason, whatever else we might think of his prejudices, that Aristotle scorned the notion of profit for its own sake, and even Adam Smith was clear that it was prosperity, not profits, that constituted the goal of the free-market system, whether or not the individual businessperson thought of this at the time.

MPP4-596 SHAREHOLDER PROFIT ISN'T THE ULTIMATE VALUE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.61.

A more sophisticated but not dissimilar executive myth states that the managers of a business are bound above all by one and only one obligation--to maximize the profits for their stockholders. We need not inquire whether this is the actual motive behind most upper management decisions in order to point out that, while managers do recognize that their own business roles are defined primarily by obligations rather than by the profit motive, that unflattering image has simply been transferred to the stockholders (i.e., the owners). But it is true that investors/owners care only about the maximization of their profits? Do they not think that there are all sorts of values and virtues to be considered along the road to dividends and share-value increases? And if some four-month "in-and-out" investor does indeed care only about increasing his investment by 30 percent or so, why should the managers of the firm have any obligation to him, other than to avoid intentionally frittering away or wasting that money?

MPP4-597 SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AREN'T THE ULTIMATE END

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.61.

This is how we misunderstand business and lose our Aristotelian orientation: we adopt a too narrow vision of what business is (e.g., the pursuit of profits) and then derive unethical and divisive conclusions. It is the inexcusably limited focus on the "rights of the stockholders," for example, that has been used to defend some of the very destructive and certainly unproductive hostile takeovers of major corporations in the last few years. To say this is not to deny the rights of stockholders to a fair return, of course, or to deny the fiduciary responsibility of the managers of a company; but these rights and responsibilities make sense only in a larger social context, and the very idea of the profit motive as an end in itself--as opposed to profits as a means of encouraging and rewarding hard work and investment, building a better business, and serving society better--poses a serious obstacle to understanding the rich tapestry of motives and activities that make up the business world.

MPP4-598 ATOMISTIC INDIVIDUALISM IS A FALSE VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.63-4.

This most persistent metaphor, which seems to endure no matter how much evidence is amassed against it, is atomistic individualism. It is this, more than anything else, that makes the Aristotelian approach to business ethics seem so odd, so suspicious. We assume, whether or not we say so, that business is "every man [sic] for himself" and then find it hard to agree on any place for the virtues, at least, any virtue over and above rational prudence. The resulting idea, that business life consists wholly of mutually agreed upon transactions between individual citizens (avoiding government interference), goes back beyond Adam Smith and the philosophy that dominated eighteenth-century Britain and France. But it has always been a false view of human nature, whether in the "state of nature" or in society, and most of business life too consists of roles and responsibilities in cooperative enterprises (whether they be small mom-and-pop businesses or gigantic multinational corporations).

MPP4-599 ATOMISTIC INDIVIDUALISM DOESN'T ACCURATELY CHARACTERIZE BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.64.

But atomistic individualism is not only a bad theory of human nature and wholly inaccurate in the face of the corporate complexity of today's business world; it is also naive in its supposition that no institutional rules and practices underlie even the simplest promise, contract, or exchange. Business is a social practice, not an activity of isolated individuals. It is possible only because it takes place in a culture with an established set of procedures and expectations, and these are not (except in the details) open to individual tinkering.

MPP4-600 AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS REQUIRES TRANSCENDING THE BOTTOM LINE

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.65.

The bottom line of the Aristotelian approach to business ethics is that we have to get away from bottom-line thinking. What is essential to a good life in business is not just results and accomplishments as measured by financial gain but what is above (not beyond) the bottom line, the whole package of cooperative as well as competitive effort, personal integrity as well as contribution to the community.

MPP4-601 GREED IS A FORM OF PATHOLOGY

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.65.

Wanting too much without regard to one's character or reputation is a myopic form of stupidity, evident in Midas-like individuals throughout history, no doubt, but peculiar as a generally approved consciousness in our time. Aristotle saw quite clearly that greed (or "grasping," pleonexia) was a kind of pathology, a defect of character so serious that it was beyond redemption. Not that he was against wealth and comfort (no ascetics, those Athenians), but in the quest for the good life it was at most a favorable precondition, not something worth worrying about at the expense of one's soul.

MPP4-602 OUR PRESENT CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS IS ARISTOTELIAN

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.65-6.

It is a question of proper perspective, and the truth is that our concept of happiness is a lot more Aristotelian than we would think. Students and job-hoppers (and, let me say, even professors of the humanities) who accept positions on the basis of salary alone and then hate their jobs (and often their luxurious lives, as well) miss the obvious: what makes for happiness is not money to spend but a respected place in a decent and prosperous community and time in which to enjoy it. Success is not salary but respect and love and admiration. As John Steinbeck wrote in *East of Eden*, "A living, or money.... Money's easy to make if it's money you want. But with a few exceptions people don't want money. They want luxury and they want love and they want admiration."

MPP4-603 THE ARISTOTELIAN PERSPECTIVE STRESSES THE UNITY OF BUSINESS WITH THE REST OF SOCIETY

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.66.

The Aristotelian approach to business ethics ultimately comes down to the idea that, while business life has its specific goals and distinctive practices and people in business have their particular concerns, loyalties, roles, and responsibilities, there is ultimately no business world but only people working in business as part of their life in society. It is an obvious point, perhaps, but to read much if not most of what gets written about business and to listen to managers and executives on the job talk about what they do is to realize that it is a point readily lost in the obsessive pressure to satisfy the bottom line. That line, after all, is only a measure, and what it measures--often falsely or misleadingly--is the quality and efficiency of an organization and its output, which in turn is the product of hundreds or thousands of individuals and how well they work together.

MPP4-604 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS REPUDIATE GREED

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.66.

The Aristotelian approach is not anti-business and certainly not anti-success but only anti-pleonexia, anti-greed. Aristotle's central ethical concept is "happiness" (more accurately, eudaimonia, perhaps better translated as "flourishing" or "doing well"). "Happiness," therefore, has what we would call "success" built into it, and success in a consumer society necessarily entails a certain level of financial success. Let's remember, however, that we "consume" art and music, books and ideas, as well as cars and kitchenware, and the dollar costs of such consumption may not be considerable at all. What Aristotle's conception excludes is mediocrity and isolation--especially the mean-spirited competition that too many people in business abstractly confuse with free enterprise. Moreover, it is not enough to be a subjectively contented or even blithe failure; it is what one actually accomplishes, with and for others as well as by and for oneself, that counts.

MPP4-605 HAPPINESS IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF BUSINESS AS WELL AS PERSONAL ETHICS

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.66-7.

It would be a crass vulgarization to suppose that doing well is to be understood, in our society, as just a matter of "making it." Most Americans, when not engaged in business conversation, would rather readily admit that the only bottom line that counts is how happy we are, as individuals, as families, as employees, as a people. Happiness may include success, but it is not wholly defined by success, and while an excellent company will almost always do well in the market, it is not doing well that makes them excellent. Tom Peters's incessant insistence on the "satisfied customer" and the "contented employee" highlights an extremely important Aristotelian measure. The rather banal equation between happiness and having fun too readily blinds us to the idea that our work ought to be satisfying and rewarding (only occasionally "fun"). The familiar image of the harried manager, on the other hand, is a symptom of something very wrong, in a career, in a company, in the market itself. Happiness (for us as well as for Aristotle) is a holistic concept, and it is one's character, not one's bottom line, that is the ultimate determinant and beneficiary of happiness. This is equally true, I want to insist, for giant corporations as it is for the individuals who work for them.

MPP4-606 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS UNDERMINE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ALTRUISM AND SELF-INTEREST

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.67.

I want to use Aristotle to attack a popular misconception of what this notion of character and the related notion of social-mindedness entails. One of the worst philosophical dichotomies to have worked itself through the ranks of the hoi polloi is the false antagonism between selfishness on the one hand and what is called altruism on the other, but for the properly constituted social self the distinction between self-interest and social-mindedness is all but unintelligible and what we call selfishness is guaranteed to be self-destructive as well. And altruism is too easily turned into self-sacrifice, for instance by that self-appointed champion of selfishness, Ayn Rand. But altruism isn't self-sacrifice; it's just a more reasonable conception of self as tied up intimately with community, with friends and family who may, indeed, count at times for more than we do. What the Aristotelian approach to business ethics demands isn't self-sacrifice or the submerging of oneself to the interests of the corporation, much less voluntary unhappiness. What it does say is that the distinctions and oppositions between self and society that give rise to these wrongheaded conceptions are themselves the problem, as well as the cause of so much unhappiness and dissatisfaction.

MPP4-607 ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZED THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE SELF

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.68.

The virtue of the Aristotelian approach to business ethics, I have argued, is its focus on the character of the individual and not just on impersonal policies and abstract principles and theories. A related virtue, however, points us in just the opposite direction, toward the enlargement of the self as a thoroughly social self and not an isolated Hobbesian or Lockean self whose place in society is up for negotiation. The Aristotelian approach must be understood in terms of a certain concept of self, an expanded self that is constituted by and identifies itself with the larger community or society.

MPP4-608 ARISTOTELIANISM REPUDIATES RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.68-9.

Of particular interest here is a mixed set of emotions that, with the rise of radical individualism and the loss of a sense of Aristotelian virtue, the emphasis on policies and principles and the neglect of the person, has all but dropped out of business ethics. They include loyalty, honor, and a sense of shame. (Guilt is quite different from shame and is not part of the set.) All three emotions tie into the central notion of integrity, the first two by way of definition, the latter in the breach.

MPP4-609 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS PLACE PEOPLE BEFORE PROFIT

Robert Solomon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.73.

Humanitas is ultimately not a subject matter but a certain attitude toward life, an attitude of "humanity" and a broad perspective in which it is the whole of life that comes into focus, not just the office problem of the moment, in which the whole of community and even the whole of humanity is within our scope, not just the boardroom or the stock report or one's immediate superiors and subordinates. It is, in other words, just that larger sense of self that Aristotle talked about so long ago. The Aristotelian approach to business ethics is, ultimately, just another way of saying that people come before profits, and before a great deal of what is often called ethics, too.

MPP4-610 ARISTOTELIAN BUSINESS ETHICS WOULD STRESS THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY

Patricia Werhane, University of Virginia, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.99.

Solomon presents a model for approaching business ethics, a model derived from Aristotle, Smith, and Mill, rather than from Kant, Nozick, and Rawls. This model emphasizes the personal dimension of business ethics: the cultivation of excellence in moral character. In brief, Solomon's framework positions what he calls the social self, with its civic virtues of loyalty, honor, and shame, against six Aristotelian ingredients for business ethics: community, excellence, public identity, holism, nobility, and judgment. The aim of the model, its "bottom line," is the common good: the well-being of society.

MPP4-611 THE ARISTOTELIAN PERSPECTIVE REJECTS PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

Robert Almeder, *BUSINESS ETHICS: CORPORATE VALUES AND SOCIETY*, Milton Snoeyenbos, et al., eds., 1983, p.91.

In the long run, of course, corporate and individual willingness to do what is clearly immoral for the sake of monetary gain is a patent commitment to a certain view about the nature of human happiness and success, a view that needs to be placed in the balance with Aristotle's reasoned argument and reflections to the effect that money and all that it brings is a means to an end, and not the sort of end in itself that will justify acting immorally to attain it. What that beautiful end is and why being moral allows us to achieve it, may well be the most rewarding and profitable subject a human being can think about. Properly understood and placed in perspective, Aristotle's view on the nature and attainment of human happiness could go a long way toward alleviating the temptation to kill for money.

MPP4-612 MORAL VIRTUE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR MAKING BUSINESS DECISIONS

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.77-8.

Solomon prefers virtue talk to anything that admits of calculation. Virtue talk is indeed often appropriate in discussing the sort of issue that most individuals face in most organizations, and utilitarianism and justice, for example, are more useful in the discussion of public policy issues. Nonetheless, students who will be managers making more than seventy-five thousand dollars a year need some guidance on how to deal with external stakeholders who speak in many voices. What Solomon thinks will help them is phronesis, or practical wisdom. Sharpening our students' phronesis, which Aristotle regards as a necessary and sufficient condition of virtue but not identical with it, is part of the point of giving them case studies. The doctrine of phronesis is today often invoked to adjudicate among incommensurable ways of calculation or incompatible systems of rules; so, for example, Bernstein. But the first intention of the doctrine is not to minimize the importance of calculation or rules; on the contrary, it includes calculation, and universals as well as particulars are within its ken. The emphasis is on the necessary role of intelligence in guiding virtuous action. If it is true that virtue generates good corporate and social policy, as Solomon claims, it can only be because virtue includes intellectual virtues such as phronesis as well as moral virtues. Aristotle would never claim that managers (or others, for that matter) should love virtue and do as they please.

MPP4-613 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS OFFER LITTLE PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.78.

Just mentioning phronesis does not, in any case, solve any actual moral questions. There is a great deal in Aristotle's ethics about what is involved in being a good person, but not much that helps guide action given that one is or wants to be good. One thinks of the turn-of-the-century Oxford satirical piece entitled "Aristotle on Golf": "For the good golfer is he who hits the ball truly and well and as the professional would hit."

MPP4-614 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS ARE OVERLY PAROCHIAL

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.79.

Aristotle's great strength, as well as his great weakness, is his confidence about what is natural. Although he seldom claims to find rules that sharply circumscribe anything, including moral behavior, he does believe in nature as a constant and in its categories as fixed and external to our minds and our purposes in a way in which many philosophers nowadays do not. He thinks man is an animal whose nature it is to live in a polis, to which we might respond, "That's right: in a community." There is, however, good reason to think he means a polis, not just any old community; he is that parochial. This is after all the philosopher who claims that the great-souled man, the one who cares about honor above all else, has a dignified gait and speaks in a bass voice.

MPP4-615 ARISTOTLE UPHELD SLAVERY

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.79.

This is also a philosopher who countenances slavery. We should now recall that brilliant passage in *Huckleberry Finn* in which Huck wrestles with his conscience, which tells him not to assist the runaway slave Jim in his escape. "After all, what has Jim's owner ever done to Huck to make him treat her so mean?" He gives in finally to his moral weakness because he isn't man enough to obey the clear promptings of his better self, in part because he lacks the appropriate moral education. It is not clear that Aristotle would see the irony.

MPP4-616 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ARE OVERLY NARROW

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.79.

For Aristotle the paradigm of what is natural--virtually synonymous with essential--cannot be otherwise, but Aristotle extends the concept beyond its paradigm case and calls natural what can in fact be otherwise, although with more self-consciousness than later philosophers have shown in taking as analytic what can be otherwise. Aristotle takes the borderline between essence (which he sometimes calls nature) and accident to be possibly fuzzy but not changeable, and very important. That position makes a great deal of sense in morality: for example, we see a fuzzy line between a dolphin's soul and that of a profoundly retarded human, but we honor that line and do not suppose we can readily move it or cross it. It matters to Aristotle and to us that humans are by nature rational, even if this human is not. But on ethical issues Aristotle shows his narrowness when he gives the strong impression that, while the Athenian gentleman may not be the only person who is in any way virtuous, no one who is very unlike the Athenian gentleman could be virtuous.

MPP4-617 ARISTOTLE DOESN'T SUCCESSFULLY LINK HAPPINESS AND MORALITY

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.79-80.

Aristotle takes virtue itself to be natural, and rationality, too. Solomon adds some reasons for linking nature, happiness, community, and morality. But the conceptual connections--no community without morality, and not even a linguistic community without rationality--leave more leeway for irrational behavior than Aristotle admits in his discussion of weakness of will and are consistent with bad behavior in one's own interests within a community. Pace Aristotle, one can be vicious and happy; and it may be in one's best interests to be selfish. What is impossible is that this should be the case generally. Of course sympathy is not necessarily an artificial state; of course the economists' standard talk about rational egoism is wrong or trivially right. It is a great mistake, however, to underestimate the extent to which businesspeople in particular live happily as players in a game that is at best zero-sum--if that is a permissible use of game theory language.

MPP4-618 ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF THE MEAN IS OVERLY QUANTITATIVE

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.82.

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, which is meant to include fairness, has the same problems. He seems confident about his doctrine as an action-guiding device, in spite of his recognition of exceptions and his warning that the circumstances have a bearing on the appropriateness of an action. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of Book V of *Ethica Nicomachea* exhibit in their calculative talk of proportion and justice some of the worst features of Bentham and Richard Posner and not much understanding of the problems with the concept of fairness. Aristotle does concede that context is important and that *phronesis* is not calculation alone, but he goes further in quantifying virtue than would most utilitarians.

MPP4-619 ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES ASSUME A COMMON COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.82-3.

Aristotle's definitions of the virtues as means between extremes presuppose and are meaningful within a community in which each person shares views of virtues and vices—for example, cowardice and foolhardiness—sufficiently to be able to gain some further understanding from seeing how they stand with respect to each other. It is as though the community members all speak the same language, or at any rate enough to permit conversation. In such a case there is agreement about the references of common words, and you can enlighten people by defining some terms by the use of others. If, however, you are outside the linguistic/moral community that shares certain conceptions of cowardice and foolhardiness, you will not learn much about courage just from being told that it is the mean between those other two. There are no common reference points from which to triangulate.

MPP4-620 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ARE AS RULE DEPENDENT AS OTHER SYSTEMS

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.83.

In this respect the mean is similar to the categorical imperative, the hedonic calculus, the veil of ignorance, and other devices intended to enable us to calculate what is the good thing to do. Aristotle differs from, say, Kant in his ready admission that one needs *phronesis* to use the device correctly, but he patently does not hold that if you are *phronimos* you do not need the device at all—still less that principles are not significant in ethics. We do need something other than calculation to apply Aristotle's and Kant's and Bentham's and Rawls's rules and devices usefully; why is this a point to Aristotle? He is just a bit more modest than the others.

MPP4-621 ARISTOTLE FAILS TO RECOGNIZE MORAL CONFLICT

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.83.

It is not a point to Aristotle that he fails to see his doctrine as a way of dealing with moral conflict, because he does not see moral conflict as a problem. If you believe that moral behavior is natural, as Aristotle does, then you may have difficulty in giving an account of tragedy—that is, conflict between virtuous or at least conscientious people whose conceptions of duty clash. Aristotle's way with tragedy is to take it as a sign that somebody has made a mistake. How could two gentlemen disagree on a serious matter of duty? No stakeholder-sensitive manager would take that position, which simply ignores the possibility that noble and loyal people might differ in part precisely because they are so noble and loyal. In fact, stakeholder-sensitive managers will experience the clash within themselves.

MPP4-622 ARISTOTLE CAN'T EFFECTIVELY DISTINGUISH GOOD FROM BAD COMMUNITIES

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.83.

Utility and other devices promise to deal with the problem from a standpoint free of the values associated with any particular community. According to crude utilitarianism, you add up the points to determine which side is right; according to Rawls, you conduct a certain kind of thought experiment. There is reason to believe that these devices do not solve the problem. But Aristotle not only does not solve the problem; he does not see it. All of this suggests what we would not like to have to conclude—that communities themselves must be beyond any possible moral judgment. How, in the absence of any community-neutral moral device, do we distinguish good communities from bad ones?

MPP4-623 ARISTOTLE NEEDS TO BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH OTHER MORAL PERSPECTIVES

Edward Hartman, Rutgers University, *BUSINESS AS A HUMANITY*, Thomas Donaldson and R. Edward Freeman, eds., 1994, p.85.

It does not follow, however, that Kant and Rawls have no useful suggestions to make about what morality would look like in nearly any community. If we were to find a community in which the word usually translated "moral" had in its application to people and acts nothing to do with human fairness or rights or anything we could imagine as happiness, then we would have good reason to question the usual translation. I do not believe the doctrine of the mean is as essential to morality as are fairness, rights, and happiness. None of this implies that we should embrace Kant and Rawls and reject Aristotle. All three have a great deal to teach us about morality. One thing they collectively teach us is that morality is far too rich and complex to admit of only one approach.